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The Tax and Transfer Policy Institute (TTPI) was established 
at Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National 
University, with the mission to undertake independent 
research and policy analysis relevant to the Australian 
tax and transfer system. The TTPI aims to carry out and 
support independent research and policy development in 
taxes and transfers at a national, State and local level, in 
regional and global context. The establishment of the TTPI 
implemented Recommendation 134 of the Henry Review 
(Henry 2010a).
TTPI pursues the following strategies to support excellent 
research for tax and transfer policy for public benefit:
 > Building postgraduate, doctoral and postdoctoral 
research positions in all disciplines relevant to tax and 
transfer policy;
 > Forming partnerships with other universities in Australia 
and throughout the world to harness the best expertise 
on taxes and transfers;
 > Publishing research and policy analysis widely in both 
academic and public forums to inform, enhance and 
influence public knowledge and debate about taxes and 
transfers.
 > Engaging with government agencies to learn about policy 
concerns and to build researcher access to data on taxes 
and transfers for evidence-based policy, including through 
secondments and exchanges between academic, 
government and private sector.
 > Holding public and invitational events on tax and transfer 
policy to inform, engage and influence policymakers, 
stakeholders and the public and to further academic 
research.
 > Establishing a network of fellows across relevant 
academic disciplines including public finance, economics, 
law, accounting, political science, psychology, governance 
and philosophy.
TTPI does not exist to offer a single perspective on tax 
and transfer policy. Rather, it aims to foster a richness and 
diversity in tax and transfer policy research in Australia 
and internationally for the short and long term, exploring 
issues and solutions to the critical tax and transfer policy 
challenges facing governments over the next few decades. 
T H E  T A X  A N D  T R A N S F E R  
P O L I C Y  I N S T I T U T E
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Tax reform is in the news daily. Calls for fundamental 
reform have become louder, but there are diverse views 
on the direction and scope of the reform that is needed. 
The Liberal/National Coalition Government has committed 
to a White Paper process on Tax Reform, which the 
Government has indicated will commence with the release 
of a discussion paper designed to prompt a national 
conversation about tax reform. The Government has 
also commenced a White Paper process for reform of 
the federation (DPMC 2014; 2015), which is examining 
the distribution of responsibilities between State and 
Commonwealth governments, with implications for federal 
financial relations, including taxation. 
But what is tax reform? What needs fixing in Australia’s tax 
system, why, and what can and should be done? Hotly 
debated issues range from whether to broaden the base or 
increase the rate of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), to 
how we can properly tax multinational corporations. There 
is debate about whether superannuation tax concessions 
are fair; the impact of tax on housing; and many other 
issues ranging from the complexity of tax rules for small 
business to the volatility of stamp duty revenues.
Five years ago, the Henry Review (Report on Australia’s 
Future Tax System, Henry 2010a) made a detailed 
examination of Australia’s tax and transfer system. To place 
the myriad of tax issues, proposals and debates in context, 
this TTPI report provides a stocktake of the tax system five 
years after the Henry Review. Tax reform is fundamentally 
political. Rather than recommending specific reforms, we 
aim to identify key principles and directions for tax reform 
and to show what we know, and where the gaps are in our 
knowledge of tax policy. 
This TTPI report:
 > reviews the economic and social challenges which the 
Henry Review identified and identifies new ones which 
have come to the fore in the last five years;
 > provides an overview of the tax and transfer system and 
changes since the Henry Review, including comparisons 
with selected countries; 
 > identifies principles for analysis and discusses some of 
the broad choices and trade-offs that will need to be 
considered in any reform;
 > assesses the extent to which the Henry Review continues 
to provide a basis for considering the direction of tax and 
transfer system reform; and
 > identifies areas that warrant further consideration and 
research.
Principles of tax reform
Taxation is our primary mechanism for funding government. 
The transfer (or social security) system is our primary tool 
for redistribution to those who are in need. The tax system 
must deliver sufficient revenue for governments to achieve 
service delivery and policy development, including adequate 
levels of transfers or social security, in line with expectations 
of the Australian people. Since federation, the Australian 
community has made broad choices about the desired level 
of government expenditures, redistribution and taxes based 
on the history of our government and economy, community 
values and the political contest of ideas. 
Tax reform should aim to support sustainable and inclusive 
economic prosperity through improving efficiency, promoting 
fairness in an overall progressive tax-transfer system and 
building resilience in the tax system in the face of economic, 
social and technological challenges. As recommended 
by the Henry Review, Australia needs a broad based tax 
system that raises adequate revenues from personal and 
business income, economic rents from resources and 
land, and private consumption. Tax reform should aim to 
strengthen the tax system across all of these bases.
Taxes and transfers affect the behaviour of individuals and 
businesses. Economic theory and modelling of tax efficiency 
and the incidence of the tax burden is difficult and relies on 
many assumptions. However, it is an important input to tax 
policy decisions that aim to support economic prosperity 
by reducing distortions in individual and business decision 
making, especially where capital or labour is mobile or tax 
planning margins exist.
Fairness is critical to the system to ensure appropriate 
contributions from those with capacity to pay, to enable 
redistribution to those in need through the transfer system, 
and to support essential government goods and services 
for the wellbeing of all Australians. Fairness should be 
considered across the tax and transfer system, and 
government as a whole. The principle of ability to pay remains 
important in delivering progressivity in the tax system.
The concept of resilience of the tax and transfer system 
aims to capture a range of important goals relating to 
the effectiveness and adaptability of the system as it 
operates in the real world. Goals for a more resilient tax 
and transfer system include simplicity, sustainability, 
certainty, cohesiveness, legitimacy, ease and low costs of 
administration and compliance, flexibility and resistance to 
tax avoidance and evasion.
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Much of the recent commentary and analysis about reform 
of the Australian tax system has focused selectively on 
‘priority’ areas for reform. The Henry Review addressed the 
overall Australian tax system including Commonwealth, State 
and local taxes and sought to take into account interactions 
between different taxes and in the tax and transfer system. 
It then identified a broad set of taxation arrangements to 
position Australia for dealing with the social, economic and 
environmental challenges for the next forty years. 
There is much we do not know about the effects of the 
tax-transfer system. In particular, new empirical research 
into responses to the tax system and the effects of 
administrative and compliance mechanisms can give 
us new insights into how to design a resilient system. 
Significant research and policy analysis is needed on future 
options for tax reform.
Challenges for the tax system
The Henry Review identified six challenges and opportunities 
for designing a future tax and transfer system for Australia. 
These were: demographic change; the social context and 
expectations; the environment; increased factor mobility; 
addressing system weaknesses; and growth in Asia. 
The following challenges have come to the fore in the last 
five years to form the context for tax reform today. These 
build on those identified by the Henry Review:
1. the effect of the mining investment boom as it declines, 
including the decline in the rate of economic growth, 
effects on revenue and structural changes in the Australian 
economy;
2. demographic changes especially population ageing and 
changing patterns of work, family and care;
3. Australia’s lagging productivity performance;
4. concerns about fairness and inequality;
5. the digital global economy including new multinational 
business models; and
6. environmental challenges and climate change impacts.
The current state of the tax-transfer system
The Commonwealth Government levies income tax and 
GST exclusively, as well as petroleum and gas resource 
rent taxation, customs and excise. State and Territory 
governments levy land tax, payroll tax, stamp duties, 
gambling taxes and some other levies exclusively and 
also receive royalties from mineral resources extracted 
from within their jurisdiction. Local governments levy 
property rates. Australia’s total tax burden across all levels 
of government in 2012 was 27.3 per cent of GDP. This 
was below the OECD average of 33.7 per cent and below 
Canada (44 per cent) and New Zealand (33 per cent). 
Australia’s tax level has declined in recent years. 
The Commonwealth Government raises around 80 per cent 
of all tax revenues. There is a significant disparity between the 
broad governing responsibilities of States, and their limited 
tax revenues, termed vertical fiscal imbalance. This is a key 
issue for the government’s White Paper on reform of the 
federation, which must be taken into account in tax reform.
Australia relies less on consumption taxes than many 
other countries, especially in Europe. Australia collects 
proportionately less revenue than other countries 
including New Zealand and Canada, from a broad-based 
consumption tax such as the GST.
The Intergovernmental Agreement that allocates GST to the 
States and Territories requires any reform to the GST rate or 
base to be unanimously agreed between the Commonwealth 
and all State and Territory Governments. It has proved to be 
quite stable in its 15 years of operation. It is unlikely that the 
Commonwealth would proceed with any significant change 
without the agreement of all States and Territories.
The personal tax-transfer system is Australia’s main tool for 
redistribution of incomes. Tight targeting of transfers means 
Australia is the fifth lowest spender relative to other OECD 
countries and spends less than both Canada and New 
Zealand on the transfer system. 
Government spending may be undertaken through 
targeted concessions or subsidies in the tax law, called tax 
expenditures. We cannot get a full picture of government 
taxing and spending without taking account of tax 
expenditures. The largest tax expenditures in the personal 
income tax relate to superannuation and other forms of 
savings and investment. In the GST, tax expenditures 
include the exemptions for food, education and health. 
Broadening the tax base often requires removing or 
reducing some tax expenditures. 
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Personal income tax, transfers and saving
Personal income tax comprises about 40 per cent of all 
tax revenues and close to half of Commonwealth taxation. 
It is Australia’s largest single source of tax revenue. Our 
reliance on personal income tax is similar to New Zealand 
and Canada. Australian personal income tax revenues have 
declined as a share of GDP because of cuts in average tax 
rates over the last 2 decades. Fiscal drag, or bracket creep, 
will cause average tax rates to rise again in the future, unless 
changes are made to rates or thresholds.
The highly targeted nature of Australia’s transfer system 
including income and asset testing produces high effective 
marginal tax rates for many who receive support. This 
reduces the incentive and economic return to paid work, 
lowering workforce participation especially for women 
caring for young children. The combined effect of personal 
income tax and transfers on work incentives and on fairness 
must be taken into account in any reform of either system. 
The economic return from increased women’s workforce 
participation supports a tax reform direction that would 
increase support for childcare and reduce effective marginal 
tax rates on low and moderate wage earners.
There are gaps and complexity in the personal income tax 
base. There is scope to broaden this base, especially in 
relation to savings and investment, and deductions related 
to work and saving. Broadening of the personal tax base 
would strengthen revenue collection and could enable 
a reduction in tax rates on work and business income 
if desired. Lower marginal tax rates on low and middle 
income earners could improve incentives to work and do 
productive investment. The Henry Review recommendations 
to tax saving more consistently under a 40 per cent savings 
discount and to restructure superannuation tax concessions 
can provide a significant direction for reform.
The personal income tax could also be made more resilient 
by simplifying the legal design. This could reduce planning 
boundaries in respect of expenses, legal entities and 
forms of investment as well as reducing administrative and 
compliance costs. 
Company tax
Australia’s company tax is an important element in 
Australia’s tax mix. Australia raises substantially more 
revenue than many other countries in company tax (around 
5 per cent of GDP, or 17 per cent of all tax revenues). 
The Australian statutory company tax rate is 30 per cent and 
the effective tax rate for Australian companies is close to that 
rate, although it may vary across industries and sectors. The 
company tax has a fairly broad base with few exemptions 
and concessions. Australian nominal and effective company 
tax rates are higher than the OECD average and than Canada 
and New Zealand. 
Economic modelling of the company tax in a global 
economy suggests that it deters foreign investment and is 
borne in the long run substantially by Australian workers 
or consumers. A reform implication of this modelling is 
that a lower company tax rate would lead to increased 
national wellbeing. However, the ideal level of taxation on 
companies, or capital more generally, is debatable. 
The specific benefits of lowering the company tax rate are 
extremely difficult to test. Australia’s company tax collects 
revenues from economic rents, including from the resource 
industry, and is an important backstop to the personal 
income tax. The corporate-shareholder imputation system 
provides an incentive for Australian companies to pay 
company tax but also may deliver an excessive return to 
shareholders. A lower company tax rate would increase tax 
and planning margins for the personal income tax.
Company tax rules are complex for all sizes of business. 
Multinational enterprises carry out sophisticated global tax 
planning that may reduce their Australian and global tax 
rates to zero or close to it. The OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, and Australia domestically, are 
taking some steps to increase country cooperation to prevent 
base erosion. It is not clear how successful country efforts at 
coordination will be in protecting the company tax base. As 
indicated by the Henry Review, further research is needed 
into the best approach to company tax for Australia for large 
and small business in future.
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GST and payroll tax
State and Territory governments have broad power to 
tax but raise only about 18 per cent of total tax revenue. 
Together, the GST and paroll tax are the most important 
taxes for the States. The GST raises about 13 per cent of 
total tax revenue. 
GST is provided to the States and Territories under a horizontal 
fiscal equalisation formula. This means that GST is shared 
across States and Territories on a basis aiming to equalize 
their revenue and spending capabilities. There is dispute about 
whether the current formula achieves the correct balance. 
The GST is Australia’s only broad-based tax on consumption. 
It applies at a flat 10 per cent rate on a wide range of goods 
and services but taxes less than half of consumption, as 
exemptions or input-taxed elements make up more than 
half of the GST base. The GST rate is lower in Australia than 
in many comparable countries. The Henry Review was not 
able to examine GST reform specifically. However, trends in 
other countries have been to raise the rate and to reduce 
exemptions in the base, to the extent possible.
The payroll tax is a tax on the wages paid by businesses. 
If comprehensive, a payroll tax is equivalent to a tax 
on wages. Australia’s State and Territory payroll taxes 
have various thresholds and exemptions that introduce 
distortions for business decisions and make it less 
efficient than otherwise. The Henry Review recommended 
broadening the payroll tax on wages, or that it be replaced 
by a cashflow business tax, perhaps also replacing the GST.
Property and insurance taxes
Australia raises about 3 per cent of GDP in taxes on 
property, a lower proportion than many comparable 
countries. Land taxes and council rates are the most 
efficient taxes, according to economic models. Land taxes 
are primarily levied by the States and Territories, but are 
designed less efficiently than they could be. 
Most States and Territories rely significantly on stamp duties 
on property conveyancing and insurance. These are easy 
to collect but revenues are volatile. They are considered 
among the least efficient taxes as they deter individuals 
from moving as their personal circumstances change and 
encourage under-insurance. Reform is challenging politically 
and in terms of the potential impact on housing markets; a 
long term transition may be required.
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C H A P T E R  1  I N T R O D U C T I O N
M A I N  P O I N T S 
 > The Henry Review, published in 2010, was the first 
major review of Australia’s tax and transfer system 
since 1975. Its framework, analysis and findings can 
contribute significantly to good tax reform.
 > Tax reform should aim to support sustainable and 
inclusive economic prosperity through efficiency; 
promote fairness in an overall progressive 
tax-transfer system and build resilience in the 
tax system in the face of economic, social and 
technological challenges.
 > As recommended by the Henry Review, Australia 
needs a broad-based tax system that raises 
adequate revenues from personal and business 
income, economic rents from resources and land, 
and private consumption. Tax reform should aim to 
strengthen the tax system across all of these bases 
in the long term.
 > Economic modelling of tax efficiency and the 
incidence of the tax burden is difficult and relies on 
many assumptions. However, it is a useful input to 
tax policy decisions that aim to support economic 
prosperity by reducing distortions in individual and 
business decision making, especially where capital 
or labour is mobile or tax planning margins exist.
 > Fairness is critical to the system to ensure 
appropriate contributions from those with capacity 
to pay, to enable redistribution to those in need 
through the transfer system and to support 
essential government goods and services for the 
wellbeing of all Australians. Fairness should be 
considered across the system as a whole. The 
principle of ability to pay remains important in 
delivering progressivity in the tax system.
 > The concept of resilience of the tax and transfer 
system captures a range of important goals relating 
to the effectiveness and adaptability of the system as 
it operates in the real world. Goals for a more resilient 
tax-transfer system include simplicity, sustainability, 
certainty, cohesiveness, legitimacy, ease and low 
costs of administration and compliance, flexibility 
and resistance to tax avoidance and evasion. 
1.1 Tax principles
This chapter discusses the history and context of the Henry 
Review and then explains key concepts and principles of 
tax policy that are essential to understanding and engaging 
in the tax reform debate. 
The Henry Review discussed various principles of taxation 
in detail in its Architecture Report (Henry et al 2008a) 
and Consultation Report (Henry et al 2008b). In the final 
analysis, the Henry Review identified five tax and transfer 
design principles (Henry et al 2010a, Box 2.1):
 > Equity
 > Efficiency
 > Simplicity
 > Sustainability
 > Policy consistency.
The first three principles are traditional tax policy and design 
principles. The latter two principles reflect a focus in the 
Henry Review on revenue and environmental sustainability 
and coherence of the tax-transfer system with overall 
government policy. 
In this report, we follow the Henry Review in using the 
principles of efficiency (to contribute to economic prosperity) 
and fairness (equity). In place of simplicity, sustainability and 
policy consistency we use the single concept of resilience to 
indicate a tax system able to operate effectively in the face 
of social, technological and economic challenges. Each of 
these principles is discussed below.
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It is important to view tax and transfer laws and reforms 
in the context of the system as a whole. Sometimes tax 
principles are mutually reinforcing. Often, the principles 
seem to be in conflict. In any real-world tax system, all 
tax policy and reform decisions will have trade-offs and 
consequences for the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
However, taking a broader view of the goals of economic 
prosperity, fairness or resilience for the system as a whole 
can assist in resolving conflicts in these tax principles. 
1.2 The Henry Review
The Henry Review was the first ‘root and branch’ review of 
Australia’s tax and transfer system in more than 30 years. 
The Review was system-wide in scope and long-term in 
vision, presenting an ambitious blueprint that identifies 
a range of reform directions. It was intentionally framed 
in terms of a 40-year vision aimed at identifying reform 
pathways for emerging medium and long-term challenges 
facing Australia.
The last comprehensive reviews of Australia’s tax and 
transfer system were completed in 1975. The Asprey 
Review (Asprey et al 1975) examined the tax system and 
the Henderson Review (Henderson et al 1975) examined 
the social security system. The Asprey Review set a reform 
framework with the central objective of broadening the 
tax base and lowering tax rates; this was progressively 
achieved in successive reform packages over ensuing 
decades. These goals continue to be relevant in current 
debates about tax reform.
Changes to the tax system following the Asprey Review 
took place through a number of policy analysis and political 
reform processes. The Draft White Paper (Commonwealth 
of Australia 1985) led to the introduction of Fringe 
Benefits Tax (FBT), Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and the 
corporate-shareholder dividend imputation system while 
reducing personal and company tax rates. Numerous 
tax and retirement system reforms established our 
superannuation system and associated tax concessions 
during the 1980s and 1990s. A New Tax System 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1998) introduced the GST, 
eliminated many inefficient indirect taxes including the 
wholesale sales tax, and reduced income tax rates. The 
Review of Business Taxation (Commonwealth of Australia 
1999) led to a reduction in the company tax rate, broadening 
of the company tax base and lower tax on savings, including 
the introduction of the CGT 50 percent discount. 
The Henry Review had a breadth of expertise on its Panel 
drawn from the public sector, academia and business. 
It engaged both the community and tax experts through 
an extensive process of consultation which attracted 
more than a thousand public submissions and carried out 
significant research and economic modelling, releasing 
several preliminary papers and convening an international 
academic and policy conference.1 Some other countries 
conducted substantial tax reviews at the same time, 
including the Mirrlees Review (Institute for Fiscal Studies 
2011) in the United Kingdom and the Tax Working Group 
(2010) in New Zealand. 
The guiding principles and motivations for the Henry Review 
were set out in its Preface (2010a, v-vi). Its underlying 
premise was that economic, social, technological and 
environmental changes would profoundly affect Australia’s 
tax and transfer system but that these changes would evolve 
slowly. The Review did not conclude that the tax and transfer 
system was broken or in crisis, but it recommended that early 
consideration of challenges and reforms is needed in order to 
position Australia’s tax and transfer system for the future. 
In spite of its broad remit, there were limitations in the Henry 
Review’s terms of reference that hampered its ability to 
comprehensively examine tax policy settings. The two most 
significant limitations were exclusion from consideration of 
the GST rate and base and the treatment of tax-exempt 
superannuation benefits (although the Review addressed 
taxation of superannuation contributions and earnings). The 
Review did examine the role of a consumption tax base in 
Australia’s tax system, suggesting a business cash flow tax 
as a direction for reform. However, there is no doubt that 
exclusions from its terms of reference influenced the final 
form of the Henry Review’s recommendations. 
The Review examined Commonwealth, State and local 
taxes in the federation and it identified the need for 
intergovernmental agreement in a federal context as 
necessary for reform of Australia’s tax system. However, the 
Review did not consider a reform of the federation including 
State and Commonwealth roles and responsibilities, tax 
allocation, grants and expenditures. If it is to contribute to 
sustainable tax and transfer reform, the analysis of taxes 
must be embedded in a fuller understanding of how we fund 
governments in our federation, while any federation reform 
necessarily requires analysis of taxes.
1 The Henry Review presented an Architecture Report Consultation Papers 
 on the Tax System and Retirement Income, a Report on Strategic Issues 
 in the Retirement Income System and a Final Report Part 1 (Overview)  
 and two volume Detailed Analysis, released on 2 May 2010. All reports  
 and research papers are available at www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au.
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The Review produced a list of 138 Recommendations 
(see the Appendix), some of which are specific and others 
general. Most of the reforms proposed by the Henry Review 
were intended to be considered in a holistic way with other 
recommendations rather than separately, and as guidance 
for future tax policy and law development rather than as 
a discrete package of tax reforms. Around a third of the 
Recommendations have been implemented by governments 
in the last 5 years. However, no coherent package of reform 
has been based on the Review and previous attempts to 
enact some of the more important recommendations have 
led to significant missteps in tax policy and law design and 
implementation, especially in relation to the Minerals Rent 
Resource Tax (MRRT). Proposed reforms to State taxes 
have scarcely been addressed, except in the ACT. 
1.3 Tax bases and tax incidence
The Henry Review offered a detailed explanation of tax 
principles, concepts and bases in its various reports. We 
briefly discuss the most important concepts that provide a 
framework for thinking about alternative tax systems and 
tax reform. 
Tax bases
The Henry Review adopted a framework of the economic 
factors of production, labour, capital and land as the 
foundations of three tax bases of income, consumption 
and wealth. In general, production taxes levied on income 
or taxes on wealth are direct taxes levied directly on the 
taxpayer who derives the income from one of these factors 
of production. Consumption taxes are today levied mostly as 
indirect taxes on the suppliers of goods or services (such as 
the GST or excises) rather than on the ultimate consumer. 
The Henry Review made the following fundamental 
recommendation about tax bases, which remains centrally 
important today:
This recommendation acknowledges that to be effective, a 
tax system must likely use all substantial bases, rather than 
relying on any one ‘ideal’ base. Reform proposals to change 
the tax mix usually aim to shift the balance between these tax 
bases, especially between income, consumption and land. 
However, it is useful to consider tax policy in light of two well-
established ‘ideal’ approaches to defining tax bases as this 
can provide a benchmark for analysing the current system.
An ‘ideal’ income tax base is the comprehensive income 
tax. The comprehensive income tax applies to net economic 
gain, adjusted for inflation, derived by an individual taxpayer 
in a period of time. Income defined comprehensively includes 
all real, accrued gains from work or investment, net of 
losses or expenses. Comprehensive income is equivalent to 
consumption plus the change in net wealth of an individual in 
the period.2 In the real world, income taxes do not succeed 
in taxing all net economic gain of an individual for various 
reasons. In particular, they usually only apply to realized gain, 
gain derived when an asset is sold or income is earned, and 
rarely adjust fully for inflation or capture all forms of return. 
An ‘ideal’ consumption tax, sometimes known as an 
‘expenditure tax’, would tax all expenditures of an individual in 
a period of time and would exempt savings and investment. 
Savings are assumed to be deferred consumption and 
so would not be taxed until actually consumed. Thus, the 
expenditure tax base excludes the change in net wealth and 
under certain restrictive conditions it is equivalent to a tax on 
labour income. The longstanding practice of exempting the 
home from the income tax, zero or lower taxation of capital 
gains and low taxed superannuation means that Australia’s 
personal income tax is a hybrid that has characteristics of a 
expenditure tax (see discussion in Chapter 4).
2 It is sometimes called the Schanz-Haig-Simons income tax base in  
 honour of the economists who invented it, most famously Simons (1938).
Recommendation 1 (Henry et al 2010a)
Revenue raising should be concentrated on four 
robust and efficient broad-based taxes:
 > personal income, assessed on a more 
comprehensive base;
 > business income, designed to support economic 
growth;
 > economic rents from natural resources and land; 
and
 > private consumption.
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Tax incidence
Public perceptions of tax incidence may differ from economic 
or legal incidence, while alternative academic views about 
the relative merits of taxation reform proposals often reflect 
a different understanding of where the burden of taxation 
actually falls (Henry et al 2010a, 19). All taxes ultimately fall 
on the returns to individuals as owners of the three factors 
of production of labour, capital and land (Henry et al 2008a, 
Appendix B). That is, all taxes are borne by people, whether 
as workers, investors or consumers. 
For instance, company tax is not borne by the company 
but is ultimately borne by individuals who may be investors 
through a reduction in the return to capital, or consumers or 
workers through a shifting of the burden in prices or wages. 
The extent of tax shifting through prices or wages may vary. 
The question of who bears the incidence, or real financial 
burden, of taxation is a difficult and debated area of tax 
policy analysis that requires complex whole-of-economy 
modeling. Tax shifting is a consequence of the impact 
of taxes on prices and factor returns and of individuals’ 
decisions. The responsiveness of prices and factor returns, 
such as the economic return earned by working, is known 
as the price elasticity of the good, service or factor. This 
depends on a range of factors including:
 > the extent of market competition and the existence of 
economic rents (returns above a ‘normal’ rate of return 
taking into account inflation and a risk premium);
 > mobility of factors of production, principally capital but also 
labour;
 > substitutability of products, and of labour for capital (and 
vice versa); and
 > size of the domestic economy and its degree of openness 
(Rimmer et al 2014, 35).
To take another example, the GST levied on the producers 
and retailers of goods is borne by the ultimate consumer 
through being passed on in prices. However, in some 
circumstances, the GST may not be fully passed on to the 
consumer. For example, the burden of GST may fall instead 
on an individual business owner if the market for a product is 
not fully competitive. 
In spite of the complexity and difficulty of tax incidence 
analysis, it is useful to try to model tax incidence to help 
understand the economic and distributional impact of a 
tax change. The estimated tax incidence may also help in 
assessing arguments for compensating particular groups 
who might be affected by tax reform. 
1.4 Efficiency to support 
economic prosperity
Tax reform should aim to support sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth through improving efficiency, to ensure 
economic prosperity for all. While taxation clearly delivers 
benefits to society through government goods and services 
and redistribution, it also imposes economic costs.  
To support economic growth, the tax system should be 
as efficient as possible. Economists define an efficient tax 
system as one that meets revenue needs while minimising 
the distorting effects of taxes on private decisions to work, 
save, consume and invest. 
In some circumstances the distorting effects of taxes can be 
utilised by governments to improve societal outcomes using 
selective taxes or tax expenditures. Taxes may be used to 
correct market distortions or to regulate behaviour. 
For example, the substantial tax concessions for voluntary 
superannuation saving are intended to encourage 
individuals who have sufficient income to save as much as 
possible in superannuation. The research and development 
tax offset available for companies is intended to address 
a market failure that leads to underinvestment in research 
and development, by improving the returns to companies 
which engage in research and development activities. 
Selective taxes or tax expenditures may also generate 
economic costs and may have unintended consequences 
and reduce revenue-raising overall.
Optimal tax design
One important theoretical approach to modeling economic 
efficiency of taxes is called ‘optimal tax design’ (see Abelson 
2008, 416). It aims to inform policy-makers about how taxes 
and transfers can best be designed to minimise negative 
effects on economic growth, accepting that almost all taxes 
distort economic behaviour in one way or another. 
In the case of businesses, taxation can alter decisions 
about how businesses are structured; how much they 
invest and where; how many people they employ and what 
they produce. For individuals, the tax system can alter the 
choice of investment, work and saving in ways that are less 
productive for the economy as a whole (see, e.g. Heferen 
(2012)). The greater the size of these taxation-induced 
behavioural changes or distortions, the more the tax system 
detracts from overall economic efficiency. This distortion 
can be at a point in time when a tax is paid, or it may affect 
future behaviour and actions over time. 
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The simplest economic model compares decisions made in 
the tax system to decisions made in a ‘no-tax world’. In this 
model, all taxes are inefficient apart from a head tax which 
is a lump sum on every individual. However, as all decisions 
by individuals are made in the real world with pre-existing 
taxes, regulations and public goods, this simple theoretical 
basis is of limited relevance in practice. 
The extent to which an individual actually responds to a 
tax—the elasticity of his or her response to taxation—is an 
empirical question and will depend on the characteristics, 
choices and context for the individual. Studies in optimal 
taxation recognise that ‘real world’ choices must be taken 
into account in assessing efficiency of a tax system (Slemrod 
and Gillitzer 2014, Apps and Rees 2010). 
Efficiency should be considered in the context of the tax 
and transfer system as a whole. It is often difficult to identify 
how taxpayers will respond to changes in taxes or transfers. 
Consequently, it may be difficult to target tax bases and set 
tax rates in ways that are least likely to distort behaviour 
(see, e.g. Mankiw et al 2009). However, in some contexts, 
the empirical evidence is clear. One important lesson from 
optimal tax theory combined with empirical measurement 
concerns the different responses of men and women to 
changes in the tax system (for example, see Apps and Rees 
2010). Women are more responsive to tax rates, in respect 
of their work behaviour, than men. High effective marginal 
tax rates as incomes rise and transfers are withdrawn can 
reduce work, particularly among low and middle-income 
women. We return to this issue in Chapter 4.
Individuals and businesses may respond to tax systems in 
a variety of ways, not only through choosing to change their 
decisions about work, investing and saving. For instance, a 
taxpayer may plan their affairs by claiming a large expense 
deduction so as to reduce taxable income, or choose 
to leverage investment in an asset such as real estate, 
generating a tax deduction to shelter their wage income from 
tax. Some large businesses, including some multinational 
enterprises, have almost unlimited ability to minimise taxes 
while maintaining investment in productive sectors around 
the globe. Small or privately owned businesses have less 
access to global strategies but can take advantage of family 
relationships that may facilitate minimizing tax. 
On the other hand, many economic decisions of taxpayers 
are driven by factors other than taxes, and most taxpayers 
are compliant with the tax system. It is critical to build and 
maintain a tax system that is easy to comply with and is 
perceived as legitimate to support Australia’s high level of 
voluntary compliance, so that it will raise adequate revenues.
A feature of tax policy design has been reliance upon a 
broad-based personal income tax for much of the revenue 
raising task, featuring a progressive rate scale with the 
average tax rate rising as incomes rise. This can achieve a 
reasonable degree of progressivity and distributional equity 
without excessively harming efficiency (Auerbach 2010, 63). 
Excess burden of taxes
Economists attempt to estimate the efficiency effects 
of tax reform proposals for taxation by estimating the 
excess burden of a tax. Mathematically, economists seek 
to estimate the dollar value of the size of the tax-induced 
change in economic behaviour (substituting an activity that is 
taxed for another activity) over and above the cost of the tax. 
The marginal excess burden reflects the economic cost 
over and above the revenue impact from a small increase 
in a tax expressed in cents per dollar of additional revenue. 
The average excess burden represents the economic cost 
from introducing a new tax, expressed in cents per dollar 
of additional revenue raised by the new tax. The marginal 
excess burden may be useful for considering the impact of 
small changes in the tax, such as an incremental change in 
the tax rate or tax base, while the average excess burden 
may be useful for considering the impact of introducing, or 
abolishing, a tax (KPMG Econtech 2010, 4). Both measures 
provide some rough and ready guidance about what taxes 
are preferred from an economic efficiency perspective. 
The lower the calculated marginal excess burden, the more 
efficient is the tax. The Henry Review presented indicative3 
modelling undertaken by KPMG Econtech of the excess 
burden from a 5 per cent increase in selected major 
Australian taxes.4 This modelling indicated a wide variation 
in the relative efficiency of different taxes (Henry et al 
2010a, 13).5 
3 The Henry Review noted that its modelling results could  
 only be indicative due to the difficulty of modelling the full range  
 of potential efficiency costs and interaction effects when there are  
 simultaneous changes to different taxes (Henry et al 2010a, 13).
4 Royalties and crude oil excise, insurance taxes, payroll tax, corporate  
 income tax, labour income tax, motor vehicle taxes, stamp duties,  
 GST, land taxes, municipal rates and petroleum resource rent tax.
5 Updated modeling published by KPMG Econtech in 2011: 
 https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/~/media/Corporate/AllFiles/  
 Document/professional-resources/taxation/kpmg-econtech-final.pdf
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The most efficient taxes (with lowest marginal excess 
burden) are found to be land and resource taxes, as they 
are considered to apply in general to an immobile source 
of return.6 The next most efficient taxes according to this 
model are broad-based taxes on consumption because 
they do not distort the decision to save or consume, and 
taxes on labour such as the personal income tax or a 
comprehensive payroll tax. The GST is an efficient tax; 
however the GST base has many exemptions which make it 
less efficient, as explained in chapter 6. 
The least efficient taxes are modelled to be company income 
tax and taxes on capital, assuming that capital investment 
is mobile and taxes that fall on market transactions, such as 
stamp duties and insurance levies, that impede people from 
productive market activity.
The Henry Review recommended reducing company 
income tax in the long term, while increasing taxation of 
non-renewable resources and land. This does not mean that 
Australia would stop levying taxes on capital. Rather, a shift 
in the tax mix towards consumption tax and taxes on land 
is argued to increase economic prosperity because these 
taxes are more efficient. OECD modelling (Johansson et al 
2008) suggests that a revenue-neutral shift of one per cent 
of tax revenue from income tax to consumption tax could 
increase long-run GDP by up to three quarters of a per cent. 
However, Hines and Summers (2009) point out that greater 
use of consumption taxes in place of income taxes has 
potential implications for tax progressivity and distributional 
consequences that would require careful consideration from 
the perspective of fairness.
1.5 Fairness
Two principles are useful for determining fairness of the tax 
and transfer system. These are the benefit principle and the 
ability to pay principle. 
Fairness may be considered at a point in time (a static 
distribution) or over the lifecourse of individuals. There are 
times when considering inequality between individuals at a 
particular time is appropriate. While it may be more difficult 
to assess, it is also important to examine the effect of the 
tax and transfer system for individuals as they move in and 
out of dependence and independence and are situated in 
different family and work structures through the lifecourse, 
or even across generations (intergenerational equity). The 
Henry Review placed a strong emphasis on lifecourse and 
intergenerational equity. We discuss this further in Chapter 4.
6 However, the extent to which even resources such as minerals  
 are ‘immobile’ depends on how much technology or intellectual  
 property is used in their extraction. See further chapter 5.
Benefit principle
The benefit principle states that it is fair that we pay taxes 
in exchange for the benefit derived from government as a 
whole including government services such as education and 
health and public goods such as roads, rail, public transport, 
sewage and water infrastructure, and our redistributive 
transfer or social security system. This can be expressed 
broadly as ‘taxes are what we pay for civilized society’.7 
The benefit principle is most useful as a broad justification 
for adequate taxation across the community as a whole, 
rather than the distribution of relative burdens of taxation. It 
carries considerable weight in the community, for example 
in terms of the relationship between taxes paid and transfer 
payments and tax concessions received over a person’s life, 
with an expectation that some tax paid over the course of a 
working life should be returned in retirement. 
In applying the benefit principle, we should take a broad 
view of outcomes from government as a whole, including 
taxes and transfers, as well as expenditures on public 
goods. Examining the tax system in isolation, and at a 
single point in time, does not present the full picture of the 
distributional impact of taxes and transfers.
The benefit principle also underpins specific taxes or user 
charges on identifiable groups, such as agricultural levies or 
local government rates applied to a particular community. 
In an international context, the benefit principle is the main 
justification for taxing multinational enterprises that are not 
based in Australia on their profits derived from Australian 
operations or activities. This is because these multinationals 
gain a positive benefit from goods and services such as 
infrastructure that are funded from Australian tax revenues.
Ability to pay
The ability to pay principle helps to identify what is a fair 
amount or proportion of tax to be paid by individuals relative 
to each other. Ability, or capacity, to pay taxes is generally 
considered across two dimensions:
 > individuals with the same economic capacity should pay 
the same amount of tax (horizontal equity); and
 > individuals with greater economic capacity should pay 
more tax than those with lower economic capacity 
(vertical equity).
These principles of horizontal and vertical equity are widely 
accepted, yet equally open to wide interpretation. They 
depend on the particular characteristics of a taxpayer and their 
circumstances, and on a measure or metric of ability to pay. 
7 Compania General De Tabacos De Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275  
 US 87 (1922) (United States Supreme Court) per Oliver Wendell Holmes J, 100.
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In an income tax, the measure of ability is provided by the 
concept of taxable income, which is the legal definition of 
income, less deductions, that is subject to tax. To ensure 
fairness, it is important to ensure that the legal definition 
of taxable income provides a proper reflection of ability to 
pay. In a consumption tax such as the GST, ability to pay 
can be assessed by examining taxed consumption against 
a benchmark of either total consumption or total income of 
the taxpayer.
We often consider ability to pay in respect of a single tax, 
such as the personal income tax. However, it is the overall 
outcome across the tax and transfer system, including 
interactions between policy at different levels of government 
and effects over the lifecycle, which ultimately determines 
the fairness of the system. 
Progressive, proportional and 
regressive taxes
In general, we measure the progressivity of a tax 
with respect to the income of the taxpayer. A head 
or lump sum tax would be fair in the sense that 
each individual would pay exactly the same amount. 
However, it is clear that such a tax would have a 
larger impact on a low income individual, relative 
to its impact on a higher income individual. That is, 
because incomes are unequal, individuals must pay 
different amounts of tax if the system is to be fair.
A proportional tax levied at a flat percentage rate 
would provide for an equal and proportionate 
sacrifice across all individual taxpayers. An example 
would be a 30 per cent tax on all income. 
In Australia, as in most comparable countries, it 
is recognised that an individual’s ability to pay tax 
increases as his or her income or assets increase. 
This supports a progressive tax in which higher 
income earners are subject to higher marginal tax 
rates and average tax rates than lower income 
earners. This has been a long-standing design 
feature of the Australian tax system. Progressivity in 
our tax system is principally delivered through the 
personal income tax, by increasing the marginal tax 
rate as incomes rise. Some other taxes, such as 
local government rates, are also progressive to a 
limited extent.
Chart 1.1 indicates the marginal tax rates and average tax 
rates in Australia’s personal income tax (for more detail, see 
section 4.2 below). The average tax rate is calculated as 
the total tax an individual pays as a percentage of his or her 
taxable income. The average tax rate is always lower than 
the marginal tax rate except at very high income levels when 
it converges to the marginal tax rate. 
Chart 1.1 shows that even for income earners in the top 
one per cent earning more than $250,000 per year, the 
average tax rate (the tax take as a percentage of taxable 
income) is less than 35 per cent although they face a 
marginal tax rate of 45 per cent (excluding the Medicare levy 
and deficit reduction levy).
The GST is a proportional tax as it is levied at a flat 10 
per cent rate on all consumption in the base. However, 
relative to the income of taxpayers, the GST falls more 
heavily on low income taxpayers who spend more of their 
disposable income and have less capacity to save. This is 
because the GST does not tax income that is saved but 
only income that is ‘consumed’. High income individuals 
can afford to, and do, save some of their income. 
Consequently, the GST is considered to be regressive with 
respect to income. Australia’s GST exempts many basic 
consumption items including fresh food and vegetables, 
education, health, childcare and water, which are widely 
thought to reduce its regressivity. However, the extent to 
which these exemptions achieve this outcome is less clear.
Chart 1.2 represents how the average tax rate increases 
as income increases under a progressive tax, compared 
to a proportional tax (average tax rate stays the same) or a 
regressive tax (average tax rate declines). 
The tax and transfer system takes account of a broader 
range of factors that affect an individual’s ability to pay, 
including household size, the number and age of children 
and the nature of any caring responsibilities. In Australia, as 
in most comparable countries, the basic unit of taxation is 
the individual. The tax system contains some allowances for 
variations in living costs due to family structure and other 
factors through targeted tax relief. However, most provisions 
recognising family circumstances are in the transfer system. 
We discuss this in Chapter 4.
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Chart 1.1: Marginal and average tax rates 
Source: ATO (2014a). Tax rates are the individual resident income tax rates in 2013-14, excluding Medicare Levy and temporary levies. 
Chart 1.2: Progressive, proportional and regressive taxes
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Examples 
 > Individuals and employers are changing how 
work is done from standard employment 
relationships to casual, self-employed and 
flexible working hours. The tax and transfer 
system must be designed to ensure that a fair 
share of tax is borne by all who earn income and 
that social security payments are available for 
this flexible workforce when needed most.
 > In a digital economy, the value in multinational 
businesses is increasingly located in intangibles 
such as brands and trademarks. The tax law 
must be able to define and locate profits based 
on the value of intangibles, so tax administrators 
can identify the taxing rights of Australia and 
apply this law so that the right level of company 
tax can be collected.
1.6 A resilient tax and  
transfer system
The concept of resilience of the tax and transfer system 
aims to capture a range of important goals relating to the 
effectiveness and adaptability of the system as it operates 
in the real world. The dictionary definition of ‘resilience’ 
is the ability to rebound or recover quickly and to be 
adaptable or flexible in changing circumstances. 
In this report, we use the concept of resilience to embrace 
a range of important principles for design and operation of 
taxes and transfers, including:
 > simplicity
 > sustainability
 > certainty
 > cohesiveness
 > legitimacy
 > ease and low costs of administration
 > ease and low costs of compliance for taxpayers
 > flexibility
 > resistance to tax avoidance and evasion. 
The tax system needs to be adaptable to changing 
economic circumstances locally and globally including 
changes in the way we do things, technologies and 
employment, investment and savings patterns. Resilience 
is a dynamic concept that aims to capture how the tax and 
transfer system responds and adapts to address changes in 
the behaviour of individuals in relation to their family, work, 
and other economic and social opportunities or misfortunes. 
Sustainability 
Resilience includes the ability for tax revenues to be 
sustainable and to recover in the face of external shocks. 
Australia’s tax revenues as a proportion of GDP have 
not fully recovered since the Henry Review reported, in 
part because of the GFC and in part because of slowing 
economic growth. A decline and lag in recovery of tax 
revenues is not surprising and shows flexibility of the 
system, as business and investment losses are absorbed 
over time. Tax revenues should grow with the economy, but 
Commonwealth tax receipts are lower now as a proportion 
of GDP than they were in the last decade. State tax receipts 
have also declined as a percentage of GDP. 
Simplicity, certainty and consistency
Resilience requires certain and reasonably simple tax laws. It 
also requires a stable and predictable tax system. Dramatic 
swings of policy direction generate significant uncertainty 
for individuals and businesses and this may undermine 
economic prosperity. Nonetheless, the system should also 
be sufficiently responsive and flexible to changes in the 
technological, social and economic environment.
Tax laws should be internally coherent and consistent with 
transfer policy and laws, to the extent possible. There 
are numerous tradeoffs in this context. For example, the 
individual unit is used in the tax system as it best reflects 
ability to pay and supports work incentives. However, 
the transfer system generally tests eligibility for income 
support payments based on couple or household income. 
Tax and transfer laws should also be consistent with other 
government policy, especially regulatory policies aimed at 
changing behaviour.
A relatively uniform treatment of different kinds of income, 
consumption, or assets, and of different individuals and 
legal entities will contribute to resilience of the tax system. 
The more uniform the system, the fewer planning margins 
exist to create opportunities and incentives for individual 
taxpayers to modify their behaviour or to avoid or evade 
tax. However, a balance must be struck. Tax law cannot 
be completely uniform because of inevitable differences 
in the characteristics and circumstances of taxpayers and 
goals of fairness.
Excessive complexity can make the tax and transfer system 
less fair. Some taxpayers will be better able to deal with 
complexity and adapt to change in the tax system (including 
by adopting structures for minimising or avoiding tax) than 
others. It is for these reasons that many tax systems offer 
simplified taxation arrangements to small businesses, for 
example in relation to depreciation of assets, while targeting 
complex integrity measures at larger businesses and 
multinational corporations. 
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Poorly managed interactions between different parts 
of the tax system offer avenues for taxpayers to exploit 
boundaries, for example, by shifting income to a lower 
taxed individual or entity or converting it into a more lightly 
taxed form, such as capital gains. The tax system should be 
designed to cope with these challenges without increasing 
the wasteful burden of complexity for the system and 
economy as a whole.
Minimise administration and  
compliance costs
All taxes involve administration and compliance costs that 
detract from overall efficiency.
Administration costs include the costs to government of 
designing, operating and changing the tax system. The 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) is widely regarded as an effective 
tax administrator. It has an overall cost of collection of less 
than $1 for every $100 of net tax collected (ATO 2014b). 
The ATO’s cost of collection ratio, which measures the 
administrative cost per $100 of net revenue is comparable 
to the ratio for similar countries. This is indicated in Chart 
1.3 below. However, overall, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom have lower ratios than Australia.8
Tax administration costs vary depending on the tax and as 
a result of specific contextual factors. In Australia, the GST 
has a relatively high administration cost of approximately 
$1.29 per $100 of GST revenue, close to $700 million in 
2014-15 (Treasury 2014a, Paper 3, Table 3.9). We discuss 
some reasons for this in chapter 6. The ATO’s cost of 
collection for the personal income tax is lower than the cost 
of collection ratio indicated in Chart 1.3. 
A range of other indicators may also indicate challenges for 
tax administration. For example, the ATO has a significant 
amount of ‘collectable debt’ from Business Activity 
Statements, income tax and superannuation guarantee 
obligations, totalling $19.5 billion in 2013-14 (ATO 2014b, 
Table 2.13).
8 Caution is needed in comparing the cost of collection ratio as this  
 ratio is an average across taxes and also does not cover all taxes in 
 each country; nor does it usually cover sub-national tax agencies.
Chart 1.3: Tax administration costs as a percentage of revenue collected
Source: OECD (2013b) Table 5-3. 
$ per $100 collected
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A more resilient tax system would enable the ATO to reduce 
administration costs further, to provide clearer up-front legal 
guidance, settle outcomes to disputes for timely collection 
and build cooperative approaches to audit backed by 
strong enforcement where needed, while enabling it to 
adapt to new tax planning structures and approaches.
Compliance costs are borne by taxpayers and include 
the financial cost and time individuals and entities spend 
complying with their tax obligations. This encompasses the 
costs of engaging tax agents and accountants to assist 
with managing and planning tax affairs. Compliance costs 
in Australia are substantial and the empirical evidence 
suggests that compliance costs tend to be regressive. 
Recent analysis by Tran-Nam et al (2014) reports survey 
data suggesting that personal tax compliance costs 
totalled around $9.6 billion in 2011-12, or around 7 per 
cent of Commonwealth tax revenue. They also provide 
evidence suggesting that personal tax compliance costs fall 
disproportionately on lower-income earners who are least 
able to deal with them. For businesses, compliance costs 
fall more heavily on small firms relative to larger firms.
More than 75 per cent of all individual taxpayers lodging a tax 
return utilised a tax agent in 2011-12 (ATO 2014c), among 
the highest rates of tax agent use in comparable countries. 
For individual taxpayers, a resilient tax system would be one 
which compliance costs are reasonable, engagement with 
the system simple and minimal, and tax payments could be 
easily made on time so that tax debt is manageable. 
Digital advances in data, payment and financial systems 
have potential to streamline and improve tax administration 
and compliance in future. Technological upgrades are 
costly but may generate benefits. For example, individual 
taxpayers may be able to view their tax obligations and 
transfer entitlements in a single uniform online account 
in future. Governments may be able to collect multiple 
taxes, perhaps even for different levels of government, 
from businesses in a simpler way using online business 
accounting systems, such as the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)
wage withholding system.
1.7 Institutions and the 
pathway to tax reform
It is crucial for a resilient tax system that taxpayers accept 
that the tax law is legitimate and that processes of tax 
reform, law making and administration are fair, transparent 
and accountable. The Henry Review focused significant 
attention on tax institutions, governance and administration. 
Recommendations 111 to 138 address processes of tax 
policy and law making, tax and transfer administration and 
monitoring of the tax system. 
This report does not address the institutions and processes 
of the tax system in detail. However, one Recommendation 
that we wish to highlight concerns the need for good 
empirical research to build a resilient tax system. As far as 
possible, we should aim to design and administer the tax 
and transfer system based on empirical evidence of how 
the system really works and how people really behave. The 
Henry Review recommended that the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory governments should systematically collect 
data on taxes and transfers and make this information 
available for empirical research (Recommendation 133) 
while also updating the privacy framework for taxpayers 
(Recommendation 129). The TTPI aims to support 
governments in making tax and transfer data available for 
good research to support a resilient tax system.
The Henry Review also put forward a number of necessary 
elements in the pathway towards tax reform. Its main points 
concerning the pathway to tax reform, which we support, 
are briefly summarized here (Henry et al 2010a, xxiv-xxv):
 > Tax and transfers are instruments of government policy 
and must be reviewed and reformed in light of overall 
tax, regulatory and expenditure policy of government.
 > The field of taxes and transfers is very broad and tax 
reforms will need to be made over time.
 > Businesses, individuals and markets need time to adjust 
to new settings in the tax and transfer system;it must 
also be recognised that adjustment has costs.
 > Implementation of effective tax reform will require 
agreement of the Commonwealth and all State and 
Territory governments and the implications for revenue 
sustainability must be assessed in detail.
 > Tax reform should not be pursued independently of 
the overall fiscal and macro-economic circumstances 
facing Australia.
 > All tax reforms affect the distribution of benefits and 
burdens across taxpayers. Transition is critical and 
compensation or other assistance may be required for 
affected taxpayers.
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C H A P T E R  2  C H A L L E N G E S  F O R  
T A X  R E F O R M
M A I N  P O I N T S 
 > The Henry Review was undertaken over an 18 
month period in 2008 and 2009, at a time of 
uncertainty regarding the economic outlook in 
Australia and globally. This uncertainty arose 
principally because of the impact of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) and the expected future 
trajectory of the mining boom. 
 > The Henry Review identified six challenges and 
opportunities for designing a future tax and transfer 
system for Australia. These were: demographic 
change; the social context and expectations; the 
environment; increased factor mobility; addressing 
system weaknesses; and growth in Asia. These 
challenges remain for tax reform today however 
some aspects have become more pointed in the last 
five years.
 > The mining boom has transitioned to a third phase 
of production and lower investment accompanied by 
lower prices. Combined with the decline in the rate 
of economic growth and accelerating changes in the 
Australian economy towards services, this presents 
a number of tax challenges. These include lower 
corporate revenues than predicted and the need to 
build a tax system to support investment in Australia.
 > The digital global economy including new 
multinational business models poses a major 
challenge to the tax system. It is likely that 
coordinated global solutions will be needed to 
fully address these challenges. New technologies 
also present opportunities for improvements 
in tax systems that will make compliance and 
administration easier and more effective in future.
 > Australia’s lagging productivity performance means 
that tax policy should focus on reducing distorting 
effects of taxation on decisions of individuals and 
businesses with the aim of improving skills and 
efficient allocation of labour and capital.
 > Since the Henry Review, Australia’s population 
profile has reached a turning point, with the 
proportion of the population at working age in long 
term decline. There is a need to broaden workforce 
participation especially by young people, women 
currently working part-time or not at all, and older 
workers transitioning to retirement, in order to 
maintain the tax base while also addressing needs 
for family and care through the tax-transfer system. 
New work practices also pose challenges for 
resilience of the tax system.
 > The tax-transfer system is a key element of Australia’s 
policy response to ensure a fair distribution of 
economic rewards. Fairness, actual and perceived,  
is critical to legitimacy and sustainability of the tax 
system. In the face of increasing public and policy 
concern about inequality, investigation of policies to 
address uneven benefits at the top end of the income 
and wealth distribution, and ensuring an adequate 
basic minimum for all, should be prioritised. 
 > Environmental challenges and climate change 
impacts continue to grow, Tax policy should 
aim to support environmental sustainability 
coherently with other government policy, while not 
generating perverse incentives that run counter to 
environmental policy goals.
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Source: Treasury (2014a), Paper One, Statement 4. 
Note: The purple area in the 2013-2025 column represents the additional labour productivity growth required to achieve long-run average growth in 
real gross national income per capita. The dotted line is a forecast of the growth in national income per capita if labour productivity grows according 
to the 2014-15 Budget forecast.
Chart 2.1: Changing drivers of per capita income growth
2.1 The mining boom and 
structural economic change
The greatest single influence on Australia’s economic fortunes 
over the last decade has been the ‘millennium’ mining boom 
supported by East Asian industrialisation and burgeoning 
Chinese demand for coal, iron ore and natural gas (Garnaut 
2013; Grafton 2014). The mining boom and the associated 
terms of trade effect has been the major factor driving the 
expansion in Australians’ material living standards. This is 
reflected in increases in wages and profit levels and in the 
level of government goods and services funded through 
taxation, including family transfers and age pensions. 
The mining boom has proceeded in three distinct, yet 
overlapping phases:
 > Phase 1: from 2003 and peaking in 2011, a rapid and 
sustained rise in global prices for Australian minerals 
exports which, in turn, drove the Australian dollar and 
terms of trade—the ratio of export prices received to 
import prices paid—to record levels;
 > Phase 2: from 2006 and peaking in 2013, a large and 
rapid increase in new mining investment; and
 > Phase 3: a production-driven phase, still continuing and 
characterised by rising export volumes, but accompanied 
by lower global minerals prices, with a lower level of new 
mining investment and a reduction in employment in the 
(mining) construction sector.
The resulting rise in living standards continues a record of 
strong Australian national income growth that started in the 
1990s with a productivity boom. Per capita income grew 
steadily in the period from the 1970s to the mid-2000s. Per 
capita income is projected to level off in future years. 
The effect of the mining boom on the broader economy 
is contested (see, e.g. Edwards 2014; Pincus 2014). It 
has been suggested that the mining boom and the high 
Australian dollar have contributed to accelerating structural 
change in the Australian economy. This involves a more 
rapid shift away from the trade-exposed agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors that previously lost international 
competitiveness under a high Australian dollar, towards 
mining and services (Connolly and Lewis 2010). 
The recent pace of change has fuelled community concerns 
about the implications of a ‘two-speed’ economy and how 
returns from investment in previously expanding sectors such 
as mining and financial services should be captured and 
distributed as part of the structural adjustment process.
These changing drivers of income growth, as estimated in 
the 2014-15 Federal Budget, are shown Chart 2.1.
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The Henry Review coincided with the early part of the 
investment stage of the mining boom and linked it to the 
long run rise of Asian economies (Henry et al 2010a, 7). 
The latest projections in the Commonwealth Government’s 
Mid-Year Financial and Economic Outlook Statement (MYEFO) 
(Treasury 2014b) indicate that annual growth in real per capita 
incomes will be 2.5 per cent in 2014-15, increasing to 3 per 
cent in 2015-16. 
However, as the mining boom enters its third phase and 
Australia’s terms of trade decline, nominal GDP growth will 
be only 1.5 per cent, ‘the weakest nominal GDP growth 
in a financial year in over 50 years’ (Treasury 2014b, 3). At 
the recent G20 summit, an overall challenge of increasing 
economic growth was highlighted by all participating 
governments including Australia. 
The decline in the rate of economic growth is one cause of 
the recent and projected fall in tax revenues. As observed 
by the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), nominal 
economic growth is the main driver of government revenue 
(PBO 2014, vii). The mining boom underpinned strong 
growth in company tax collections during the early phases 
of the boom (2003-2008) but weaker growth since 2008. 
This is also partly a result of an increase in deductions 
generated by new mining investment. 
A fall of more than 30 per cent in iron ore prices since the 
2014-15 May Budget has led to downward revision of 
company tax receipts of $2.3 billion in 2014-15 and $14.4 
billion over the next four years. Lower wage and employment 
growth will also reduce personal income tax receipts by an 
estimated $2.3 billion in 2014-15 and $8.6 billion over the 
next four years (Treasury 2014b, 3).9
The mining boom’s transition raises other issues for tax 
policy, including how the taxation system supports capital 
investment and the efficient taxation of resource profits. The 
MRRT implemented by the previous government in 2012 
was intended to harness gains from the mining boom. It 
failed to do so and in 2014 the MRRT was repealed by the 
current Government. 
9 The sensitivity of budget parameters to changes in the  
 economy are also discussed by the PBO (2014b).
2.2 Demography
The changing structure of Australia’s population has been 
a key driver of the rise in Australian living standards and tax 
revenues. The impact of population on economic wellbeing 
is driven by the size of the potential labour force and by the 
proportion of that potential labour force that is in work or is 
searching for a job. The forthcoming 2015 Intergenerational 
Report, not yet released, is expected to confirm these trends.
The working age population is often defined as that 
proportion of the total population that is between the ages 
of 16 and 65. The proportion of the labour force in work (or 
looking for work) is also called the participation rate. Between 
1970 and 2010, the working age population as a proportion 
of the total population increased from 62.8 per cent to 
67.4 per cent, largely a result of the baby boomers and net 
migration (Treasury 2010, 10). The participation rate rose 
from 60.7 per cent in 1978-79 to peak at around 66 per cent 
in 2010 (Connolly et al 2011, 1). 
The Henry Review identified the ageing of the Australian 
population as a key feature of the next 40 years which would 
reduce some tax bases and raising the costs of health, aged 
care and dependency (Henry 2010a, xv). Since the Review, 
Australia’s population profile has reached a turning point, as 
the proportion of the population that is working age is now in 
long-term decline. This trend is indicated in Chart 2.2.
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The increase in workforce participation from 1957 up to 
2010 was primarily because of increasing participation by 
female workers, older workers (aged over 55) staying longer 
in the workforce, and a greater focus on attracting skilled 
migrants of working age. This participation was of various 
kinds including full and part-time work. 
In particular, women’s workforce participation increased 
from below 45 per cent in the 1970s to almost 60 per 
cent by 2014. The Harvester family10 comprising a man 
who works full time in paid work and a woman who cares 
for children at home without pay is now a small minority 
(Garnaut 2013, 162). Trends in male and female workforce 
participation since the 1970s are shown in Chart 2.3.
10 The famous Harvester ‘family wage’ judgment   
   (1907) 2 Conciliation and Arbitration Reports 1.
Chart 2.3: Trends in male and female workforce participation
Source: ABS (2014b).
Chart 2.2: Working age share of the population (aged 16-65)
Source: ABS (2008), ABS (2014a) and Productivity Commission (2013b). 
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Chart 2.4: Trends in full-time and part-time female workforce participation
Source: ABS (2014b).
Chart 2.4 shows that almost half of female workers are 
in part-time employment. It is growth in part-time work 
that has driven the dramatic increase in female workforce 
participation. Australia’s female workforce participation rate is 
higher than the OECD average but lower than that of Canada 
and Scandinavian countries, while more Australian women 
work part-time than do Canadian women (OECD 2012).
The expansion of employment opportunities in service 
industries, flexible working arrangements, changing social 
norms, improved technology and access to paid parental 
leave and formal child care have provided families with more 
options for blending work and family. Among employed 
mothers with children aged between three and five years, 
utilisation of formal childcare increased from 48.8 per cent 
in 1984 to 71.2 percent in 2011 (Baxter 2011, 9). Provisions 
in the tax and transfer system support increased use of 
child care services, and hence female participation. These 
include the ability to salary sacrifice employer-provided child 
care and both universal and family means-tested child care 
benefits. However, around 65 per cent of households with 
children aged under 5 years experienced difficulties with 
the availability of childcare and around 55 per cent with 
affordability in 2011 (Wilkins 2014, 14).
Today, families face a complex array of choices about who 
works, how much and when; how to value and prioritise 
work, education and business decisions of individuals; 
care arrangements; and how household saving should be 
managed including decisions about buying a home and 
saving for retirement. Many of these choices are directly 
affected by the tax and transfer system, as all individuals 
and families, to a greater or lesser extent, move in and out 
of engagement with paying taxes, and receiving transfers 
across the lifecourse. 
Effect of workforce participation on taxes 
and transfers
The 2010 Intergenerational Report (IGR) estimated that 
by 2049-50, there will be only 2.7 people of working 
age to support each Australian aged 65 years and older, 
compared with 5 people of working age per aged person 
in 2010 (Treasury 2010, viii). The workforce participation 
rate is projected to fall to less than 61 per cent by 2049-50 
(Treasury 2010, ix). 
The greater tendency for women and older workers to 
work part time, and for younger people to delay entering 
full time work to pursue further education, mean that 
even as the participation rate has increased, a greater 
proportion of the labour force are part-time workers 
(Connolly et al 2011, 1). This trend is expected to continue 
as baby boomers transition from full-time work into 
part-time work and retirement.
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Chart 2.5: Contribution of various factors to labour productivity growth
Source: Unpublished ABS data and Treasury.
As noted by the Henry Review, an ageing population has 
implications for sustainability of government budgets. Until 
recently, increasing workforce participation by women and 
older workers more than offset the ageing of the population, 
contributing to higher national incomes and taxation 
revenues. However, population ageing will increasingly 
detract from economic growth and tax revenues in future 
decades. Demographic ageing also puts upward pressure 
on spending on age-related health, pensions and aged care 
(Treasury 2010, 45).
The IGR does not examine ageing-related fiscal impacts 
for the States and Territories. To address this gap, 
the Business Council of Australia commissioned ‘An 
Intergenerational Report for the States’, mirroring the 
approach taken in the 2010 IGR with a primary focus on 
long-term projections of health and ageing expenditure 
(Deloitte Access Economics, 2011). Based on the report’s 
projections, expenditure by the States and Territories on 
health and ageing sectors is projected to rise from 26 per 
cent of total State and Territory government expenditure in 
2009-10 to 41 per cent in 2049-50. 
Tax and transfer reform can help address these challenges 
through encouraging more workforce participation by 
women, older workers and the unemployed. Tax reform 
can also aim to improve productivity of the workforce, 
supporting higher wages and consumption which will also 
bolster tax revenues. To achieve growth and better tax 
revenue, governments at the G20 committed to a significant 
increase in women’s workforce participation (G20 2014). 
2.3 Productivity
As we face the end of the mining boom and population 
ageing, there is a need for other drivers of growth. 
Improved productivity can fill the gap so Australians 
can continue to enjoy improvements in living standards 
(e.g. Minifie et al 2013). 
Productivity is defined as the amount of goods and 
services produced by an individual, a business or the whole 
economy, relative to the amount of resources or inputs used 
in production. Measures of productivity attempt to measure 
how efficiently and effectively those production inputs, 
such as labour and capital, are used to produce goods and 
services (Department of Industry 2013, 2). 
In the last four decades of the 20th century, productivity 
accounted for around 90 per cent of national income 
growth (Gruen 2012, 3). Workforce productivity growth 
averaged around 1.5 per cent annually over this period 
and contributed strongly to overall productivity. However, 
workforce productivity growth has dropped significantly, 
with only a slight improvement in recent years (Treasury 
2014a, 4-6). Multifactor productivity, a residual indicator that 
captures the efficiency with which labour and capital inputs 
are combined in production, has also declined in the last 
decade (Banks 2010; Treasury 2014a, 4-8, 4-13, 4-14).
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There are multiple pathways to improving national productivity 
including adopting new production processes that allow 
existing resources to be used more efficiently, greater 
utilisation of technology and capital infrastructure, improving 
individual capabilities and skills. Another pathway is to reform 
regulatory and tax policy to support a more efficient allocation 
of factors of production (land, labour and capital). 
Reforms that reduce the distorting effects of taxation 
on decisions taken by individuals and businesses can 
contribute to improving individual skills and participation in 
more productive work.
2.4 Inequality 
A fair distribution of economic rewards is important in 
maintaining national wellbeing, social cohesion and 
acceptance of our political and social institutions. There 
is widespread public concern about rising inequality 
and wealth in Australia and comparable countries. In 
Australia, concern has been expressed in community and 
policy studies (e.g., Oxfam 2014, Douglas et al 2014). 
The evidence of rising inequality in income and wealth 
and the effect of government policy has been discussed 
in government reports and scholarly research (e.g. ABS 
2013a, 2013b; Wilkins 2013; Leigh 2013; Whiteford 2013). 
Internationally, attention has focused on the long-term 
trends, causes and consequences of rising income inequality 
across wealthy and poor countries (OECD 2011; Piketty 
2014; IMF 2014; Stiglitz 2014; Atkinson and Morelli 2014).
Australia’s tax and transfer system plays a central role in 
sharing the benefits of economic growth across society 
in an inclusive and fair manner. We can measure income 
inequality after taxes and transfers have applied, by 
measuring equivalised household income standardized 
for household size and composition. This is basically the 
disposable income of households after all sources of 
income (including income from work and business, capital 
gains, dividends, interest and so on), taxes and cash 
transfers from government are taken into account.
Using this measure, inequality in income and wealth may be 
measured by household income surveys (e.g. ABS 2013a, 
2013b; Wilkins 2013) or expenditure surveys (Greenville et 
al 2013).11 Chart 2.6, based on the ABS household income 
survey shows that the top 20 per cent (highest quintile) had 
nearly five times the disposable income of the bottom 20 per 
cent. The distribution of net assets is much more unequal.
11 Measures of income distribution and of inequality are sensitive to data 
  sources and changes in data collection methodologies. There is some 
  divergence of opinion about levels of inequality and the magnitude of  
  change in Australia over time, depending on the timeframe and data source.  
  However, the trends summarized here are consistently identified across studies.
Chart 2.6: Distribution of Australian household disposable income and net worth
Source: ABS (2013a).
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The mining boom generated economic benefits for most 
Australian households, and Australia has had stronger 
growth in real household disposable income than the 
OECD average leading to improvements in per capita living 
standards across the income distribution. The Productivity 
Commission estimates that equivalised household income 
grew by 4.5 per cent for the top 10 per cent and 3 per 
cent for the bottom 10 per cent per year since the 1990s in 
Australia (Greenville et al 2013, 99). This compares to 1.9 
per cent growth for the top 10 percent and 1.3 per cent for 
the bottom 10 percent per year since the 1980s across the 
OECD (Greenville et al 2013, 103). 
Nonetheless, the benefits of growth have not been spread 
equally. The groups enjoying the largest real increases were 
at or above the middle of the income distribution and those in 
the top 10 per cent.
Measures of income inequality
The most commonly used index for tracking changes 
in inequality over time is the Gini coefficient. This index 
measures the degree to which the income distribution of 
a country is different from a perfectly equal distribution 
of income across a population. A lower Gini coefficient 
indicates a more equal distribution of income (a value of 0 
represents perfect equality in which every person has 
exactly the same income). A higher Gini coefficient indicates 
a more unequal distribution (a value of 1 represents perfect 
inequality, in which one person has 100 per cent of the 
income and all others have zero income).12 
In Australia, inequality in disposable household income 
measured by the Gini coefficient has increased over the last 
few decades, as indicated in Chart 2.7. OECD estimates 
suggest that in Australia, inequality in income has grown 
faster than in most other OECD countries, although this is in 
part due to changes in ABS survey methods (Greenville et al 
2013, 100-101).
The trend in growing inequality is not uniform. Whiteford 
(2013) shows that income inequality:
 > declined between 1994-95 and 1996-97 during a period 
of expanding employment following the recession in the 
early 1990s;
 > increased gradually between 1996-97 and 2003-04 
during a period when the microeconomic reforms of the 
1980s and early 1990s took hold;
 > declined in 2002-03 and 2003-04, coinciding with the 
expansion of government payments to families; and
 > rose rapidly from 2003-04 to 2007-08 during the early 
phases of the mining boom before falling back in 2009-10 
following the GFC.  
12 See Jenkins and Van Kerm (2008) and Greenville et al (2013, Appendix 
   A) for methods of measuring inequality, including the Gini Coefficient.
Chart 2.7: Trends in income inequality in Australia, Gini coefficient, 1981 to 2011
Source: Johnson and Wilkins (2006), ABS (2013a).
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Chart 2.8: The distribution of household assets over time
Source: ABS (2013b).
Increases in inequality are not just a function of increasing 
incomes at the top of the income distribution, but are 
spread across the income distribution. Household incomes 
at the top of the distribution have increased relative to the 
middle of the distribution, and incomes in the middle have 
increased relative to the bottom of the distribution over the 
last decade (Wilkins 2013). 
Inequality in labour and capital income 
A key factor driving change in household incomes especially 
in the upper half of the income distribution is growth in 
labour income. Between 1988-89 and 2009-10, individual 
labour earnings increased by 38 per cent across the 
Australian economy (Greenville et al 2013, 5). Low income 
households benefited from increased employment, while 
high income households benefited from higher wages 
(Greenville et al 2013, 106). Increases in some transfers, 
such as the age pension, have also supported rising 
incomes for households in the bottom 20 per cent, although 
the unemployment benefit has not kept pace with income. 
We know less about the distribution, composition and 
trends in wealth and assets among Australian households 
than we do about income; this is an important issue that 
warrants significant further research. However, capital 
gains and income from assets have contributed to 
increased incomes for the top 20 per cent (Greenville et 
al 2013, 106). Recent analysis also indicates substantial 
and growing gender inequality in the distribution of assets 
(Austen et al, 2014).
Chart 2.8 shows that the top 20 per cent of households 
(highest quintile) own 61 per cent of total assets while the 
bottom 20 per cent of households (lowest quintile) own just 
1 per cent of total assets. This distribution is fairly stable over 
the last decade.
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Intangible assets
Increasingly, the economic value of businesses 
is held in intangible assets such as patents, 
trademarks, brand names, copyright, corporate 
and insurance services and marketing information 
about products, customers and systems. These 
intangible assets are central to the commercial 
success of many service and technology-based 
multinational companies. 
Intangible assets have several features that make 
them difficult to tax. They are often intrinsic or 
unique to a particular firm and rarely traded, 
making it difficult to identify, value and measure 
income from the asset. They are also mobile, 
which means that they can be owned by legal 
entities anywhere in the world. 
Not only digital companies, but ‘real’ or traditional 
businesses, are becoming digital in this way. 
Businesses that deal in assets, such as coffee 
(e.g. Starbucks) or furniture (e.g. IKEA) and even 
mining companies that must extract minerals 
where they find them, hold an increasing share of 
value in mobile intangibles including technology, 
services, brands and patents.
See further OECD (2013a).
2.5 The digital global economy
The digital economy revolution, increasing capital mobility 
and the rising economic value of intangible assets may be 
the most significant factors influencing economic prospects 
in the next few decades. Digital developments also may 
offer opportunities for streamlined and more efficient tax 
administration in the future.
Rapid innovation in communications and digital technology 
and the emergence of new multinational business models 
have recently gained greater attention. Governments are 
increasingly concerned about so-called base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinationals. The OECD is 
currently carrying out a major project on BEPS, building 
consensus on an Action Plan focused on multilateral 
coordination on information exchange and design of tax 
integrity arrangements that has been endorsed by the G20 
(OECD 2013a; G20 2014). We return to these challenges 
in Chapter 6.
In dealings with consumers, digital companies are 
increasingly selling goods and services including books, films 
and games online (famously represented by Google, Apple 
and Amazon). This poses challenges for sales taxes like the 
GST. The sale of goods and services via digital download 
has made the origin of supply increasingly uncertain, with 
suppliers often having no single location and consumers 
not being subject to taxes when they purchase online. 
The recent growth in the use of cloud technology and new 
ways of transmitting value, such as cryptocurrencies, also 
present challenges. These new systems potentially eliminate 
the intermediary from the transaction, allowing anonymity, 
while also allowing the location of supply to be determined 
arbitrarily by the supplier.
In the global economy, multinational enterprises can use 
legal and commercial structures to invest and operate 
across national borders and can shift mobile intangible 
assets within these structures. They can also take 
advantage of innovative financial structures that operate 
across many countries. All of these strategies can be used 
to reduce tax on multinational enterprises. For example, 
the use of a Luxembourg based company for financial 
arrangements can take advantage of differences in the 
taxation treatment of debt and equity in different countries.13 
13 Some such structures were revealed in the ‘Luxembourg 
   Leaks’ published by the International Consortium of Investigative  
   Journalists: http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks.
A multinational enterprise can use offshore companies as 
a repository for marketing, corporate services, intellectual 
property and insurance functions, typically located in low 
tax or no tax jurisdictions. Multinational enterprises organise 
their supply chains on a global, rather than a national 
basis. Geographic dispersion of the different elements of 
a multinational’s operations offers considerable flexibility 
around how intra-firm revenues and expenses—and hence, 
corporate profits—are located. 
The Henry Review identified these trends but they have 
become increasingly pointed. For example, in 2011, the 
Treasury’s review of transfer pricing rules pointed to significant 
growth in intra-firm trade in the areas of interest and 
insurance and services (Treasury 2011, 2).
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Australia’s historical advantages that typically encourage 
inbound investment, such as high levels of political stability 
and institutional transparency, effective market regulation, 
quality infrastructure and an educated and skilled workforce 
may offer a less distinct advantage in the future as other 
nations in our region develop. This makes the burden of 
taxation on mobile factors of production a more important 
consideration. It is not clear whether these challenges are 
significant enough to warrant change to Australia’s company 
tax system, for example by lowering the rate, or whether 
the current system can support economic prosperity and 
adequate revenues for the foreseeable future.
2.6 The environment
The Australian environment faces multiple challenges 
which are likely to have serious economic consequences. 
These include the economic costs of climate change and 
climate variability, the expanding footprint of our cities 
and suburbs as the Australian population grows and the 
impact of economic growth and structural change on 
resource utilisation, investment and consumption patterns 
of individuals and businesses. The goal of economic growth 
must be sustainable in the long-term.
Our growing population is leading to new and increasing 
demands on housing, transport, water, energy and 
communications and waste management infrastructure and 
supply. Over the coming decades, Australian governments 
will need to find ways to fund new investment in public 
infrastructure to meet these demands. 
For example, land clearing associated with expanding 
agricultural production, resource extraction and expansion of 
Australia’s urban centres averaged around 1 million hectares 
each year in the decade to 2010 (State of the Environment 
Committee 2011, 25). This leads to soil erosion and loss 
of habitat and biodiversity. Expanding development along 
Australia’s coastline has impacts on the coastal environment. 
Other challenges include transport congestion and high 
levels of household energy use in our cities and towns. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
indicates that Australia is continuing to experience long-term 
trends towards higher surface temperatures, more heat 
extremes and fewer cold extremes and lower rainfall levels, 
particularly in south-eastern Australia (IPCC 2014). 
Australia has many policy tools to address these challenges, 
although the appropriate policy response to some challenges 
is the subject of intense political and social debate. 
The Henry Review emphasised sustainability of the 
tax and transfer system, referring to both revenue and 
environmental sustainability. In relation to climate change, 
the Henry Review did not directly address the issue of a 
carbon tax or emissions trading scheme, as this was the 
subject of a separate policy process. The contentious 
political debate about the use of a carbon tax or carbon 
pricing scheme is evidenced by the recent enactment and 
then repeal of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS), an emissions trading scheme that operated like a 
carbon tax in its initial period. 
There are different tax and regulatory approaches that 
can be taken to climate change. We note that a carbon 
emissions pricing approach is being increasingly adopted in 
various other countries and regions in the world, including 
the European Union and China. The G20 has highlighted 
climate change as a key issue that requires policy reform 
(G20 2014).
It is also important to ensure that our tax and transfer 
settings do not work against environmental goals or 
generate perverse incentives that would undermine other 
environmental policy or regulation. For example, current 
Australian land tax arrangements tend to support land 
degradation at the expense of regeneration of native forests 
and other ecosystems (Wentworth Group 2014). The Henry 
Review recommended monitoring of tax concessions that 
affect environmental outcomes, to ensure their effectiveness 
(Henry et al 2010a, Recommendation 60).
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M A I N  P O I N T S 
 > A comparison of Australia’s tax and transfer 
system with the systems of other countries can 
provide a useful benchmark for understanding 
its coverage and scope, its distinctive features, 
where it performs well and where there is scope 
for improvement, although caution is required 
as context, history and data may differ across 
countries. Comparisons are made with a selection 
of OECD member states and in some cases with 
other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. We make 
specific reference to New Zealand and Canada for 
comparison in tax systems. 
 > Australia’s total tax burden in 2012 was 27.3 per 
cent, below the OECD average of 33.7 per cent 
and below that of Canada (44 per cent) and New 
Zealand (33 per cent). Australia’s tax burden has 
declined since the Henry Review.
 > The Commonwealth Government levies income tax 
and GST exclusively, as well as petroleum and gas 
resource rent taxation, customs and excise. State 
and Territory governments levy land tax, payroll 
tax, stamp duties, gambling taxes and some other 
levies exclusively and also royalties from mineral 
resources. There is a disparity between the broad 
governing responsibilities of States and their limited 
tax revenues, termed vertical fiscal imbalance. 
 > Australia relies less on consumption taxes than 
other countries, especially in Europe. In particular, 
Australia collects proportionately less revenue 
than other countries including New Zealand and 
Canada, from a broad-based consumption tax 
such as the GST. The GST comprises 13 per cent 
of all tax revenues.
 > Taxes on income including personal and company 
tax comprise more than 60 per cent of all tax 
revenues. Australia’s reliance on personal income 
tax, the single largest source of tax revenue, is 
similar to New Zealand and Canada. Australia has 
a heavy reliance on company tax compared to 
other countries.
 > Australia’s transfer, or social security system, 
provides flat-rate, means-tested income support 
payments to those not expected to work (retired 
people, lone parents and carers), unable to work 
(people with disabilities and the sick) or unable to 
find work (the unemployed). Payments for families 
with children provide direct cash assistance for 
more than half of all families. Other payments 
include paid parental leave, assistance with 
childcare costs and private rental assistance and 
war pensions. 
 > Australia has a mixed system of public and 
private support for retirement. The income- and 
asset-tested age pension is available for all 
eligible Australians. To support retirement saving 
Australia has a system of both compulsory and 
voluntary superannuation, funded by employers 
and employees as well as through contributions by 
the self-employed. The superannuation system is 
supported by substantial income tax concessions 
at a very significant cost to revenue. The most 
benefit of these concessions is derived by high 
income earners.
 > There has been a significant increase in spending on 
social security in recent years. Despite this, Australia 
remains the fifth lowest spender relative to other 
OECD countries and spends less than both Canada 
and New Zealand on the transfer system. 
 > The highly targeted nature of Australia’s transfer 
system including income and asset testing 
produces high effective marginal tax rates for many 
who receive support. This reduces the incentive 
and economic return to paid work, lowering 
workforce participation especially for women 
caring for children.
 > We cannot get a full picture of government 
taxing and spending without taking account 
of tax expenditures, which are concessions or 
exemptions in the tax system. The largest tax 
expenditures in the personal income tax relate to 
superannuation and other forms of savings and 
investment. In the GST, large tax expenditures 
include exemptions for food, education and health. 
Broadening the tax base usually requires removing 
or reducing some tax expenditures. 
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3.1 Analysing and 
comparing Australia’s tax and 
transfer system
In this chapter, we discuss the overall tax burden in Australia 
in the context of the historical and current fiscal position 
of the country and we explain the framework of Australia’s 
federation, which forms the legal and democratic context for 
our tax and transfer system. 
The Commonwealth Government derives most of its tax 
revenue from direct production taxes levied on sources of 
income, for example on income from labour or capital; and 
consumption taxes levied on the uses (or consumption) of 
income. Wealth is taxed primarily through property taxes, 
including land taxes levied by State governments and 
rates levied by local governments. Overall, Australia has 
substantial reliance on direct taxes on production and this 
has been remarkably stable for the last 60 years. 
Why compare Australia with  
other countries?
The comparison of Australia’s tax and transfer system 
with the systems of other countries can provide a useful 
benchmark for understanding its coverage and scope, 
its distinctive features, where it performs well and where 
there is scope for improvement. It is common to compare 
Australia with other OECD members (generally advanced 
industrial countries), and the OECD collects and publishes 
comprehensive standardised taxation data for comparison 
of its members. 
Informed comparisons between countries must take into 
account the impact of different economic structures and 
endowments of inputs into production (labour, capital and 
land) on the composition of national tax systems. When 
making cross-country comparisons, caution is necessary 
as there are differences in approaches to data collection 
and statistical analysis as well as to the design of tax and 
transfer systems. For example, although the OECD relies 
on a standardised definition of a ‘tax’, there remain some 
difficulties in comparison of the tax and other regulatory 
policy settings in different countries.
What is a tax?
A tax is generally characterised as ‘a compulsory 
and unrequited transfer to the general government 
sector’ (Henry et al 2008a, 11; ABS 2005, 140, 
162). A tax may be distinguished from a fee or 
user charge, as a taxpayer’s liability does not bear 
a direct relationship to the cost of a particular 
government service or benefit that the payer of 
a fee or charge personally receives. A tax is also 
distinguishable from a penalty for wrongdoing or 
breach of the law.
One area of controversy is retirement 
contributions. Australia has a system of 
superannuation contributions required by law 
by employers into each individual employee’s 
superannuation account, or voluntarily by 
self-employed individuals. These contributions 
are pooled with others and invested on behalf 
of the individual. Contributions and earnings 
can be accessed by the individual for private 
use on reaching the retirement age. Australia 
does not treat superannuation contributions as 
a tax although they may comprise a significant 
proportion of an employee’s total remuneration 
(ranging from 9 per cent to 17 per cent or more). 
In contrast, in many other countries retirement 
incomes are funded (at least in part) by a social 
security tax or ‘social insurance’ contributions 
that are required to be paid by employers to the 
government, usually to be invested in a government 
fund. Social security taxes are generally counted as 
a tax on wages for OECD comparisons.
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In this report, we make specific reference to New Zealand 
and Canada. Both New Zealand and Canada have 
similarities in colonial history, legal system and a substantial 
Indigenous population. New Zealand has close economic 
ties to Australia. However, there are significant differences 
as well. New Zealand is much smaller in population and 
geographical size, does not have a federal system or 
bicameral parliament and has very different resource 
endowments from Australia. Linguistic and cultural factors 
(especially, the French language and culture of Quebec) and 
Canada’s close interdependence with the United States are 
two ways in which Canada differs from Australia. 
Given Australia’s location and major trading partners, it may 
also be relevant to compare our tax and transfer system with 
countries in Asia. Australia is an open trading and investment 
economy in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. The design 
and outcomes of Australia’s tax system are directly affected 
by the mobility of factors of production such as capital 
and skilled labour. Other countries in the region are also 
competitors for capital investment and for skilled labour. 
These issues relate generally to the ‘international 
competitiveness’ of Australia’s tax system, which is 
frequently raised in public debate, especially concerning 
personal and company tax rates. When such comparisons 
are made, it is important to bear in mind that many 
other factors including the level of services, security and 
infrastructure provided by country governments influence 
decisions by workers and investors about where to locate 
their activities.
Finally, as Australia’s trade and cross-border investment 
in the region increases, the inconsistencies between tax 
systems, poor understanding and lack of engagement 
between country tax agencies can create frictions and 
inefficiencies to the detriment of all. This is a good reason 
for comparisons and harmonisation.
3.2 The constitutional 
framework
Australia’s tax and transfer system is fundamentally 
structured by our federal legal and institutional system 
comprising democratic governments at Commonwealth, 
State and local level. The Constitutional framework has had 
a significant influence on federal financial relations, including 
processes for reforming the tax system.
Under Australia’s Constitution, the Commonwealth 
Government has a broad power to levy taxes of any kind, 
although it is not able to discriminate between States 
or parts of States in taxation.14 The Commonwealth 
Government has exclusive power to levy excise taxes and 
customs tariffs.15 This broad taxing power contrasts with the 
rather limited powers of the Commonwealth Government 
to legislate on other matters specifically listed in the 
Constitution (for example, corporations, labour arbitration, 
defence, immigration, foreign affairs, statistics, currency, 
banking, marriage and divorce). 
Where it does not have a specific power, the 
Commonwealth Government can legislate in agreed areas 
if State governments refer power to it. The Commonwealth 
Government can also provide financial grants to State 
and Territory governments that are conditional on those 
governments carrying out defined activities or policy goals.16
The Constitution grants the Commonwealth Government 
specific powers to establish and maintain Australia’s social 
security system including invalid and old age pensions;17 
and maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child 
endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and 
hospital benefits, medical and dental services, benefits to 
students and family allowances.18 
14 Section 51(ii) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act  
   (Cth) 1901, available from www.comlaw.gov.au (the Constitution).
15 Section 90 of the Constitution.
16 Section 96 of the Constitution.
17 Section 51(xxiii) of the Constitution. Most transfers are  
   provided under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth).
18 Section 51(xxiiiA), inserted into the Constitution in  
   1946 after a successful popular referendum.
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State governments have broad powers to levy taxes of 
any kind, apart from excise and tariffs. State and Territory 
governments levy land tax, payroll tax, stamp duties, 
gambling taxes and some other levies exclusively and also 
receive royalties from mineral resources extracted from within 
their jurisdiction, which are owned by the State governments. 
State governments also have broad responsibilities for 
government in general, except for specific listed matters 
such as defence that are exclusively the domain of the 
Commonwealth Government. This means that they have 
primary responsibility for health, education, law and order, 
infrastructure and planning, except where an agreement 
exists with the Commonwealth Government. State 
Governments can provide social security benefits but there 
are only a few relatively small State-based transfer payments.
There is a disparity between the broad governing 
responsibilities of States, and their limited tax revenues, 
termed vertical fiscal imbalance. Essentially, the States only 
raise half in taxation of their expenditure responsibilities 
(DPMC 2015). 
Disparities in revenue-raising capacity and expenditure 
responsibilities exist across States and Territories. This 
is taken into account in the horizontal fiscal equalization 
formula for allocating the GST, and in some targeted grants. 
These are key issues in the government’s White Paper on 
reform of the federation and are also relevant to tax reform.
Prior to World War II, all States levied income tax (as well 
as the Commonwealth Government). However, income 
tax was taken over by the Commonwealth during wartime 
and grants were made to State governments. Afterwards, 
income tax was retained at Commonwealth level and greatly 
increased in rate, scope and base. States could again levy 
income taxes from the 1970s but none have done so. In 
contrast, all Canadian provinces levy income taxes that 
apply on top of the Canadian federal income tax. 
The GST and the  
Intergovernmental Agreement
The GST was enacted by the Commonwealth 
Government in 1999 and it replaced the previous 
Commonwealth wholesale sales tax. The reform 
was carried out under an Intergovernmental 
Agreement between the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory governments which commits the 
Commonwealth Government to provide all the GST 
to the States and Territories. 19 
The distribution of all of the GST revenues to 
the States (net of administrative costs) is made 
on a horizontal fiscal equalisation basis. The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission makes 
recommendations on the distribution of the GST 
to the States and Territories on the basis of a 
formula that aims to equalise the revenue raising 
and spending capacity across all of the States and 
Territories. The formula is controversial, with some 
States (especially Western Australia) arguing that 
the formula is unfair. 
In a contrasting federal arrangement, Canada also 
has a GST but the Canadian provinces directly 
levy sales taxes largely on a harmonized base, 
with different rates, in addition to the central 
government GST.
As a matter of law, the Commonwealth 
Government could unilaterally change the 
GST because it is a Commonwealth tax (it 
could override the Agreement). However, the 
Intergovernmental Agreement requires any reform 
to the GST rate or base to be unanimously agreed 
between the Commonwealth Government and all 
State and Territory Governments. The Agreement 
has proved to be quite politically stable in its 15 
years of operation and it is unlikely that any reform 
would proceed without agreement of all the States 
and Territories.
19 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, 
   s 1-3; Intergovernmental Agreement (2009) cl. 19, available  
   from www.Commonwealthfinancialrelations.gov.au .
27 The Tax and Transfer Policy Institute
3.3 The tax burden
A common measure of the tax burden, or tax level, 
of a country is the total taxes collected by all levels of 
government as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Australia’s tax level in 2012 was 27.3 per cent of 
GDP (OECD 2014d). Of this, the Commonwealth raises the 
majority of revenues: Commonwealth taxation was 21.4 per 
cent of GDP in 2012-13. 
Australia’s tax level is low relative to most other OECD 
countries. It is below the OECD average (33.7 per cent of 
GDP in 2012) and is also significantly lower than Canada 
(44 per cent of GDP) and New Zealand (33 per cent of 
GDP). The historical trend and these country comparisons 
are shown in Chart 3.1.
Long term trends in Australian tax revenues since federation 
show the growth in government role and size of Australia 
(in a similar pattern as other comparable countries) during 
the 20th century. This is revealed in Chart 3.2, which also 
shows the proportion of tax revenues collected by the 
Commonwealth Government, compared to State, Territory 
and local governments.
The Commonwealth fiscal balance
A fiscal surplus or deficit arises if government expenditures 
exceed revenues in a fiscal year. 
It has been Commonwealth Government policy to achieve 
budget surpluses on average over the economic cycle 
(Treasury 2014a, Statement 3). The Commonwealth 
Government (both the current Government and the former 
Rudd/Gillard Governments) has indicated a desired cap 
on tax revenue. This is not binding but is a budgetary 
mechanism to signal the intent to limit Commonwealth 
taxation levels. In 2013, the Gillard Government committed 
to keeping Commonwealth taxation as a share of GDP 
lower on average than the 2007-08 level of 23.7 per cent 
(Treasury 2013a, 6). In 2014, the Abbott Government 
imposed a cap on Commonwealth tax revenue of 23.9 per 
cent (Treasury 2014a, 3-9). 
Unlike some other OECD countries with relatively low 
levels of taxation, Australia has sustained a lower tax 
level without running large budget deficits for some years. 
However, the Commonwealth budget has been in deficit 
since 2008 and the fiscal deficit is currently 1.6 per cent of 
GDP. This is projected to return to balance after 2017-18 
(Treasury 2014b). 
The Commonwealth deficit has been identified by the PBO 
as structural rather than merely cyclical, as a result of both 
tax and expenditure factors (PBO, 2013). Commonwealth 
tax revenues peaked in 2007-08 after a decade of growth 
and have since declined. Lower tax revenues are partly a 
result of the economic challenges discussed in Chapter 2, 
They are also due to the cumulative effect of the successive 
personal income tax cuts granted between 2003-04 and 
2008-09 (PBO 2013, 3). Another contributor was a decline 
in revenues from fuel excise (for which indexation was 
halted in 2002-03 and has recently been reintroduced) and 
from excise on cigarettes and tobacco because of a decline 
in consumption.
One factor that tends to increase tax receipts is fiscal drag 
or bracket creep. The tax system is based on nominal 
wages and incomes. As nominal wages increase with 
inflation, individual taxpayers face higher average taxes 
because the personal income tax rates and thresholds are 
not adjusted to take account of inflation. Over time, this 
drives up tax receipts. 
Fiscal drag makes a big difference to Commonwealth tax 
revenues because personal income tax comprises nearly 
50 per cent of those revenues. Fiscal drag is projected 
to increase tax revenues above the Commonwealth 
Government tax cap by 2021-2022 (MYEFO 2014). We 
return to this issue in Chapter 4.
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Chart 3.2: Commonwealth, State, Territory and local tax burden since federation
Source: Treasury.
Note: The GST line indicates GST revenues collected by the Commonwealth Government but which are allocated in full (net of administrative costs) to 
State and Territory governments.
Chart 3.1: Trends in tax burden as a percentage of GDP, selected countries
Source: OECD (2014f).
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Tax Revenue
(Commonwealth 
receipts 2013-14)
($million)
Percentage of 
Commonwealth tax 
revenue  
(% rounded)
Approximate 
percentage of total tax 
revenue from all levels 
of government 
(% rounded) 
Income Tax (includes capital gains tax, Medicare Levy)
Individuals (and other withholding) 156,300 47.9 40
Fringe Benefits Tax 3,922 1.2 1
Company Tax 66,911 20.5 17
Superannuation Fund taxes 7,661 2.3 2
Minerals resource rent tax 310 0.1 0.1
Petroleum resource rent tax (net impact) (a) 1,507 0.5 0.4
Total income tax 236,610 72.5 60.7
Sales Tax
GST 48,596 14.9 12.5
Wine equalisation tax 725 0.2 0.2
Luxury car tax 434 0.1 0.1
Total sales taxes 49,755 15.2 12.8
Excise
Petrol 5,990 1.8 1.5
Diesel 8,594 2.6 2.2
Other fuel products 3,466 1.1 0.9
Tobacco 7,660 2.3 2.0
Beer 2,257 0.7 0.6
Spirits 1,931 0.6 0.5
Other alcoholic beverages 944 0.3 0.2
Total excise 30,842 9.4 7.9
Customs duty 2,713 0.8 0.7
Other indirect taxes
Carbon pricing Mechanism 3,631 1.1 0.9
Agricultural levies 463 0.1 0.1
Other taxes 2,412 0.7 0.6
Total other indirect taxes 6,506 2.0 1.7
Total taxation revenue 326,426 100.0 83.7
Table 3.1: Commonwealth Government Taxes 
Note: (a) Petroleum resource rent tax is deductible against company tax.
Source: Treasury (2014a) Paper 1, Statement 5, Table 8. State revenue from ABS (2014c).
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Chart 3.3: Composition of tax bases, selected countries, 2011-2012
Source: OECD (2014d).
3.4 The tax mix
The Henry Review did an exhaustive survey of Australia’s 
tax system at Commonwealth, State and local levels. The 
majority of revenues come from personal and company 
income tax and the GST. Australia’s overall tax mix has 
remained remarkably stable over time. 
Chart 3.3 shows Australia’s tax mix, or composition of taxes, 
in comparison to selected OECD countries. Taxes on income 
comprise 64.3 per cent of total Australian tax receipts. Taxes 
on income include personal income tax, fringe benefits 
tax, superannuation fund tax and company tax at the 
Commonwealth level, and payroll taxes levied by States. 
Australia’s reliance on income tax is broadly similar to 
New Zealand. If we include social security taxes levied on 
employers, then Australia’s reliance on wage taxation is 
similar to that of comparable countries. Our heavier reliance 
on company tax is discussed in Chapter 5.
Chart 3.3 indicates that Australia relies less on consumption 
taxes than other countries, especially in Europe. In 
particular, Australia collects proportionately less revenue 
than other countries from a broad-based consumption tax 
such as the GST. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
The Commonwealth Government tax mix has not changed 
significantly in the last 60 years. The numerous tax reforms 
since the 1980s made significant changes within tax bases 
but left the overall composition of the tax system broadly 
unchanged. This is shown in Chart 3.4, which presents four 
snapshots of the composition of Commonwealth taxes: 
from 1950-51, a few years after the Commonwealth began 
levying personal income tax; 1975-76, at the time of the 
Asprey Report; 2001-02, after the introduction of the GST; 
and in 2011-12, at the peak of the mining boom.
31 The Tax and Transfer Policy Institute
C U R R E N T  S T A T E  O F  T H E  T A X  A N D  
T R A N S F E R  S Y S T E M  c o n t i n u e d
Chart 3.4: Composition of the Commonwealth tax system since 1950
Source: RBA statistics and Treasury estimates.
3.5 The transfer system
Australia’s transfer, or social security, system of income 
support payments has a long history; the age pension was 
established in 1908 (for a detailed analysis, see Whiteford 
2013). As explained above, all income support payments 
are made by the Commonwealth Government and funded 
from Commonwealth general revenues, primarily taxes. The 
Commonwealth Department of Social Services has policy 
responsibility for income support transfers worth around 
$100 billion in 2012–13.20 
The social security system provides flat-rate, means-tested 
income support payments to those not expected to work 
(retired people, lone parents and carers), unable to work 
(people with disabilities and the sick) or unable to find 
work (the unemployed). Payments for families with children 
20 This discussion focuses on cash transfers. A broader definition of social 
   security would also include compensation arrangements for work and road 
   accident injuries and deaths (financed by insurance-type schemes and 
   levies of State and Territory governments); paid sick leave provided and 
   financed by employers; and a wide range of other welfare  
   benefits and services, such as subsidised childcare, public housing  
   and transport, care services for aged and disabled people, rebates  
   on local government property taxes for pensioners and reductions  
   in charges for utilities such as water, electricity and gas.
provide direct cash assistance for more than half of all 
families and higher levels of assistance for those receiving 
income support benefits or in low paid jobs. Other payments 
include paid parental leave, assistance with childcare costs 
and private rental assistance. The Commonwealth also pays 
pensions for war veterans and dependents. 
Australia has a mixed system of public and private support 
for retirement. In addition to the income- and asset-tested 
age pension, Australia has a system of both compulsory 
and voluntary superannuation, funded by employers and 
employees as well as through contributions by the self-
employed. The superannuation system is supported by 
substantial income tax concessions at a very significant 
cost to revenue. These superannuation tax expenditures are 
briefly discussed below and in detail in Chapter 4. 
There appear to be two long-standing values that provide 
the basis of the Australian social security system. One is 
the recognition of government and community responsibility 
to assist those in need of poverty relief. The other is that 
private provision is to be encouraged as far as possible, 
with the social security system seen primarily as a safety 
net. Mutual obligations and activity conditions for income 
support payments are a fairly recent feature, requiring 
certain benefit recipients to participate in activities of value 
to the community.
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Table 3.2: Transfer (social security) payments
Income support payments
Age Pension Parenting Payment Partnered
Widow Class B Pension (closed 1997) Carer Payment
Wife Pension (closed 1995) Austudy Payment
Partner Allowance (closed 2003) ABSTUDY Living Allowance
Widow Allowance Youth Allowance (Student and Apprentice)
Bereavement Allowance Student Assistance (DVA)
Service Pension (DVA) Newstart Allowance
Income Support Supplement (DVA) Youth Allowance (Other)
Disability Support Pension Sickness Allowance
Parenting Payment Single Special Benefit
Supplementary assistance
Pension Supplement Rent Assistance, without child
Pension Supplement (minimum) Family Tax Benefit (FTB) Part A
Pension Supplement (basic) End of year supplement-FTB Part A
Seniors Supplement Rent Assistance, with child (FTB Part A max rate only)
Youth Disability Supplement Family Tax Benefit Part B
Income Support Bonus (to be abolished) End of year supplement-FTB Part B
Pensioner Education Supplement Remote Area Allowance
Education Entry Payment Utilities Allowance
Fares Allowance Pharmaceutical Allowance
Mobility Allowance, higher rate Telephone Allowance
Mobility Allowance, standard rate Clean Energy Supplement
Carer Allowance (child) and (adult) Clean Energy Low Income Supplement
Carer Supplement Large Family Supplement
Child Disability Assistance Payment Multiple Birth Allowance
Double Orphan Pension Assistance for Isolated Children Scheme (various)
ABSTUDY Scheme Supplementary Payments (various) Baby Bonus (until 28 February 2014)
Student Start-up Scholarship/Loans Stillborn Baby Supplement (from 1 March 2014)
Relocation Scholarship Newborn Supplement and Newborn Upfront Payment (from 1 March 2014)
Schoolkids Bonus (to be abolished) Single Income Family Supplement
Essential Medical Equipment Payment Approved Program of Work Supplement
Incentive Allowance (closed 1991) Language, Literacy and Numeracy Supplement
Pension Bonus Scheme (no new registrations from 1 July 2014) Community Development Employment Program Participant Supplement (closed 2009)
Source: McClure (2014).
Australian income support payments are not related to 
earnings and this distinguishes Australia from most other 
OECD countries (apart from New Zealand). They are subject 
to income and assets tests and are in general available on 
an ongoing basis subject to the means tests. Coverage of 
the system is universal, subject to residence requirements. 
In contrast, in many other countries, the primary principle 
is one of contributory earnings insurance and income 
replacement across an individual’s lifecourse. 
While protection from poverty is a primary objective of 
Australia’s system, it is by no means the only goal. For 
example, family and childcare benefits are paid to many 
low and middle-income families to assist them with the 
extra costs associated with having children. Age pensions 
are payable to roughly 80 per cent of the aged population, 
many of whom live in their own home and have substantial 
other assets. For many, the age pension operates similarly 
to an income replacement insurance scheme in retirement. 
Table 3.2 shows the main income support payments and 
supplementary assistance available at March 2014 (McClure 
et al 2014). 
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Chart 3.5: Level and composition of spending on transfer payments
Source: Calculated from OECD (2014c). 
Note: The spike between 1999 and 2000 is largely a result of the compensation package for the introduction of the GST.
Source: OECD (2014c). 
Over the past 40 years, there has been a significant 
increase in the level of social security transfers and in the 
number of individuals and families receiving payments. 
Chart 3.5 shows that spending was close to 7 per cent of 
GDP in 1983. It fell in the recovery of the mid to late 1980s, 
before rising considerably in the 1990s. After 2000, social 
security spending fell back to about 7.3 per cent of GDP 
in the strong period of economic growth leading up to 
the GFC, but rose substantially as a result of the stimulus 
packages in 2008 and 2009, a significant part of which was 
in the form of cash payments.
In general terms, changes in the economic and social 
environment have been the most significant contributors 
to increased transfer spending over the past 30 years. 
Spending on age pensions has remained the largest single 
program and has been broadly stable at about 3.5 per cent 
of GDP since the 1990s. Over different periods, in response 
to the business cycle, unemployment spending has been 
the largest contributor to the total increase in spending. 
Policy changes have had varying influences on the level 
of transfer spending. From the late 1980s onwards, 
first as part of the Hawke Government’s pledge to end 
child poverty by 1990, and subsequently by increases 
in assistance for families in the period of the Howard 
Government, the real level of family payments increased 
significantly. In 2009, the real level of age and disability 
pensions was increased significantly. 
Despite the increase in spending on social security, Australia 
remains the fifth lowest spender relative to other OECD 
countries, as shown in Chart 3.6. Australia spends less than 
both Canada and New Zealand on the transfer system; the 
main explanation for this is our low relative spending on age 
pensions, which are well below the OECD average. Most 
other transfer components are very close to the OECD 
average, with the exception of family payments, where 
Australia spends around twice the OECD average. 
Per cent of GDP
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Chart 3.6: Spending on transfer payments, selected countries, 2012
Chart 3.7 Ratio of transfers received by poorest 20% to those received by richest 20%, 
selected countries
Source: OECD (2014c).
Source: OECD (2014c). 
OECD analysis indicates that the combined redistributive 
impact of personal income taxes and cash transfers is higher 
in Australia than the OECD average. This is because Australia 
has relatively greater reliance on progressive income taxes than 
regressive consumption taxes, combined with a long history of 
tight targeting of transfers at families raising children and low 
income earners (Joumard et al 2012; Whiteford 2010). 
The most recent figures (Causa et al 2014) show that the 
poorest 20 per cent of Australian households receive 12.6 
times as much in transfers as the richest 20 per cent. This ratio 
is shown in Chart 3.7 covering selected OECD countries. 
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The high degree of targeting in Australia is a product of 
concentrating a higher share of resources on lower income 
groups, together with the virtual exclusion of the richest 20 
per cent of households from the social security system. The 
richest quintile in Australia receive around 1 per cent of their 
disposable income from transfers compared to 9.9 per cent 
for the OECD on average, and close to 30 per cent in Italy 
and France.
3.6 Tax expenditures
Government spending may also be undertaken through 
concessions in the tax law, called tax expenditures. 
Tax expenditures include tax exemptions or holidays; 
special tax deductions or tax offsets; preferential tax rates; 
concessional valuation of benefits or assets; timing rules 
that enable a taxpayer to defer paying tax or to bring 
forward a deduction; and administrative concessions or safe 
harbours that permit a more generous treatment of some 
taxpayers or particular types of transaction. They are ‘rules 
and practices which reduce the amount of tax revenue 
collected, compared with a benchmark tax system’ (Burton 
and Stewart 2011, 3; Burton and Sadiq 2013).
Typically, tax expenditures are less scrutinized than direct 
expenditures. The Australian Treasury produces an annual 
Tax Expenditures Statement (TES) each year as required by 
the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Treasury 2015). A 
summary of tax expenditures is also included in the budget 
and MYEFO.
A tax expenditure may have similar effects to the direct 
payment of a grant or cash transfer. However, a tax 
expenditure is not a real payment but is estimated revenue 
foregone by the government. Estimating tax expenditures 
is difficult for a number of reasons. It requires an estimation 
of the revenue that would be collected without the tax 
concession, and an assumption of repeal only of the 
specific concession, with no other changes. 
The usual approach of estimating revenue foregone from 
tax expenditures does not take account of behavioural 
responses to the tax law (as explained in Chapter 1), or 
interactions of different tax expenditures. For example, if the 
CGT 50 per cent discount was removed, individuals may 
choose to hold onto their capital assets for a longer period 
of time instead of selling them to realise the gain. Such a 
major reform would also likely change other elements of the 
tax system, producing other effects on behaviour, which are 
not taken into account in estimating the tax expenditure.
An alternative approach adopted by the Treasury is called the 
revenue gain method, which aims to estimate the tax revenue 
that would be gained if the tax expenditure was repealed. 
This aims to take into account behavioural responses but 
it still cannot account for interaction between different tax 
concessions and it cannot always be estimated. The estimate 
of the tax expenditure by the revenue gain method is typically 
lower than that estimated as revenue forgone.
Defining and estimating a tax expenditure also requires 
definition of the benchmark tax system. There are important 
debates about the correct benchmark for estimating tax 
expenditures. The TES uses a comprehensive income tax 
benchmark for estimating tax expenditures in the personal 
income tax. The Treasury defines the benchmark as all 
nominal income and gains derived by an individual taxpayer, 
less expenses for earning income, at marginal income tax 
rates. For the GST, the benchmark is all consumption in 
Australia (real expenditure) at a flat 10 per cent rate.
The choice of benchmark can substantially affect 
calculations of revenue foregone. The treatment of savings 
is particularly contested and we return to this issue in 
chapter 4. When considering taxation of savings, should an 
income tax or consumption tax benchmark be used? Under 
a comprehensive income tax benchmark, income from 
capital is taxed at marginal rates but under an expenditure 
or consumption tax benchmark, income from capital is 
exempt from tax. It may be argued that a consumption tax 
benchmark is more appropriate when considering lifecourse 
saving (which economists define as deferred consumption). 
Table 3.3 presents selected large tax expenditures in the 
personal income tax and GST, estimated for 2014-15 by 
the revenue foregone method. Even acknowledging the 
weaknesses of estimation methods and debate about 
benchmarks, it can be seen from Table 3.3 that the 
government provides substantial benefits to individuals and 
households by means of tax expenditures.
The TES does not capture  tax planning or minimization 
strategies in the tax system, many of which rely on 
benchmark rules or the interaction of different rules for 
different types of entity or source of income. 
We cannot get a full picture of government taxing and 
spending without taking account of tax expenditures. From 
a tax policy perspective, broadening the tax base would 
involve removing some tax expenditures. More generally, the 
policy question is, should the particular benefit or subsidy 
be provided by means of a tax preference? Is this the best 
means of establishing an efficient, fair and resilient tax system 
and of delivering other aspects of government policy?
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Table 3.3: Largest tax expenditures in personal income tax and GST, 2014-15
Tax Expenditure Revenue Foregone 
(estimate $m)
Income Tax—Main residence CGT exemption (Item E6 discount component) 25500
Income Tax—Main residence CGT exemption (Item E5 exemption component) 20500
Income Tax—Superannuation concessional taxation of employer contributions (Item C3) 16300
Income Tax—Superannuation concessional taxation of earnings (Item C6) 13400
GST – Exemption of fresh food (Item H28) 6400
Income Tax – CGT 50 per cent discount for individuals and trusts (Item E11) 5800
GST – Exemption of education services (Item H16) 3950
GST – Financial supplies input-taxed (Item H2) 3550
GST – Exemption of medical and health services (Item H19) 3550
Income Tax—Concessional taxation of termination payments (e.g. redundancy payments) (Item C5) 2700
Income Tax – Exemption of Family Tax Benefit A and B (Item A38) 2220
Income Tax – Medicare Levy exemption for residents with taxable income below the low 
income thresholds (Item A19)
1710
Income tax – Exemption of private health insurance rebate (Item A17) 1570
Income tax – Exemption from fringe benefits tax for public benevolent institutions (excluding 
public and not-for-profit hospitals) (Item D14)
1400
Income tax – Exemption from fringe benefits tax for public and not-for-profit hospitals and 
public ambulance services (D10)
1360
Income tax – Philanthropy – Deduction for gifts to deductible gift recipients (Item A54) 1100
GST – Exemption of childcare services (Item H5) 1090
GST – Exemption of water, sewerage and drainage (Item H6) 1010
Source: Treasury (2015).
Note: The Treasury observes that the reliability of these estimates is low in many instances.
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 > Personal income tax is Australia’s largest single 
source of tax revenue. Australia collects more 
personal income tax revenue as a proportion of GDP 
than many other OECD countries but relies less on 
personal income tax than Canada and New Zealand.
 > Personal income tax revenues have declined as 
a share of GDP because of cuts in tax rates over 
the last 2 decades. However, fiscal drag will cause 
average tax rates and revenues to rise again in 
coming years unless changes are made to rates or 
thresholds.
 > The personal tax-transfer system is Australia’s main 
tool for redistribution of incomes and delivery of 
progressivity to the tax-transfer system as a whole. 
 > The combined effect of personal income tax and 
transfers in particular on work incentives must be 
taken into account in any reform of either system. 
 > There are gaps and complexity in the personal 
income tax base and scope to broaden this base, 
especially in relation to aspects of work and fringe 
benefits tax income and deductions. There is 
also scope for improvement in taxation of savings 
and investment including superannuation tax 
concessions. The Henry Review recommendations 
to tax saving more consistently under a 40 
per cent savings discount and to restructure 
superannuation tax concessions provide a 
significant direction for reform.
 > Substantial broadening of the personal tax base 
could raise sufficient revenue to enable a reduction in 
tax rates on work and business income, especially on 
low and middle income earners. This could improve 
incentives to work and do productive investment.
 > The personal income tax could be made more 
resilient by simplifying the legal design to reduce 
planning boundaries in respect of expenses, legal 
entities and types of income. This could also reduce 
administrative and compliance costs.
4.1  Trends in the personal 
income tax
Personal income tax is the largest single source of 
government revenue in Australia. It comprises (including 
fringe benefits tax and tax on superannuation contributions) 
more than 10 per cent of GDP and nearly half of 
Commonwealth Government taxes. Chart 4.1 illustrates 
Australia’s reliance on personal income tax compared to 
other countries and the OECD average. 
Australia has a similar reliance on personal income tax 
to Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, but 
significantly more reliance than Japan, Korea and many 
European countries. Chart 4.1 excludes social security 
taxes which operate as a substantial tax on wages in many 
countries. If those taxes are included as similar to the income 
tax, Australia is more comparable with other countries. For a 
comparison including social security taxes, see Chart 3.3. 
Chart 4.2 shows a decline in the average tax rate over the 
last 30 years. This, combined with a lower share of national 
income derived by workers, is the primary driver of the fall 
in personal income tax revenues, most notably during the 
2000s (PBO 2014a). Governments reduced the personal 
income tax burden during this period by more than required 
to return fiscal drag, as discussed in section 4.2 below.
The Henry Review argued that core reform objectives for 
the personal tax system should be reducing disincentives to 
work and improving incentives to save through simpler, more 
transparent policy settings. Tax reform should aim to provide 
clearer signals to people about the impact of their alternative 
choices and ease the administrative burden of the tax and 
transfer system (Henry et al 2010a, 29). The Henry Review 
also emphasized the importance of fairness to ensuring the 
personal tax system is legitimate and sustainable. 
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Chart 4.1: Personal income tax as a percentage of GDP, selected countries
Chart 4.2: Trends in personal income tax revenues and average tax rate
Source: OECD (2014f).
Source: PBO (2014a).
Note: The average tax rate is calculated by dividing personal income tax receipts by taxable income (excluding net capital gains) for individuals.
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Table 4.1: 2014-15 Resident personal marginal income tax rates
Source: ATO (2014a). 
Note: Non-residents are not eligible for the tax-free threshold or 19 per cent marginal tax rate and must pay 32.5 per cent to $80,000 and higher 
marginal rates above that.
Taxable income ($) 
(tax bracket)
Tax payable ($) and marginal rate
0-18,200 Nil (tax free threshold)
18,201-37,000 19% of excess over 18,200
37,001-80,000 3,572 + 32.5% of excess over 37,000
80,001-180,000 17,547 + 37% of excess over 80,000
180,000 + 54,547 + 45% of excess over 180,000 
+ 2% of excess over 180,000 (temporary ‘budget deficit levy’)
The Henry Review argued that fairness could be enhanced 
by treating activities with the same economic value 
consistently, facilitating easier choices and ensuring 
progressivity in final tax outcomes. 
These objectives were encapsulated in the following reform 
directions for the personal income tax:
 > Flatter and lower—but still progressive—statutory personal 
income tax rates and thresholds on individuals, involving 
a higher tax free threshold of $25,000, absorption of 
the Medicare levy into the statutory rates, the removal 
of structural offsets such as the low income tax offset, 
introduction of a standard deduction for work-related 
expenses and exempting pensions, allowances and 
transfer payments from tax (Recommendations 2 to 7); 
 > taxing most forms of remuneration consistently including 
taxing fringe benefits at personal marginal rates in the 
hands of employees, simplifying and limiting deductions 
and strengthening rules for personal services income 
(Recommendations 8 to 13); 
 > taxing capital gains and investment income, net of 
deductions including interest on debt, more consistently 
through a standardised 40 per cent discount against 
personal marginal rates (Recommendations 14 to 17); 
 > maintaining the home exemption in the income tax 
and capital gains tax. This is because of its special role 
in facilitating redistribution of income over a person’s 
lifecycle and sustainable responses to the ageing of the 
population; and
 > fairer taxation of superannuation, and examination of 
longevity insurance and direct tax policy to increase 
workforce participation in retirement (Recommendations 
18 to 24). 
Some reforms were introduced by Governments in the last 
five years, following these recommendations, in particular 
concerning the tax rate structure and tax offsets. However, 
there has not been a major reform of the personal income 
tax base.
4.2 Personal income  
tax rates
Australia’s statutory personal income tax rates and 
thresholds are shown in Table 4.1. The Commonwealth 
Government has enacted a temporary budget repair levy 
of 2 per cent for incomes exceeding the top threshold of 
$180,000, applicable for three years from the 2014-15 year.
A low income tax offset (LITO) provides additional tax relief 
for taxpayers earning up to $67,000 in 2013-14. Individuals 
eligible for the full LITO pay no tax on incomes below an 
effective tax-free threshold of $20,542. The withdrawal of 
LITO increases the effective marginal tax rate for taxpayers 
earning between $37,000 and $66,667, by one and a half per 
cent above the statutory personal income tax rates.
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Most taxpayers pay a Medicare levy of 2 per cent of taxable 
income, increased from 1.5 per cent from 1 July 2014, to 
assist in funding the National Disability Insurance Scheme. 
The Medicare levy nominally contributes to funding the 
costs of public health care, but in practice it provides only 
a fraction of total Commonwealth Government health costs 
and is not hypothecated to health expenditure, instead 
forming part of consolidated revenue. A Medicare levy 
surcharge of up to 1.5 per cent applies to higher income 
earners who do not maintain adequate private health 
insurance coverage. Very low income earners are exempt 
from the Medicare levy as are Defence Force members and 
some veterans, non-residents and some other individuals 
not entitled to Medicare coverage.
Chart 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates marginal tax rates and the 
equivalent average tax rate for individuals. It shows how 
the average tax rate is always lower than the marginal rate 
except at very high incomes. This is also illustrated in the 
following example.
The Rudd/Gillard Governments increased the tax-free 
threshold and broadened the personal tax base by more 
tightly targeting or removing tax offsets. Effective 1 July 
2012, the tax-free threshold was increased from $6,000 to 
$18,200, equivalent to earnings of approximately $350 per 
week (about 20 hours at the minimum wage). 
There were some simplification benefits from these rate 
structure changes because low earners at or below the 
new tax-free threshold did not have to file a tax return. 
The Rudd/Gillard Government estimated up to one million 
workers potentially benefited in this way, although in 
practice the number of beneficiaries may be lower. Many 
low-income workers opt to continue filing tax returns for 
other reasons, including accessing family payments through 
the transfer system. 
There is also debate about whether such flattening of 
the rate structure is the most fair or efficient strategy. For 
example, Apps and Rees (2010) show that it increases 
marginal and average tax rates on secondary earners with 
children (mostly women) and this undermines goals to 
increase workforce participation and may negatively affect 
tax revenues and economic growth. 
The former Government legislated for a second round of 
tax cuts linked to the CPRS implementation, including 
a further increase in the tax-free threshold to $19,400. 
However, the current Government has opted not to 
proceed with these second-round tax changes as it has 
now abolished the CPRS.
The longer term trend has been to reduce the number of 
thresholds and rates in the personal tax system, from more 
than 20 in the early 1970s to only four rate thresholds 
above the tax-free threshold in the current system. There 
has also been a significant reduction in the top two marginal 
tax rates. These trends are illustrated in Chart 4.3.
Australia’s top marginal tax rate of 45 per cent excluding the 
Medicare levy, rising to 47 per cent for 3 years as a result 
of the deficit reduction levy, is a little higher than the OECD 
average and relatively high by international standards. This 
is shown in Chart 4.4. Top marginal tax rates commence at 
very different thresholds across countries. Chart 4.4 shows, 
based on the right axis, the AUD equivalent level at which 
the top marginal tax rate commences in each country (with 
appropriate estimates for sub-national income taxes).21
21 Average wages also vary significantly between countries; the 
   average tax rate for the average worker is shown in Chart 4.6.
Example
Joe earned full-time average weekly earnings 
of about $75,000 this year. After expenses are 
deducted, Joe has a taxable income of $70,000. 
Joe faces a marginal tax rate of 34.5 per cent 
including the Medicare Levy. Joe’s average tax rate 
is 22.4 per cent including the Medicare Levy.
Jane is a partner in a major law firm. This year, Jane 
earned $250,000 in salary and partnership profits, 
net of expenses (this places Jane in the top one 
percent of income earners in Australia). Jane faces a 
marginal tax rate of 49 per cent including the budget 
deficit levy and Medicare Levy. Jane’s average tax 
rate is 37 per cent.
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Chart 4.3: Trends in marginal tax rates
Chart 4.4: Top marginal tax rate in selected countries
Source: Treasury.
Note: The dotted line shows the increase in the LITO and its effect on the tax-free threshold.
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation Tax Research Platform (2014); Canada Revenue Agency (2014); KPMG (2014).
Note: Includes central government tax rates and selected sub-national government tax rates where significant. (a) Canada – example of Ontario; (b) Switzerland 
– example of Zurich; (c) United States – example of Minnesota.
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Dependent and other tax offsets 
Some family circumstances are taken into 
account in the tax law but most family support 
is in the transfer system. The most significant 
reform following the Henry Review has been the 
staged removal and consolidation of complex and 
out-dated tax offsets. These changes include:
 > phase out of the dependent spouse tax 
offset in the 2012 Budget by limiting access 
to dependant spouses born before 1952, 
abolished from 1 July 2014;
 > consolidate a range of dependency offsets 
into a single tax offset targeted at taxpayers 
maintaining a spouse who is invalid or a carer. 
The single Dependant and Carer Tax Offset now 
provides tax relief to taxpayers maintaining an 
invalid or carer spouse;
 > merge the pensioner and senior Australians tax 
offset in to a single tax offset;
 > phase out Mature Age Worker Tax Offset, 
subsequently abolished from 1 July 2014;
 > restrict access to the medical expenses tax offset 
for high out-of-pocket medical expenses through 
a means test and higher eligibility threshold; 
 > abolish the entrepreneurs’ tax offset.
Fiscal drag
Australian personal tax thresholds are not indexed to 
inflation. Individuals face higher tax rates over time as their 
nominal wages (and other incomes) rise. This effect is 
known as fiscal drag or bracket creep. Historically, Australia 
has taken the approach of periodic ad hoc adjustments 
to tax thresholds and rates to address this issue. Most 
countries in the OECD follow the same approach as 
Australia by not indexing income tax thresholds. Some 
countries, including Canada and the United States, index 
certain tax thresholds for either wage or price inflation.22 
Analysis in the 2014-15 Budget indicates that, without 
policy change, the effects of fiscal drag will be a major 
factor underpinning growth in Commonwealth revenues 
over the next decade (Treasury 2014a). The budget 
projected that personal tax revenue would exceed 12 per 
cent of GDP by 2017-18. This would fully claw back all tax 
cuts provided since the introduction of the GST in 2000.
Treasury estimates that a person on average full-time 
earnings23 will be pushed into the second-top 37 per cent 
tax bracket by 2015-16 and will face an average tax rate of 
28 per cent by 2023-24, compared with 23 per cent today 
(Parkinson 2014). This is shown in Chart 4.5.
22 See Canada Revenue Agency (2014); Inland Revenue  
   Service (IRS) (US), Revenue Procedure 2013-25.
23 The correct benchmark of earnings for this index is complex. Because many 
   people work part-time, the tax rate that applies to an average worker is  
   lower than the rate that applies to full-time workers. 
   Moreover, the increased prevalence of part-time work will  
   act to decrease the tax rate paid by the ‘average’ worker.
Chart 4.5: The effect of fiscal drag
Source: Parkinson (2014, Chart 6).
Note: Based on Budget 2014-15 parameters.
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Chart 4.6: Average tax burden after transfers for the average worker, selected countries
Source: OECD (2014b). 
Note: Figures include income tax plus social security contributions less cash benefits. Australian superannuation guarantee is not included.
Fiscal drag has the potential to affect adversely work 
participation incentives at the same time as the impacts of 
an ageing population are being more strongly felt. It may 
increase incentives for individuals to enter into tax planning 
arrangements so as to avoid higher marginal rates and it also 
has the effect of reducing progressivity of the tax structure as 
low income earners move into higher tax brackets over time.
4.3 The tax-transfer system: 
interactions and effects
The personal tax and transfer system aims to achieve 
redistributive outcomes that broadly reflect a ‘commitment 
to Australian values of fairness and support for those who 
are disadvantaged’ (Henry et al 2010a, 59), as well as 
recognition that some level of equalisation of incomes is 
an important aspect of social cohesion and a marker of 
national progress. The combined impact of the personal 
tax and transfer systems is to reduce the final disposable 
income of higher income households and increase the final 
disposable income of lower income. 
The general features of Australia’s transfer system and its 
redistributive effects are summarized in section 3.5, while 
the challenge of inequality is considered in section 2.4. 
The tax and transfer system historically and today has a 
significant effect in reducing inequality. It achieves these 
objectives at relatively low budgetary cost compared to 
other nations because Australia has the most targeting 
of transfer payments in the OECD, as shown in Chart 3.7 
above (Whiteford 2014). 
However, the tax-transfer system is less redistributive than it 
was 20 years ago (Herault and Azpitarte 2014, Greenville et 
al 2013, Whiteford 2013). Changes to the personal income 
tax have reduced the overall progressivity of the tax system. 
These include personal income tax cuts and tax threshold 
increases for the top two brackets between 2003 and 
2008 and tax concessions for various forms of saving and 
investment, especially superannuation and capital gains tax, 
which favour higher income earners.
In the transfer system, allowances for the unemployed 
and the sick have been indexed to prices rather than 
community-wide incomes. This means that the people in 
these groups have been slipping down the income ladder 
for the last two decades, relative to others. In the mid-
1990s a single person receiving Newstart would have been 
about $10 per week (in current terms) below the tenth 
percentile of the income distribution, but by 2011–12 they 
would have been close to $160 below that percentile. 
Another group who have not enjoyed the general rise in 
prosperity are lone parents on benefits whose youngest 
child is aged eight years or more, who now receive 
Newstart rather than the more generous parenting payment.
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Tax burden on the average worker
The OECD indicates that the average tax rate on labour 
income in Australia was 27.4 per cent in 2013 for an 
individual, compared to the OECD average of 35.9 per 
cent (OECD 2014b). A comparison of average tax rates 
for individuals and families across selected countries is in 
Chart 4.6. Australia’s tax burden on labour income is slightly 
lower than in Canada, but significantly higher than in New 
Zealand, especially for families with children. 
Workforce participation was a central focus of the Henry 
Review and, as explained in Chapter 2, is of even greater 
importance today. Australia’s targeted transfer system 
combined with progressive marginal tax rates creates 
complexity and challenges for workforce participation. 
Effective marginal tax rates
Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs) are produced by the 
withdrawal of income support transfers and the LITO as 
incomes rise, combined with progressive marginal tax rates 
as earnings increase. EMTRs may be significantly higher 
than either nominal statutory rates or average tax rates.
The Australian tax and transfer system can produce 
high EMTRs. The interaction of tax rates and transfers 
can be difficult to understand because there are many 
income support transfers which may apply to individuals 
and households (as shown in Table 3.2). The complexity 
is compounded by the withdrawal of different income 
transfers through various income ranges. 
There is evidence that high EMTRs have an effect on 
individuals’ decisions about whether and how much they 
work. Individuals and families making important work and 
care decisions are aware of the impact on the net wage 
(their disposable income after taxes and transfers). 
Low income earners and women who are secondary 
earners in a household especially with caring responsibilities 
have higher labour supply elasticities. They are more 
sensitive to changes in their tax burden than high income 
earners and primary earners in a household (e.g. Dandie 
and Mercante 2007). 
Negative incentive effects are likely to be most strongly felt 
among groups where there is the greatest scope to increase 
labour market participation to help counter the impacts of 
an ageing population, particularly women and part-time 
workers, including those transitioning to retirement. 
The salience of tax rates and the 
elasticity of labour supply
The behavioural response of an individual to a 
change in their net wage from an increase or a 
decrease in taxes depends on the substitution and 
income effects for that individual. An increase in the 
marginal tax rate decreases the net reward from 
work and there is an incentive for the individual to 
substitute unpaid work or leisure for paid work. 
This is the substitution effect. A decrease in the 
tax rate may have the opposite effect, providing an 
incentive for the person to engage in or increase 
their paid work. 
An increase in the tax burden of a person as a 
result of a higher tax rate may cause him or her 
to work more in order to be able to purchase the 
same quantity of goods. This is the income effect. 
A decrease in tax burden may instead provide an 
incentive for the individual to work less but still be 
able to purchase the same quantity of goods.
The relative importance of the substitution and 
income effects determines whether there will be 
a positive or a negative labour supply impact 
from a change in tax rates on work. Estimates of 
responsiveness or elasticity of labour supply take 
into account both of these effects. These estimates 
measure the percentage change in labour supply of 
an individual, resulting from a one per cent change 
in the net wage rate, for example as a result of a tax 
increase or a tax reduction. 
Empirical studies indicate that elasticities of labour 
supply and sensitivity to changes in tax rates vary 
substantially across different individuals. The variation 
depends on factors such as whether an individual is 
the primary or a secondary earner in a household, 
and their responsibility to care for example for 
children (e.g. Dandie and Mercante 2007).
Recent international studies suggest salience of 
tax rates and transfers varies, as do the costs to 
individuals of changing behaviour such as work 
hours. In some circumstances, average tax rates 
may have more of an impact than marginal rates 
(see, e.g. Chetty and Saez 2013; Saez et al 2012).
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Chart 4.7: EMTR for a single parent with two children on $31.50 hourly wage
Source: PC (2014). Corresponds to Cameo 1 in Box E.3, Appendix E
Note: $31.50 hourly wage corresponds to an annual salary of about $62,000 (full time).
Chart 4.7, produced by the Productivity Commission, shows 
an EMTR for an illustrative individual who is a single parent 
with two children. It includes the combined impact of the 
progressive marginal tax rate structure, the withdrawal of 
childcare benefit and childcare rebate and the withdrawal of 
parenting payment and Family Tax Benefit B. The EMTR can 
exceed 100 per cent over certain work/wage ranges. That is, 
the effect of the reduction in income support and childcare 
payments, combined with marginal tax rates, can exceed 
the wage that a worker is paid over these ranges. Even at 
lower ranges, the EMTR faced by the individual is quite high, 
ranging from just below 40 per cent to 80 per cent. 
These EMTRs do not take account of non-deductible 
costs such as the excess childcare costs not supported 
by childcare assistance, or the cost of commuting to work. 
It is not surprising that a single parent in this situation 
would choose not to increase her working hours above a 
maximum of three days per week. Clearly, work does not 
pay in this case.
Henry Review recommendations for the 
transfer system
The Henry Review made numerous recommendations 
for reform of the transfer system and housing support 
(Recommendations 82 to 106). Since the Review, many of 
these recommendations have been progressed and a more 
detailed review of income support payments, the McClure 
Review of Australia’s Welfare System (McClure et al 2014), 
has recently reported to government (the report is not yet 
released). The goals of better work and social outcomes 
were taken up in the McClure Review.
While noting that the broad architecture of the Australian 
transfer system is well targeted, the Henry Review identified 
a number of weaknesses including that the system is overly 
complex, can treat people of similar means differently, 
and can result in people making choices that potentially 
undermine long-term wellbeing, for example through high 
EMTRs as explained above. 
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Key structural recommendations of the Henry Review 
were that there should be three main categories of income 
support payment:
 > A pension category for people not expected to support 
themselves through paid work because of their age, a 
disability or the fact that they are providing full-time care 
for another person. 
 > A participation category for people of working age 
expected to support themselves through paid work now 
or in the near future: this would include unemployed 
people, youth, people who are temporarily incapacitated, 
people with a partial capacity to work, and people who 
are the primary carers of dependent children. The rate 
of payment in this category should provide a basic level 
of adequacy while maintaining incentives to work. This 
would be less than the pension rate. 
 > Student assistance for people engaged in full-time study. 
The Review did not recommend full integration of the tax 
and transfer systems, given their different objectives. It 
recommended better coordination to support greater equity 
between transfer recipients, reducing disincentives to work 
and underpinning a better client experience of the systems. 
Establishing adequacy benchmarks for transfer payments, 
especially unemployment benefit, would make the 
system more robust, particularly if the benchmarks were 
preserved through a common but sustainable indexation 
arrangement (Henry et al 2010a, 59). The Review noted 
that indexing all payments to male AWE has been projected 
to involve a significant increase in budgetary outlays, so 
it will be necessary for governments to regularly review 
the appropriateness of this benchmark. The Government 
proposed in the 2014-15 Budget reducing the indexation 
of the age pension to prices instead of wages; however, 
this would lead in the longer term to age pensioners falling 
further and further behind workers in income; and it seems 
unlikely that this will pass the Parliament.
The Henry Review also recommended that current income 
and assets tests for income support payments should 
be replaced with a comprehensive means test based on 
a combined measure of employment income, business 
income and deemed income on assets. The liquid assets 
waiting period and the sudden-death cut-out that applies 
to people on certain payments should be removed. These 
recommendations, if taken up, would reduce high EMTRs in 
some cases, assisting workforce participation.
Family and childcare policy
There is ongoing public and academic debate about the best 
way to provide assistance to families with children, evidenced 
by the contentious issue of how to design and fund an 
adequate paid parental leave scheme for all who need it. 
These policy decisions are complex and contested in an era 
when governments are seeking to reduce expenditures. 
The Henry Review recommended that FTB A and B and 
related benefits should be replaced by a single family 
payment, covering the direct costs of raising children in a 
low-income family and assisting parents nurturing young 
children to balance work and family responsibilities. The 
rates of payment should increase with the age of the children 
to recognise the higher costs of raising older children. 
Assistance for families should also recognise that there 
are specific circumstances for which additional support is 
appropriate. The Review recommended that the total amount 
of family assistance should be withdrawn with a single means 
test to avoid cumulative withdrawal rates which create 
unnecessarily high disincentives for parents who are working. 
A single low withdrawal rate of 15–20 per cent is suggested.
For young people, the Henry Review recommended 
that youth payments should be the main form of income 
support from the age of 18 and should reflect the fact 
that most young people have lower needs than adults 
but need adequate assistance to participate in education 
and training. Dependent recipients should be subject to a 
parental income test consistent with that applying to family 
payments. Dependent older children for whom a suitable 
pathway may be leaving school and looking for work or 
combining part-time work and part-time study should have 
access to a youth payment, governed by strict participation 
requirements. Children without financial support from 
their families should continue to have access to a youth 
payment, governed by strict criteria.
The Productivity Commission has recently carried out a 
detailed review of childcare (PC 2014). The McClure Review 
recommendations on family payments (also reported to 
government but not yet released) are also relevant.
The Henry Review recommended that Childcare Benefit 
and Childcare Rebate should be combined into a single 
payment to parents (or centres) based on a percentage of 
costs. The payment should provide a high rate of subsidy 
for low-income families covering most of the costs of child 
care (up to 90 per cent) and a base rate of assistance for 
all families participating in work, education or training. The 
base rate of assistance should be set as a proportion of child 
care costs, with reference to the marginal tax rate faced by 
the majority of taxpayers. The full costs of child care should 
be covered for at-risk children and children facing multiple 
disadvantages, without participation requirements on parents.
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4.4 The personal income  
tax base
In this section, we discuss the personal income tax as 
it applies to work and business income including the 
Henry Review recommendations. We identify gaps and 
complexities in the tax base that suggest directions 
for tax reform. We then turn to the tax treatment of 
personal savings and investment in section 4.4 and 
retirement saving in section 4.5. 
Income from employment and  
fringe benefits
An Australian resident individual is taxed on all their 
income sourced from Australia or overseas, from 
employment or performing services. Most employment 
remuneration is taxed by employer withholding under 
the PAYG system. Gifts, inheritances and lottery or 
prize winnings are excluded and some income support 
transfers including childcare, family payments and the 
disability support pension are exempt from income 
tax. Deductions are allowed for the expenses of 
earning income and for some other expenses including 
charitable gifts.
In a comprehensive income tax, in addition to wages, 
salary and allowances, an individual’s assessable 
income from employment should include the market 
value of fringe benefits, or non-cash benefits received 
by them. This supports fairness by ensuring horizontal 
equity between employees who are similarly situated 
except for the form of their remuneration. It also ensures 
that maximum revenue is obtained at lowest possible 
rates and it minimizes tax planning opportunities 
available to only some workers and not others, thereby 
building resilience of the tax system.
Most non-cash remuneration derived by employees 
or their associates is captured by the FBT. The FBT 
is levied on employers in respect of fringe benefits 
provided to current, former and in some cases future 
employees and associates of employees (such as family 
members). The introduction of FBT in 1986 contributed 
substantially to broadening Australia’s personal income 
tax base. FBT is levied at the top marginal tax rate plus 
the debt levy (currently 47 per cent).
 
As shown in Table 3.1 above, FBT raised $3.9 billion 
in revenue in 2013-14. This is only a fraction of the 
total $156.3 billion raised in personal income tax. The 
FBT operates as a backstop to support the income 
tax and prevent avoidance of tax on remuneration. 
The economic incidence of FBT most likely falls on 
employees in the form of reduced wages.
While the FBT is intended to ensure a broad tax base for 
employment income, there is an array of tax expenditures 
including exemptions, concessional valuation rules 
and concessional tax rates in the FBT Act. The FBT 
benchmark comprises a tax base that includes all fringe 
benefits provided to an employee and recognizes a 
deduction to the employer for the cost of providing fringe 
benefits and the amount of FBT paid. The TES identifies 
more than 50 tax expenditures in the FBT (Treasury 
2015, Part D). 
Examples of FBT tax expenditures include FBT 
exemptions for recreational and childcare facilities on 
employer premises; concessional treatment for motor 
vehicles, meal entertainment and living-away-from-home 
accommodation; and salary-sacrificing computers and 
other work-related equipment. 
Some concessions, such as the exemption for 
minor work-related benefits, make sense from an 
administrative perspective. Others have no such 
rationale and add substantially to the complexity of 
the tax system. An industry of advisors that specialize 
in salary packaging to take advantage of these and 
other tax planning opportunities has developed over 
time. High wage employees facing the top marginal 
rate on their cash salary have a substantial incentive 
to ‘salary sacrifice’ into non-cash benefits, converting 
ordinary wage income taxable at marginal rates into 
concessionally treated fringe benefits. 
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Employee share and option plans
Concessions exist in the tax law for some kinds 
of employee share and option plans for company 
employees. These enable some workers to reduce 
their taxes on remuneration especially through 
deferred options or shares. They seek to achieve 
policy goals such as aligning the interests of 
employees and owners in business investment. 
Employee share rules were tightened in 2009, 
so that the concessions and conditions were 
fairly limited. The Government proposes to relax 
these rules so as to encourage remuneration 
in employee shares or options in particular 
for start-up or early investment companies 
(Billson 2014). This may help support innovative 
companies to invest and employ people in 
Australia; however, it means that not all workers 
are taxed equally on the same remuneration. It is 
a tax expenditure that has a potential economic 
and revenue cost as it introduces a new tax 
planning margin into the tax system.
FBT salary packaging in the 
community services sector
The largest revenue foregone in FBT tax 
expenditures arises for fringe benefits that 
are either exempt or concessionally taxed for 
employees in not-for-profit community services, 
not-for profit and public hospitals and ambulance 
services. These tax expenditures are estimated 
at $2.7 billion in revenue foregone (see Table 3.3 
above; Treasury 2015). 
Concessional taxation of salary-packaged 
fringe benefits operates to some extent as a 
wage subsidy or lower tax rate for community 
sector workers. This is of substantial importance 
to many workers in that sector (NFP Tax 
Concessions Working Group 2013), and to 
cost-constrained services, hospitals and 
ambulances that are operated by not-for-profits 
or State and Territory governments. 
It is a challenge to address the implications for 
remuneration of workers in the community and 
health sectors of removing salary packaging 
of fringe benefits. However, equal treatment of 
remuneration across all sectors is an important 
policy goal, and reform in this area would be a 
substantial simplification that would treat all low 
and moderate wage earners equally.
The Henry Review recommended that fringe benefits that 
are readily valued and attributable to employees should be 
taxed in the hands of employees like other employment 
income in the PAYG system but that the FBT should remain 
for more general, difficult to value fringe benefits. 
Reforms since the Henry Review have included tightening of 
FBT concessions for work-related items such as computers 
and so-called ‘in-house’ fringe benefits such as staff 
discounts, living-away-from-home allowances and some 
motor vehicle fringe benefits. However, there is scope for 
further base broadening reform of the FBT.
Tax deductions
An individual’s taxable income is reduced by allowable 
deductions, which are primarily expenses incurred in the 
process of earning assessable income. Australia allows a 
wide range of deductions compared to other countries, in 
relation to income derived from employment, business or 
investments (we discuss investment expenses in section 
4.5 below). 
There is considerable interpretive flexibility regarding the 
scope of allowable deductions that has fuelled extensive ATO 
guidance, audit and litigation over many years. As a matter 
of principle, the income tax is intended to tax net economic 
gain and so expenses should be recognised. However, there 
are trade-offs in respect of complexity, tax planning and 
fairness of allowing deductions in the tax system.
The value of deductions to the taxpayer increases as their 
assessable income rises. For the same $100 expense, a 
deduction is worth $49 for an individual facing a 49 per cent 
marginal tax rate, but only $19 for an individual facing the 
19 per cent tax rate. As marginal tax rates increase, there 
is a greater incentive for individuals to identify and claim 
expenses as deductions, creating planning opportunities in 
the tax system.
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Tax statistics indicate that $19.3 billion in work-related 
deductions were claimed in the 2011-12 year (ATO 2014c, 
Table 10). Each expense requires separate identification and 
record keeping. They also contribute to the heavy utilisation 
of tax agents for completing tax returns. As the costs of 
administering one’s tax affairs are deductible against one’s 
tax liability, a proportion of these costs are borne by the 
wider community. More than 75 per cent of individuals relied 
on a tax agent to file their return and deductions in excess 
of $2 billion were claimed by individuals for the cost of 
managing their tax affairs in 2011-12 (ATO 2014c, Table 10). 
The Henry Review identified the breadth and complexity 
of Australia’s work-related deductions as a problem 
of tax base design and called for a tighter nexus 
between an expense and its role in generating income 
(Recommendation 12). 
Tax structuring using companies and trusts
Tax minimisation may be achieved through the use of income 
splitting with other individuals (such as family members), or 
through the utilization of a legal entity to generate a lower tax 
rate on employment, business and investment income. 
Individuals seeking to operate a business may select 
from alternative business structures with differing tax 
consequences, including a sole trader, partnership, 
company or trust. Many individuals, especially those who 
are self-employed, have the opportunity to use a company. 
The gap between this 30 per cent company tax rate and the 
top marginal tax rate of 49 per cent is a significant driver of 
tax planning. Other options for individuals include saving in 
self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) taxed at 15 
per cent; or using trusts to split professional, business and 
personal services income among family members, thereby 
reducing the overall tax paid. 
Chart 4.8 reveals that the number of companies and 
trusts filing tax returns has more than doubled in the last 
two decades, which may be an indicator of increasing 
tax planning. The number of SMSFs has also dramatically 
increased in recent years. There are now more than 
500,000 SMSFs with nearly 1 million individual members.
Companies and trusts can be combined to achieve a lower 
tax rate on income while ensuring maximum flexibility. An 
illustrative business structure aimed at maximising tax 
benefits derived from differences in the taxation treatment of 
different entities is presented in Chart 4.9. 
In this example, a business owner establishes a family 
discretionary trust as a shareholder in a business company, 
with trust profits distributed selectively to spouses or family 
members facing lower marginal tax rates. A SMSF may 
receive salary sacrificed superannuation contributions from 
the business and may hold debt-funded investment in the 
real property of the business, generating interest deductions 
and a rental return. In addition, a company could be used as 
a trust beneficiary ‘bucket company’ to cap taxation at 30 
per cent, deferring the application of higher marginal tax rates 
until funds need to be distributed to the owners (not shown in 
illustration below). 
Some options for reform of  
tax deductions
 > The Henry Review proposed a standard 
deduction that could be used by most 
individuals instead of itemizing their expenses 
(Recommendation 11). The Rudd and Gillard 
governments canvassed this option but their 
proposal was heavily criticised as inadequate 
and overly complex (e.g. Tran-Nam and Evans 
2011) and was subsequently abandoned. 
It could simplify the system but would not 
broaden the base.
 > Cap tax deductions at a dollar level each 
year. A Gillard Government proposal to cap 
self-education expenses deductions at $2000 
on the grounds that they were being excessively 
utilised by high-income earners was heavily 
campaigned against and the incoming Abbott 
Government reversed the policy.
 > The Canadian approach: Employees can 
only deduct expenses that the employer 
specifically requires the employee to incur 
and which are specifically identified in tax law 
or administrative guidance.
 > New Zealand abolished work-related 
deductions altogether for employees in 1987, 
as part of a package of reforms that broadened 
the base and lowered personal tax rates, while 
also simplifying the system. Combined with the 
introduction in 2000 of a pre-filled ‘personal tax 
statement’, only around one quarter of New 
Zealand taxpayers have to file a tax return (Kerr 
2012, 472). 
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Chart 4.8: Trends in legal entities filing tax returns
Chart 4.9: Illustrative diagram of a small business structure
Source: ATO (2014c).
Source: Treasury.
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This kind of tax structuring is legal and widespread. However, 
where a taxpayer has a dominant purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit by tax structuring, specific or general anti-avoidance 
tax rules may apply. For example, individuals who establish 
a company to provide their own personal services may be 
required to pay tax on the income attributed to them by 
specific rules. 
Australia’s general anti-avoidance rule in Part IVA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 is widely considered to 
be quite robust. However, administering anti-avoidance 
rules is complex and resource-intensive for the tax 
administration and for individual taxpayers, as well as 
generating uncertainty. Ideally, tax law design would aim 
to ensure that widespread tax minimization practices are 
stopped by reforms to basic tax rules wherever possible. 
If tax avoidance becomes widespread, this reduces the 
progressivity of the personal tax system and narrows the 
tax base, leading to higher statutory tax rates than would 
be necessary in the absence of tax planning opportunities. 
It may give rise to a number of costs borne by the whole 
community, including:
 > additional tax compliance and administrative costs;
 > efficiency losses through tax-driven distortions of 
decisions about business structures and modes of work, 
saving and investment; 
 > the generation of wasteful and excessive profits, 
or ‘economic rents’ for facilitators of tax planning 
arrangements including in the professional advice 
industry; and
 > actual and perceived unfairness which may undermine 
voluntary compliance.
New empirical research into  
tax elasticity
New studies undertaken in other countries using 
administrative tax return data provide evidence 
that taxpayers engage extensively in tax planning 
and other behavior so as to reduce their tax 
burden (Creedy and Gemmell 2014; Slemrod and 
Gillitzer 2014). This research about the elasticity of 
responses to taxable income and rates is important 
in understanding behaviour of taxpayers in the tax 
system and in identifying weak points and priorities 
for tax reform. 
For example, a recent New Zealand study 
examined changes to taxpayer behaviour in 
response to tax rate changes. New Zealand 
reforms in the 1980s aligned the top personal tax 
rate and the tax rate for trusts and companies 
at 33 per cent. Changes introduced from 2001 
subsequently increased New Zealand’s top 
marginal tax rate to 39 per cent and lowered 
the company tax rate to 30 per cent. Empirical 
evidence from 2002, 2005 and 2007 indicates that 
individual taxable income was abnormally clustered 
at amounts just below the top marginal rate 
threshold compared to 1999 when tax rates were 
aligned (Benge and Holland 2010; New Zealand 
Inland Revenue Department 2008). 
In a UK study, a new 50 per cent income tax 
rate introduced in 2010 elicited a substantial 
behavioural response from high-income earners, 
including bringing forward the realisation of income 
(so it would be taxed at a lower rate), moving 
income overseas and converting it into other forms. 
As a result, the underlying revenue yield from the 
new tax rate was estimated at 83 per cent less 
than originally forecast (HMRC 2012).
Very little research into tax responsiveness 
has been carried out in Australia. To carry out 
research into the responsiveness of taxpayers 
to tax planning margins, changes in tax rates or 
concessions in the tax base, researchers require 
access to tax administrative data including panel 
data sets over a period of years of confidentialised 
unit record files. The TTPI aims to work with 
government agencies to ensure that such research 
is feasible, while respecting privacy and security of 
taxpayer information.
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Chart 4.10: After-tax return to a 6 per cent returning investment
Source: Murray (2014a), Chart 3.2.
4.5 Personal taxation of 
saving and investment
Different forms of personal savings and investment such 
as financial bank deposits, shares, the family home (main 
residence), investment real estate and superannuation, are 
taxed in diverse ways. As a result, the after-tax return to 
different forms of saving varies dramatically, depending on 
the type of investment and tax bracket of the investor. 
This was illustrated in the Henry Review with a stylised 
example of the after-tax return for an investment returning 
6 per cent in various sectors (Henry 2010a, Chart A1-22). 
A similar example was provided in the Murray Financial 
Systems Inquiry Interim Report (Murray 2014a). This is 
reproduced in Chart 4.10. 
Chart 4.10 shows that for most savings vehicles, as 
expected, taxation would reduce the after-tax return in 
line with the applicable individual tax rate. However, some 
investments are not taxed at all (such as the family home), 
while salary-sacrificed superannuation actually increases 
the after-tax return (i.e. provides a subsidy) for this type of 
investment. This stylised example does not take account 
of the tax deduction for interest on borrowing, or gearing 
investments that are purchased to gain assessable income, 
which also has a significant effect on the after-tax return to 
various forms of investment and can shelter other income 
from tax.
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The Murray Inquiry into the Financial System concluded that 
the unequal treatment of different forms of saving ‘distorts 
the asset composition of household balance sheets and 
the broader flow of funds in the economy’. It recommended 
a more neutral taxation treatment for consideration in the 
government’s Tax White Paper process (Murray 2014b, 
Appendix 2). 
As a consequence of the exemption or low taxation of 
returns to saving in the home and superannuation, the 
personal tax system is really a hybrid income-consumption 
tax base. It exhibits features of a consumption or 
expenditure tax in its treatment of these forms of household 
saving (Heferen 2012; Freebairn 2014). 
A comprehensive income tax would tax all real returns to 
saving equally when they are derived. A comprehensive 
expenditure tax would not tax saving at all, but would tax 
all consumption when it occurs. On this basis, applying 
an income tax to the nominal return to saving overtaxes 
this deferred consumption (saving) relative to current 
consumption (e.g. Sorenson and Johnson 2010, 207). 
Over the lifecourse, if all saving by an individual is deferred 
consumption, these two approaches would be equivalent 
from efficiency and equity perspectives. However, 
savings may be set aside for reasons other than future 
consumption. Wealth accumulation may be an end in itself, 
or aim to leave a bequest to children. 
Not all individuals have the opportunity to save and many 
low income people effectively have no net assets and 
must spend all of their current income. The distribution of 
savings is highly unequal across the household income 
distribution. Chart 2.8 demonstrates that more than sixty 
percent of household assets are owned by the top 20 per 
cent of households, while the bottom 40 per cent own just 
over 5 per cent of household assets. Australia does not tax 
inheritance or most superannuation payments on retirement 
or death, so the tax system treats savers much more 
generously than those who cannot save. In this context, 
levying tax on savings income has been an important equity 
feature of the tax system.
Henry Review recommendations for saving
There are many possible approaches and diverse views 
about what is the best way to tax savings. On the basis that 
Australia’s personal income tax should be broad-based, 
robust and efficient, the Henry Review recommended that 
the net return to saving should be taxed more consistently 
at individual marginal rates. However, it recommended that 
a lower rate be applied than for work and active business 
income and that the main residence remain tax-exempt.
Recommendation 14 (Henry et al 2010a):
Provide a 40 per cent savings income discount to 
individuals for non-business related:
 > Net interest income;
 > Net residential rental income (including related 
interest expenses);
 > Capital gains (and losses) ;and
 > Interest expenses related to listed shares
An approach such as the Henry Review proposal would 
provide a more consistent and fairer taxation of the return 
to savings. It would move Australia towards a ‘dual income 
tax’ model that taxes the return to savings at a lower, but 
comprehensive rate compared to the taxation of work 
and business income (Sorenson and Johnson 2010). 
This approach generates its own tax planning margins, 
especially incentives to convert work or business income 
to lower-taxed savings income. To some extent, these 
incentives already exist in Australia’s tax system because of 
the lower taxation of capital gains.
Interest on bank deposits
Interest on financial deposits in banks and other 
deposit-taking institutions is taxed in the same way as 
income from work, at the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. 
However, the impact of inflation means the effective income 
tax rate on interest income is higher than the statutory rate 
(Freebairn 2014, 5). This acts as a significant disincentive 
to holding savings in deposits compared with other more 
tax advantaged savings vehicles. It is unfair because it 
penalises low income people whose only saving opportunity 
is in a financial deposit. 
Dividends
Dividends are taxed at full marginal tax rates. However, 
dividends paid out of taxed Australian company 
profits to Australian shareholders may benefit from an 
imputation credit for company tax paid. This makes 
Australian company dividends an attractive investment 
for many individuals, as illustrated in Chart 4.10. 
Company-shareholder taxes are discussed in Chapter 6.
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Capital gains 
Capital gains tax (CGT) is levied as a component of income 
tax on realised gains made on the sale of assets such 
as shares or property. The introduction of CGT in 1985 
represented a significant broadening of the personal income 
tax base, although the protection of pre-1985 capital gains 
generated complexity in the system and has likely reduced 
revenues. Net capital losses can only be utilised to offset 
other capital gains and are not able to be deducted against 
other forms of taxable income. 
Most countries comparable to Australia have a capital gains 
tax, with the notable exception of New Zealand. When 
introduced, capital gains were taxed at the marginal tax rate 
with an adjustment for inflation. From 1999, CPI indexation 
was replaced with a 50 per cent CGT discount for gains 
on assets that have been held for longer than 12 months, 
following a recommendation of the Review of Business 
Taxation (Commonwealth of Australia 1999). 
The TES estimates the annual revenue foregone from the CGT 
50 per cent discount to be $5.8 billion (Table 3.3; Treasury 
2015). The Henry Review recognizes this as likely to be 
over-generous and recommends reducing it to 40 per cent 
and applying this consistently across various savings vehicles. 
The CGT is a relatively volatile source of taxation revenue 
and CGT revenues have still not recovered from the effects 
of the GFC. CGT receipts were 0.46 per cent of GDP in 
2012-13, down from a peak of 1.56 per cent of GDP in 
2007-08. Even as asset prices have recovered, carried 
forward capital losses built up during the GFC are utilised 
to offset more recent capital gains (Clark and Hollis, 2013: 
PBO 2014a, 23). Nonetheless, the uneven distribution of 
capital gains between rich and poor provides a significant 
reason to levy tax on capital gains for reasons of fairness. 
Taxing capital gains is also important as it reduces planning 
margins (e.g. conversion of income to capital gain), 
protecting the broad income tax base and supporting 
resilience of the system.
Home (main residence) exemption
The home has a particular role in consideration of saving. 
By far the largest component of Australian household wealth 
is real estate, including the family home and investment real 
estate which comprise about 60 per cent of all household 
wealth (Finlay 2012).
Investment in the home is made with after-tax income. 
However, as illustrated in Chart 4.10, the return to owning 
your own home is entirely exempt from tax. There is 
no income tax on the annual benefit from living in your 
own home (instead of paying rent), called imputed rent, 
and no tax on capital gains from sale of your home. 
Correspondingly, tax deductions for expenses such as 
mortgage interest and repairs and maintenance are not 
available for owner-occupied housing. This treatment is 
termed a ‘pre-paid consumption tax model’ that ensures 
effective tax rates on capital income from owner-occupied 
housing are close to zero (Freebairn 2014). 
The TES estimates that the combined value of home 
ownership tax expenditures exceeds $45 billion (see Table 3.3 
above; Treasury 2015). The home is also exempt from assets 
tests for transfer payments, most notably the age pension. 
The long-standing generous treatment of home ownership 
has historically been considered one of the central tenets 
of the ‘Australian promise’ that has encouraged high levels 
of home ownership and underpinned household wealth 
in Australia (Wood et al 2008). It has been criticized as 
leading to over-investment in owner-occupied housing 
in Australia (Abelson and Joyeux, 2010; Productivity 
Commission 2004); as unfair to those who cannot afford a 
home; and as undertaxing speculative gains at the top of 
the income distribution.
Rental losses
The deductibility of net losses on rental real estate or shares to 
shelter other work or business income from tax is commonly 
known as negative gearing. Interest and other expenses in 
excess of returns on the asset (rental or dividend income) are 
fully deducted against other income of the taxpayer, thereby 
reducing their overall tax paid. The property may subsequently 
be sold with only half of any capital gain subject to tax. 
Allowing a full deduction for expenses including interest, 
when only half the gain accruing will be taxed on a 
realisation basis is the main mismatch associated with 
negative gearing. This tax advantage is not estimated as a 
tax expenditure, because it is a result of the ordinary income 
tax law rule that assessable income and deductions are 
pooled in determining taxable income, in combination with 
the 50 per cent CGT discount. 
More than 1.8 million Australian taxpayers received 
$34 billion of rental income for the 2011-12 income year 
and claimed deductions totalling more than $41.8 billion 
against this income. More than half of these deductions 
were generated by loan interest on rental properties (ATO 
2014c). Negative gearing, particularly into real property 
investments, has become a preferred investment method for 
higher income earners, either directly or via a self-managed 
superannuation fund. More than 65 per cent of landlords 
have net losses that may be used to shelter other sources 
of income from tax. The growing trend in rental deductions 
and losses is illustrated in Chart 4.11.
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Chart 4.11: Trends in rental deductions and losses
Source: ATO (2014c). 
The Murray Inquiry found that the subsidy delivered by this 
asymmetric tax treatment tends to encourage leveraged 
and speculative investment in housing, generating a 
potential source of systemic risk (Murray 2014b, Appendix 
2). The Henry Review recommendation for savings taxation 
would reduce the impact of negative gearing, but would not 
eliminate it completely. Some have proposed other limits, 
for example limiting negative gearing only to new housing 
stock, to encourage increased supply, or quarrantining 
expense deductions to rental income or capital gain.
Wealth taxation 
The distribution of net worth is much more highly skewed 
than the distribution of household income, as shown in 
charts 2.6 and 2.8. However, when household net worth is 
ranked by income, net worth is less unequally distributed 
than income. That is, some lower income households have 
household wealth. The most likely factor is the lifecycle 
accumulation of wealth, particularly housing, so that older 
people who have lower than average incomes in retirement 
are more likely to own their homes. 
Australia does not tax assets as broadly as many other 
countries. We have no asset taxes, apart from land tax and 
rates on real property. Estate and gift taxes at State and 
Commonwealth levels were abolished in the early 1980s. 
Capital gains tax does not apply to the disposal of assets 
on death. 
The Henry Review recommended further study 
and consideration of options for a bequests tax 
(Recommendation 25). The Henry Review also 
recommended taxing housing through a land tax 
(Recommendation 52). We return to land tax in Chapter 6. 
Capital gains taxed on death  
in Canada
Canada has a similar CGT to Australia in many 
respects. However, unlike Australia, Canada taxes 
accrued capital gains on death of the owner, which is 
treated as a deemed disposition. The deemed capital 
gain is eligible for a 50 per cent discount on tax, like 
other capital gains. In addition, there is a lifetime 
capital gains exemption of $800,000 in 2014 and 
some exemptions for farms passed to children.
See http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/ndvdls/lf-vnts/dth/
dmd/menu-eng.html.
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Chart 4.12: Distributional impact of superannuation tax concessions
Source: Murray (2014).
4.6 Tax concessions for 
superannuation
Australia’s retirement incomes system combines public 
provision (the age pension) with private savings through 
compulsory and voluntary superannuation. Tax concessions 
for superannuation contributions and earnings are among 
the largest tax expenditures incurred by the Commonwealth 
government, estimated to be approximately $30 billion in 
revenue foregone against an income tax benchmark (see 
Table 3.3 above; Treasury 2015). The TES estimates that 
the combined cost of superannuation tax concessions will 
exceed $45 billion by 2015-16 and will continue to grow 
over the long-term with population ageing and as the 
superannuation system approaches maturity. 
Regulated superannuation funds, including SMSFs, are 
taxed at a flat rate of 15 per cent on contributions, two 
thirds of any realised capital gains held for more than a year 
and investment income. Superannuation funds can utilize 
exemptions (in the pension phase) and imputation credits on 
share investments to reduce taxes. Superannuation payouts 
and investment earnings received after people have retired 
and are drawing down their superannuation are generally 
tax-free. Superannuation may be cashed out as a lump sum 
on reaching retirement age, or may be retained as a pension 
generating tax exempt returns.
Employees may also make additional pre-tax contributions 
to superannuation, which are not included in the employee’s 
personal income and are instead taxed in the superannuation 
fund at 15 per cent. Salary sacrifice arrangements may 
reduce an employee’s taxable income and adjusted taxable 
income for transfer means testing purposes. 
The taxation treatment of superannuation contributions, 
earnings and payouts is concessional for individuals earning 
more than the effective tax-free threshold of $20,542 and 
increasingly as an individual’s marginal tax rate increases. 
High income earners pay about two thirds less tax on their 
superannuation than on other sources of income. 
In contrast, people earning less than the effective tax 
free threshold pay more tax on their superannuation 
contributions than on their personal income from work, 
while those on low marginal tax rates derive a much lower 
benefit from superannuation concessions. The bottom 50 
per cent of income earners received just 13 per cent of total 
superannuation tax concessions (Treasury 2012). 
The skewed distributional impact of superannuation tax 
concessions is shown in Chart 4.12, from the Murray Inquiry. 
It reveals that the bottom 10 per cent is actually made worse 
off under current superannuation tax arrangements.
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The growing cost of tax support for superannuation is not 
expected to reduce appreciably the extent of reliance on 
the age pension. The Treasurer recently pointed out that 
‘despite spending billions of dollars in taxation benefits for 
superannuation, by 2050 the ratio of Australians receiving 
a full or part pension will still be around four out of five’ 
(Hockey 2014a). This could be addressed, in part, by rules 
regulating access to superannuation benefits as a pension, 
or by changing tax settings.
Superannuation tax reform
There is increasing and widespread acknowledgement 
of inequities in the superannuation system; however, the 
pathway to reform is not straightforward. The Henry Review 
made significant recommendations about superannuation 
and the Murray Inquiry has also recommended that 
superannuation tax concessions be reviewed in the Tax 
White Paper. A key issue in the retirement savings system, 
including superannuation, is to be clear about the overall 
purpose of the system and the benchmark against which to 
assess tax concessions and pension conditions.
Governments have made some ad hoc attempts to 
address equity issues concerning the distribution of 
superannuation tax concessions, including introduction 
of a concessional contributions cap to limit benefits for 
contributions by high-income earners. Excess contributions 
were initially taxed at the top marginal rate and this was 
subsequently revised so that excess contributions are 
now taxed at the individual’s marginal tax rate, plus an 
interest charge. The Gillard Government introduced a 
low-income superannuation contribution which would 
refund contributions tax up to a maximum of $500 per year 
so that individuals on annual incomes up to $37,000 would 
pay no tax on their superannuation contributions, which is 
expected to continue until 2017.
The Henry Review recommended abolishing the 15 per 
cent contributions tax and instead taxing contributions at 
marginal tax rates with a tax credit of 20 per cent so the 
majority of taxpayers do not pay more than 15 per cent 
tax on contributions (2010a, 84). It estimated that this 
approach would improve fairness and increase aggregate 
superannuation savings by 17.5 per cent without changing 
the Superannuation Guarantee rate from 9 per cent. This 
would result principally from lower income earners receiving a 
greater tax benefit than under the existing flat rate tax model. 
The Review also recommended reducing superannuation 
earnings tax to 7.5 per cent, aimed at an effective average 
tax rate on earnings close to zero per cent after accounting 
for imputation credits for company tax paid on shares held 
by superannuation funds. 
Consistent with the scope of its terms of reference, the 
Henry Review did not propose changes to the taxation of 
benefits received in retirement, although it did recommend 
including superannuation end benefits in the age pension 
means test on the same basis as other forms of saving 
(other than the family home). 
In aggregate, the Henry Review’s recommendations 
would bring the taxation of superannuation closer to a 
‘pre-paid’ consumption tax treatment like the taxation of 
owner-occupied housing. This approach would entrench 
superannuation and savings in the family home as the most 
tax preferred forms of private saving, when combined with 
the other Henry Review recommendations for the 40 per 
cent savings discount, but would remove some of the most 
extreme inequities in the system. 
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C H A P T E R  5  C O M P A N Y  T A X
M A I N  P O I N T S 
 > Australia’s company tax is long established. 
Australia raises substantially more revenue than 
many other countries in company tax. 
 > The company tax rate is 30 per cent and the 
effective tax rate is estimated to be close to that rate, 
demonstrating that the company tax has a broad 
base with few exemptions. The Australian nominal 
and effective company tax rates are higher than the 
OECD average including Canada and New Zealand. 
 > Economic modelling of the company tax in a 
global economy suggests that it may deter foreign 
investment and so its economic incidence is shifted 
from capital to be borne largely by Australian 
workers or consumers. A reform implication of this 
modelling is that a lower company tax rate would 
lead to increased national wellbeing. This also has 
implications for reforming the corporate-shareholder 
imputation system.
 > However, the specific benefits of lowering the 
company tax rate are difficult to assess. Australia’s 
company tax collects revenues from economic rents 
including from the resource sector. It is an important 
backstop to the personal income tax and the 
corporate-shareholder imputation system provides a 
significant incentive for Australian companies to pay 
company tax. A lower company tax rate would have 
implications for the boundary between the personal 
and corporate income tax systems, by increasing 
tax planning margins.
 > Tax planning margins exist for both international 
and domestic tax planning. Multinational enterprises 
carry out sophisticated tax planning that may reduce 
their Australian and global tax rates to zero or 
close to it. The OECD BEPS project internationally, 
and Australia domestically, are taking some steps 
to increase country cooperation to prevent base 
erosion. It is not clear how successful these efforts 
will be in protecting the company tax base.
 > The complexity of the company tax system is 
particularly important for small and medium 
enterprises, with current tax rules creating both 
planning, margins and compliance challenges.
 > There are overlaps with other business tax entity 
rules, especially the taxation of trusts and whether 
SMEs should benefit from specific tax policies.
 > As indicated by the Henry Review, further research 
is needed into the best long-term approach to 
company tax for Australia. The Henry Review 
considered a business level expenditure tax as 
worthy of future consideration.
5.1 Company tax role  
and revenues
Australia’s company income tax is long established, 
dating back to 1915. Company tax provides a significant 
proportion of Australia’s total tax revenues and is an 
important part of Australia’s overall tax mix. There is 
widespread policy and academic debate about the future 
role and structure of company taxation in the context of the 
challenges of a global digital economy and declining growth 
and productivity identified in Chapter 2. 
Company tax is levied at the rate of 30 per cent. Resident 
companies that are incorporated in Australia or have 
their central management and control located in Australia 
are subject to company tax on worldwide taxable profits 
including capital gains. Non-resident companies are liable 
for company tax on Australian-sourced profits. Company 
losses may be carried forward indefinitely and applied 
against taxable income in a later year. A short-lived reform 
by the Rudd/Gillard Government to allow carry back of tax 
losses has been repealed. 
Since 1987, Australia’s company tax has been integrated 
with a shareholder dividend imputation system. A 30 per 
cent credit (called a franking credit) for Australian company 
tax paid is available on franked dividends distributed to 
Australian shareholders. As franking credits are valued 
by Australian shareholders, the corporate-shareholder 
imputation system affects corporate behaviour and 
incentives in respect of the location of investment, financing 
and distribution policy. These issues were identified in the 
Henry Review and we discuss them in section 5.4 below.
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Chart 5.1: Growth in company tax as a percentage of GDP
Source: National Accounts. ABS Cat. No. 5204, Table 30. 
Note: The measure of corporate taxation used in the national accounts is the income receivable from resident corporations. This may exclude some 
revenue collected from non-resident corporations.
Company tax revenue
Company tax raised $66.9 billion in 2013-14 (see Table 
3.1 above). Combined with PRRT and MRRT (the latter 
now repealed), it contributed about 6 per cent of GDP 
in revenue, or more than 20 per cent of Commonwealth 
taxes. Actual company tax receipts, and company tax 
revenue as a proportion of GDP, have grown strongly since 
the early 1980s. 
Chart 5.1 shows that company tax revenues peaked at 5.1 
per cent of GDP in 2007-08 after growing at an average 
rate of 17 per cent in the five years prior to this peak. 
The growth in company tax revenue over the last thirty years 
closely follows growth of corporate income as a share of 
GDP (PBO 2014a, 13-15). Corporate gross operating surplus 
(a measure of corporate profitability) has grown from 15.2 per 
cent of GDP in 1982-83 to 22.8 per cent of GDP in 2012-13. 
Incorporated entities accounted for around 75 per cent of 
gross business profit in 2012-13, compared with around 60 
per cent three decades earlier (PBO 2014a, 14-15). 
This upward trend in growth of company tax revenues may 
now have come to an end as a result of a number of factors. 
These now include a stock of carry-forward losses since 
the GFC; the challenge of the third phase of the mining 
boom including declining terms of trade, leading to lower 
nominal GDP growth and a fall in the relative profit shares of 
the mining sector relative to other sectors of the economy 
(Treasury 2013b, 4-16 to 4-19). 
Australia’s company tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP compared with selected other countries is shown 
in Chart 5.2. Australia raises substantially more revenue 
from company tax than most comparable countries. More 
than half of Australian company tax revenue ($39.92 
billion in 2011-12) is raised from just over 1,000 very large 
companies with a turnover of $250 million or more each 
year (ATO 2014c, Table 20).
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Chart 5.2: Company tax level as a percentage of GDP, selected countries, 2011-2012
Source: OECD (2014d).
Company tax rate
Increasing globalisation and national economic openness 
have coincided with a reduction in company tax rates 
across the globe in the last three decades. Chart 5.3 
compares Australia’s company tax rate with selected other 
countries in the OECD and the region. 
In line with global trends, Australia’s company tax rate has 
been reduced significantly since the 1980s but the current 
30 per cent rate is relatively high by international standards 
and has been stable since 1999. 
New Zealand’s company tax rate is 28 per cent which is 
only a few percentage points below its top personal income 
tax rate of 33 per cent. This reduces the attractiveness 
of tax planning using legal entities and simplifies the tax 
system for business.
As is well known, the Irish company tax rate (not shown in 
Chart 5.3) is one of the lowest in a developed country, at 
12.5 per cent, and Ireland is used as a global base by many 
multinational enterprises.
Chart 5.3: Statutory company tax rate, selected countries 
Source: IBFD (2014). 
Note: Rates in some countries are progressive and are lower for small companies. The rate for Switzerland is the average after applying canton and 
commune rates deductible against the federal rate. The rate for Canada combines the 15 per cent federal rate with provincial company tax rates which 
add about 10 per cent on average.
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Chart 5.4: Top personal tax rate and company tax rate, selected countries
Source: IBFD (2014).
The Abbott Government announced its intention in the 
2014-15 Budget to lower the company tax rate to 28.5 per 
cent effective 1 July 2015 for companies with a turnover 
of less than $50 million (Treasury 2014a). Implementing 
legislation has not yet been enacted. 
In many countries, including Australia, the company tax 
rate is significantly lower than the top personal income tax 
rate. This creates incentives for individuals to plan their 
affairs through a company, as explained in section 4.4. It 
also creates incentives for the retention of profits inside 
a company rather than distributing them as dividends 
to shareholders, even in a system such as Australia that 
provides a credit for company tax. Consequently, in some 
countries, a policy of lowering the company tax rate has 
been linked to downward adjustments to the top personal 
income tax rate (Auerbach 2010, 63-64). 
UK and Canada reduce company  
tax rates
Effective 1 April 2014, the UK reduced its company 
tax rate to 21 per cent and proposed a ‘patent box’ 
which offers a preferential 10 per cent corporate tax 
rate for income from patents, designed to improve 
the competitiveness of the UK tax system for 
technology-driven companies (HM Treasury, 2013). 
The Canadian federal rate of company tax was 
reduced in stages to 15 per cent by 2012. This is 
equivalent to an overall corporate tax rate of around 
25 per cent, taking into account company taxes 
levied by the Canadian provinces (Hodge 2012). 
5.2 Effective company tax 
rate and the tax base
It is important to understand not only the nominal tax rate 
but also the effective company tax rate taking account of 
the definition of the company tax base (taxable profit). The 
PBO has estimated Australia’s effective company tax rate, 
by calculating company tax receipts as a proportion of 
corporate profits the economy. Chart 5.5 presents these 
estimates and tracks changes in the nominal and effective 
company tax rates over the last three decades. The chart 
does not distinguish between different sectors or industries.
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Chart 5.5 indicates that although Australia’s statutory 
company tax rate has come down significantly since the 
1980s, the effective tax rate has remained close to the 
current statutory rate of 30 per cent. This is a result of base 
broadening measures, including the removal of concessional 
investment allowances and accelerated depreciation for 
plant and equipment. It is consistent with trends in other 
countries until the 1990s, which show a close association 
between reductions in company tax rates and broadening 
of the company tax base (Loretz 2008). It may also indicate 
that the dividend imputation system has a significant effect 
in encouraging Australian companies to pay tax, so as to 
distribute franked dividends to shareholders.
Marginal effective company tax rate
The effective company tax rate can also be indicated by the 
tax wedge, or marginal effective cost of capital on corporate 
investment (Fullerton and King 1984). This measure 
produces a marginal effective company tax rate which aims 
to identify the tax cost of the next dollar of investment by a 
company, taking account of the nominal tax rate, expense 
and depreciation deductions and the tax treatment of debt 
and equity finance. 
A recent comparative study of 90 countries indicates that 
Australia’s marginal effective company tax rate is just over 
25 per cent (Chen and Mintz 2013). Chart 5.6 shows 
Australia’s marginal effective company tax rate is several 
percentage points higher than estimated rates for the UK, 
Canada and New Zealand, as well as the OECD average. 
Not surprisingly, it is also significantly higher than regional 
competitors for capital investment: Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Business tax expenditures
We can examine the definition of taxable profits for a 
company (the business tax base), to identify concessions 
and to estimate the revenue foregone from these business 
tax expenditures. 
There are more than 100 tax expenditures related to business 
income that can operate to reduce a company’s tax liability 
below the statutory corporate tax rate (Treasury 2015). 
However, most of these reduce revenue by a relatively small 
amount. Table 5.1 sets out the largest estimated business tax 
expenditures including exemptions from interest withholding 
tax on certain cross-border financial securities, accelerated 
write-off periods for certain assets in the oil and gas 
industries and heavy vehicles in the transport and agriculture 
sectors, depreciation concessions for small businesses and 
research and development tax concessions. 
Chart 5.5: Trends in effective company tax rate compared to statutory company tax rate
Source: PBO (2014a).
Note: The effective company tax rate is calculated as the ratio of company tax receipts (excluding capital gains tax) to net operating surplus  
of companies.
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Chart 5.6: Marginal effective tax rate on corporate investment, selected countries
Source: Chen and Mintz (2013).
Table 5.1: Largest business income tax expenditures
Source: Treasury (2015).
Note: Excise concessions such as the diesel fuel rebate were considered by the Henry Review not as a subsidy for fuel use but rather as a credit 
for fuel as a business input. It is not a tax expenditure in the income tax, so is not included here (Henry et al 2008a, 288).
Tax Expenditure Revenue Forgone
(estimate $m)
Statutory effective life caps (concessional depreciation for some equipment) (Item B73) 1945
Exemption from interest withholding tax on certain securities (Item B14) 1860
Small business—simplified depreciation rules (Item B81) 1265
Research and development tax offset (Item B80) 1070
Deduction for capital works expenditure (Item B75) 555
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Comparing the data in Table 5.1 with Table 3.1, it can be 
seen that the tax expenditures available for businesses cost 
much less in revenue foregone than those in the personal 
income tax and GST. 
It should be noted that the TES does not estimate revenue 
foregone from Australia’s international tax rules for 
companies, which are treated as part of the company tax 
benchmark. Nor does it estimate revenue foregone from 
difficulties in enforcing tax rules for transfer pricing or the 
treatment of business intangible assets. We discuss these 
challenges in section 5.4 below.
5.3 Company tax in a  
global economy
The future of the company tax is an important tax policy 
question for Australia that requires further research. The 
Henry Review considered underlying economic principles 
for company taxation in an international context.
Why levy company tax?
A company is a legal fiction and not a real person. 
Consequently, a company cannot itself bear the economic 
incidence of company tax but rather is a proxy or 
intermediary for taxation of others. Company tax may be 
borne by shareholders, employees or customers as explained 
in Chapter 1, because the economic incidence may be 
shifted from capital owners through wage and price effects. 
The ‘classical’ approach to corporate taxation is a tax 
on income where it is earned, levied on the full return to 
equity after expenses are deducted. In this ‘classical’ 
system, without relief for shareholders on distributed profits 
or capital gains, company tax acts as a surcharge that 
raises the cost of capital and hence reduces the level of 
investment. The rate of return to an investor needs to be, at 
a minimum, sufficient to meet both the cost of capital and 
the tax liability in order for the investment to proceed. 
The assumption of the ‘classical’ system is that the 
additional tax is borne by the investor. However, if capital 
is mobile, investment may shift and the company tax may 
be borne effectively by workers or customers because of 
lower investment.
If companies do not bear company tax, why levy it? The 
Henry Review acknowledged that a key function of the 
company tax is to operate as a backstop to the personal 
income tax, collecting a level of tax from the company as 
agent or proxy for domestic shareholders. If there was no 
company tax, there would be an overwhelming incentive 
for individuals to derive and hold returns to business and 
services in a company. 
Even in our current system, there is a significant tax 
planning margin between the top personal income tax rate 
of 49 per cent and the company tax rate of 30 per cent 
that encourages derivation and accumulation of earnings 
inside companies. This is shown in Chart 5.4 above and 
discussed in Chapter 4. If the company tax rate is lowered, 
this tax planning incentive will increase.
Company tax is easier to administer than personal income 
tax. Collected by instalments throughout the year, it 
ensures a steady revenue stream, which is less easy to 
enforce for individuals in receipt of non-wage income. 
Company tax also operates as a charge for the benefit of 
public goods consumed by the company or its investors. 
In particular, company tax ensures that profits that are 
retained within companies or distributed to non-resident 
shareholders are subject to Australian tax (Sorenson and 
Johnson 2010, 206; Vann 2014). 
Finally and importantly, company tax ensures that economic 
rents are taxed. These are above-normal returns in excess of 
the cost of capital plus compensation for risk associated with 
the investment. Where there are economic rents, for example 
from natural resource or monopoly markets, company 
tax may be able to be levied without affecting investment 
(Devereux and Sorenson, 2006).
Effects of company tax on foreign 
investment into Australia
There is significant debate about the ‘international 
competitiveness’ of Australia’s company tax. It is argued 
that the statutory company tax rate may have a negative 
impact on Australia’s attractiveness for international 
investment in a global economy. 
As our revenue statistics and Chart 5.1 shows, Australia 
continues to collect company tax effectively. The policy 
question is whether the company tax is for the national benefit 
or whether it may have an effect of reducing investment into 
Australia to the detriment of all. While economic modelling and 
the empirical evidence of other countries suggests a direction 
for tax reform, it is not clear what would be the best way 
forward for Australia in this regard.
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Economic models and taxes  
on capital
Statutory company tax rates appear to be trending 
downwards across the globe. There is evidence 
that in reducing company tax rates, governments 
are responding to global economic pressures 
including capital mobility. 
Furceri and Karras (2010) draw on annual data for 
30 OECD nations from 1965 to 2007 to analyse the 
tax structures of these countries. They find broad, 
statistically significant and robust empirical support 
suggesting that the smaller a country’s size and 
the greater the openness of its economy, the more 
it relies on consumption taxes and less on income 
taxes including company tax.
These trends are consistent with economic 
modelling of the ideal tax system for a country that 
has a small open economy (for example, Hines 
and Summers 2009; Loretz, 2008). A ‘small open 
economy’ is defined as an economy in which 
the cost of capital is set globally. This modelling 
predicts that international competition will drive 
down company tax (and other taxes on mobile 
capital) to zero because capital flight will occur 
to lower taxed jurisdictions. Thus, a zero or low 
company tax would be most efficient. However, 
there is not universal agreement that even if capital 
is mobile, it would be efficient to levy zero tax 
on capital. Some researchers conclude that it is 
efficient to levy some tax on capital in a global 
economy but it is not clear what level is ideal (for 
example, Diamond and Saez 2011).
Countries are competing not only for investment but 
also for the ability to tax corporate profits earned 
on those investments (Matthews 2011, 7). A recent 
Treasury study suggests that as an open economy 
relying substantially on foreign capital investment, 
the final costs of company tax in Australia are borne 
largely by labour (Rimmer et al 2014).
The Henry Review found that there is strong evidence that 
company tax is a significant factor in business decisions 
about where to invest, how much to invest, what to invest 
in and where to record company profits. It concluded that 
Australia’s company tax system likely makes it more difficult 
to attract foreign investment into sectors other than the 
resource industry—such as services and manufacturing—
which have fewer location-specific advantages (Henry et al 
2010a, 39). 
Distortions in the company-shareholder  
tax system
Australia’s corporate-shareholder imputation system 
assumes that the increased cost of capital arising from 
company tax is borne by the shareholder/investor. Australia 
reduces this ‘double taxation’ of corporate profits by 
integrating corporate and personal income taxes through 
a dividend imputation system that provides a credit for 
company tax paid. Australia’s reduced CGT applicable to 
sale of shares also alleviates to some extent the ‘double tax’ 
on corporate profit.
A consequence of this system is that imputation credits 
are highly valued by Australian resident shareholders, 
including individuals and superannuation funds that invest 
the retirement savings of most Australian workers. The 
attractiveness of imputation credits appears to increase 
the incentive for Australian resident companies to pay tax 
in Australia (Henry et al 2010b, 155; Ikin and Tran 2013). 
It also may affect corporate behaviour and incentives 
in respect of the location of investment, financing and 
distribution policy. 
This system creates different incentives for Australian 
companies with predominantly Australian shareholders, 
who value franking credits, and for foreign companies, or 
companies with predominantly foreign shareholders. In 
contrast to domestic shareholders, non-resident shareholders 
cannot access the dividend imputation system and it is not 
available for foreign profit of Australian companies. 
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Foreign investment by Australian companies is less attractive 
than domestic investment because there are no imputation 
credits for foreign tax paid. On a net basis, Australia remains 
a capital importer but there is now a very significant share of 
foreign investment by Australian companies.24 To minimize 
their disadvantage in doing foreign investment, Australian 
companies may seek to fund foreign investment with debt 
instead of equity, while foreign companies also prefer debt-
funded investment into Australia. 
While a possible solution to encourage inbound investment 
is to lower the company tax rate, a possible solution to 
support outbound Australian investment is to extend the 
dividend imputation system to some level of foreign tax 
paid. Either reform would cost significant company tax 
revenue and requires further research.
Multinational tax planning: can countries 
cooperate to protect the tax base?
As stated in Chapter 2, a key challenge to the effectiveness 
of Australia’s company tax is the global digital economy. The 
Henry Review was aware of the challenge of international 
profit shifting, which it viewed as ‘an important constraint 
on tax policy in an open economy’ such as Australia with a 
source-based corporate tax system (Henry et al 2014b, 155). 
However, in the last five years there has been a significant 
increase in public and policy attention paid to the tax 
minimization activities of multinational corporations, especially 
but not only ‘digital’ companies such as Google and Apple, 
including a Senate Inquiry into Corporate Tax Avoidance.25 
The increasing challenges of protecting Australia’s 
company tax base in the face of the expanding role of 
multinational corporations, the growing digital economy 
and global tax competition are indicated by the BEPS 
project of the OECD (2013) and policy developments in 
Australia (Treasury 2013c).
24 ABS Cat. 5352.0 (2 May 2013) available from www.abs.gov.au .
25 See www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Comittees/ 
   Senate/Economics/Corporate_Tax_Avoidance.
It is difficult to assess the size and revenue impact of 
the BEPS problem or the efficiency costs of alternative 
responses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some foreign 
companies are paying little or no Australian tax. This may be 
because of financing, transfer pricing and the increased use 
of payments such as royalties or service fees on business 
intangibles, or the out-dated nature of basic international tax 
concepts such as business enterprise and source of income. 
There are incentives for businesses with cross-border 
investment to ‘thinly capitalize’ their Australian operations, 
generating higher tax deductions for interest in Australia. 
In response to these tax planning margins, the company tax 
law contains many rules designed to preserve its integrity 
by limiting the ability of companies taking advantage of 
inconsistencies in the treatment of company financing 
structures and expense deductions. 
The kind of complex tax planning aimed at minimizing 
taxation globally is illustrated by the so-called ‘Double Irish 
-Dutch Sandwich’ tax minimisation arrangement shown in 
Chart 5.7. This structure capitalises on particular design 
features of the US tax system, on the low Irish company 
tax rate of 12.5 per cent and on the ability to flow through 
cross-border payments in the Dutch tax system. In this 
kind of tax structure, within the multinational corporation 
payments including royalties or services payments for digital 
intangible property, such as patents or brand names, flow 
from high tax to low tax or haven jurisdictions.
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Chart 5.7: The double Irish-Dutch sandwich
Source: Image available at http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Mt-Rl6oBvDc/UjmxxK6epVI/AAAAAAAAAGU/le3_uNdNSE0/s1600/Double+Irish+Dutch+sandwich.jpg 
Australia’s recent leadership role as the 2014 Chair of 
the G20 Forum has provided added impetus to the 
BEPS agenda. The Government has focused on gaining 
international agreement on the exchange of information in 
relation to BEPS activities and multilateral implementation 
of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan (OECD 2013a). On 
the domestic front, reforms that have already been 
implemented include:
 > updating Australia’s transfer pricing arrangements so that 
they align with standards recommended by the OECD;
 > broadening of the general anti-avoidance rule; 
 > introduction of a new integrity measure to prevent 
‘dividend washing’, a practice that allows entities through 
the timed sale and repurchase of shares to claim two 
sets of franking credits on what is effectively the same 
economic interest;
 > tightening Australia’s ‘thin capitalisation’ rules by reducing 
the debt to equity limit to 60 per cent to address 
multinational profit shifting through debt loading in 
Australian subsidiaries; and
 > increased transparency in public reporting of multinational 
tax paid, effective 1 July 2015.
The Abbott Government has stepped back from or 
revised some tax integrity measures proposed by previous 
governments, citing concerns about regulatory costs 
and their likely effectiveness as well as a lack of evidence 
supporting changes (Cormann 2014).
Increasing global tax coordination may hold a solution for 
some of these challenges but is difficult to achieve, while it 
is unclear to what extent Australia as a single nation can or 
should influence or benefit from these developments.
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5.4 Large, medium and  
small enterprises 
Australia’s company tax system contains a large number 
of special rules and concessions and complex integrity 
rules, tax administration practices and record keeping 
requirements. The tax treatment of a business depends to 
a large extent on how it is structured, for example, whether 
it operates as a single consolidated corporate group; as 
an unconsolidated group of companies; or using a mix of 
companies and trusts, as is common for SMEs.26
Since 2002, Australian wholly owned corporate groups 
may irrevocably elect to be taxed as a single corporate 
entity under a tax consolidation regime. Chart 5.8 
shows that large corporate groups elect to consolidate. 
Consolidated groups can carry forward and offset 
tax losses between companies in the group and can 
transfer business assets within the group without tax 
consequences, improving efficiency in operations.
Chart 5.8 shows that while small and medium corporate 
groups can choose to consolidate, many do not. A primary 
reason is complexity and tax costs that arise when 
26 For more detail on tax law applicable to these   
   enterprises, see Cooper et al (2012).
mergers and acquisitions take place. This disadvantages 
smaller businesses which cannot take advantage of loss 
offsetting and asset rollovers.
Utilising survey data, Evans et al (2014) have estimated 
that the overall level of tax compliance costs for SMEs is 
around $18 billion or approximately 1.2 per cent of GDP, 
and around 14 per cent of total tax revenue raised from the 
SME sector. The costs of compliance with Commonwealth, 
State and Territory taxes for large corporations (with annual 
turnover in excess of $250 million) are in the order of $0.40 
per $1,000 of annual turnover.
Some minor small business recommendations of the Henry 
Review were introduced by the Rudd/Gillard government. 
These included, from 1 July 2012, an instant asset 
write-off providing small businesses with an immediate 
deduction for assets costing less than $6,500 and for 
the first $5,000 of a motor vehicle, and a further reform 
recommended by the Henry Review allowing companies 
to carry back losses up to $1 million annually (both now 
repeated). The Gillard Government also introduced a 
re-targeted and more generous research and development 
(R&D) tax incentive for small and medium enterprises from 
1 July 2011 (Treasury 2013a). 
Chart 5.8: Proportion of wholly owned groups consolidated for tax
Source: Board of Taxation (2012, 70) from ATO data for income years 2009 to 2011.
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The Government proposes to reduce the company tax 
rate to 28.5 per cent, with the primary goal of helping 
small business. More research and policy work is needed 
into whether the design of ‘one size fits all’ rules for all 
companies is the best approach for efficiency and tax 
system resilience. However, designing a separate tax 
system for small business also produces difficulties. 
5.5 Taxing the return to 
extraction of resources
The economic return from the extraction of Australia’s 
natural resources is taxed at the Commonwealth level 
through company tax and PRRT and by State and Territory 
governments through royalties. The States are sovereign 
owners of the resources in their jurisdiction including 
minerals, oil and gas and levy royalties which are generally 
based on a percentage of the value or in some cases the 
volume of production.27 There is wide variation in royalty 
rates both across States and Territories and resource types. 
The Commonwealth Government levies PRRT at a rate 
of 40 per cent on profit (resource rent) from petroleum 
projects, including from most offshore operations and, 
since 1 July 2012, in respect of the North-West Shelf and 
onshore petroleum and gas projects. A company’s PRRT 
liability is deductible from its taxable income for corporate 
tax purposes. 
In recognition of the unique features of onshore petroleum 
projects, the on-shore PRRT regime allows a tax credit for 
State and Territory royalties and other resource taxes against 
PRRT liabilities, and allows deductions for environmental and 
native title payments with a sufficient nexus to an onshore 
gas or oil project.
27 An exception is the ACT, which does not have a minerals extraction industry.
The Henry Review recommended enacting a minerals 
resource profits tax that would be similar to the PRRT and 
apply to profits above the normal rate of return, from mineral 
extraction in Australia. The MRRT came into force on 1 July 
2012 and was repealed effective 1 July 2014 by the Abbott 
government, consistent with its election commitment.
The final design of the MRRT was substantially different 
to that envisaged by the Henry Review (Hogan 2012). It 
applied only to iron ore and coal and was criticized as highly 
complex, with significant compliance costs relative to the 
small amount of revenue raised (Treasury 2014a, 5-16). 
Rather than allowing for the abolition of mining royalties 
(Hogan 2012, 250-251) as envisaged by the Henry Review, 
the design of the MRRT created incentives for State and 
Territory governments to increase royalties on projects 
subject to the MRRT, because royalty payments were 
credited against MRRT liabilities; several states including 
Western Australia and Queensland increased mining 
royalties as a result. 
The tax reform agenda since the release of the Henry 
Review has been substantially dominated by the fate of the 
Rudd/Gillard Government’s MRRT. The prospects are, for 
the foreseeable future, that Australia will be reliant on the 
PRRT and State and Territory royalties for ensuring that the 
community receives an adequate return from the exploitation 
of the nation’s mineral reserves. More research is needed 
into the efficiency effects and resilience of royalties, as a 
significant source of revenue for some State governments.
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5.6 Directions for company 
tax reform
The Henry Review’s recommendations for company tax 
were aimed at reducing the overall tax burden on investment 
to improve Australia’s attractiveness as a destination for 
capital, improving the efficiency of Australia’s regime for 
charging for the exploitation of its non-renewable resources, 
encouraging greater innovation and entrepreneurial activity 
and promoting higher national incomes through a more 
efficient corporate tax system that supported capital 
investment and improved productivity. 
These objectives were reflected in five key reform directions 
for the corporate tax system (Henry et al 2010a). Most of 
these reforms have not been implemented:
 > Reducing the burden of company taxation, in particular 
by targeting the company tax rate towards the lower 
end of the small- to medium-OECD economy average, 
aiming for a reduction to 25 per cent in the medium term 
(Recommendation 27);
 > Supporting innovation and corporate risk taking through 
more symmetric taxation treatment of gains (which are 
taxed as they are realised) and losses by introducing a 
loss carry back arrangement allowing excess losses to be 
realised immediately by being credited against tax paid in 
previous years (Recommendation 31);
 > Reducing investment biases in favour of particular assets 
and industries through measures such as introducing 
simpler and more uniform capital allowance rules that 
more closely match economic depreciation (the decline 
in the market value of an asset over a period) and 
rationalising capital gains tax concessions and expanding 
and simplifying depreciation arrangements for small 
businesses (Recommendations 28, 29 and 30);
 > Introducing, at the same time as a lower company tax 
rate, a broad-based resource rent tax levied at the 
Commonwealth level and shared with the States and 
Territories, allowing for the removal of existing inefficient 
State and Territory-based royalties (Recommendations 45 
to 50); and
 > Given the challenges of sustaining over time an efficient 
and internationally competitive corporate tax system for 
attracting foreign capital investment, considering further 
the merits of a business-level expenditure tax, along 
with reconsideration of the long-term future of dividend 
imputation (Recommendations 26 and 37 to 40).
The previous government established a Business Tax 
Working Group to examine the possibility of a company 
tax cut funded from within the company tax base (BTWG 
2012). It examined a range of options for fully funding a 
company tax cut of two to three percentage points—the 
level considered necessary to drive a significant investment 
response—with base broadening measures targeting 
remaining exemptions and concessions but was unable to 
recommend a package of reforms. 
Given the current fiscal situation, lowering the company 
tax rate to 25 per cent seems unlikely without other major 
reform. The Henry Review noted ‘the benefits of attracting 
mobile investment to Australia by reducing the company 
income tax rate must be balanced against the loss of tax 
revenue that could have been collected via the company tax 
from location-specific investments, such as investments in 
non-renewable resource projects’ (Henry et al 2010b, 228). 
There is limited international experience with alternative 
forms of corporate income taxation, such as a business-level 
expenditure tax. There are also clear challenges resolving 
practical issues such as transitioning to a new system and 
integration with the personal tax system, this requires further 
research and policy analysis in coming years.
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 > State and Territory governments have broad power 
to tax but raise only about 18 per cent of total tax 
revenue. This imbalance has existed since the 
federation. The payroll tax, stamp duties and property 
taxes raise most revenue for States and Territories.
 > Nonetheless, Australia taxes the bases of 
consumption, payroll and land less than many 
comparable countries. There is scope to broaden 
each of these bases to improve the revenue of the 
States and Territories, making the tax system more 
efficient and resilient.
 > The GST raises about 13 per cent of total tax revenue 
and is provided entirely to the States and Territories, 
equalized for tax and expenditure capacity. The GST 
is Australia’s only broad-based tax on consumption. 
It applies at a flat 10 per cent rate on a wide range 
of goods and services but there are exemptions or 
input-taxed elements making up more than half of the 
GST base. The rate of GST is lower in Australia than 
in many comparable countries.
 > Payroll tax is paid by businesses and if 
comprehensive, is equivalent to a tax on wages. 
Australia’s State and Territory payroll taxes have 
various thresholds and exemptions which introduce 
distortions for business decisions and make them 
less efficient than otherwise.
 > Property taxes raise under 3 per cent of GDP across 
all governments, lower than in many other countries.
 > State and Territory property taxes are designed 
less efficiently than they could be. Land taxes and 
council rates are the most efficient taxes, according 
to economic models, but the base warrants reform. 
Stamp duties are easy to collect but their incidence is 
likely to deter individuals from moving when personal 
ircumstances change, while revenues are volatile. 
However, reform is challenging politically and may 
have an impact on housing markets; a long term 
transition may be required. The ACT reform provides 
an example.
 > Insurance taxes are inefficient and create incentives 
to under-insure. These taxes would ideally be 
abolished and revenues raised through broad-based 
land taxes
6.1 State taxes
In spite of their broad constitutional power to tax, the States 
and Territories raise only about 18 per cent of total tax 
revenue in Australia. About 85 per cent of that proportion is 
raised by State and Territory governments and 15 per cent 
by local governments. Taxing capacity is uneven across 
States and Territories and as explained in Chapter 3, these 
governments raise only about half of their expenditures in 
taxation. The richest and most populous states of New South 
Wales (NSW) and Victoria raise by far the most tax revenues.
Chart 6.1 sets out State taxes in total and by State or 
Territory; royalty revenues; and GST revenue allocation, in 
2012. The main tax bases are payroll tax; taxes on property 
transactions and land value; and motor vehicle taxes. States 
and territories also impose a range of other taxes including 
insurance levies, motor vehicle taxes and gambling taxes. 
Detailed information is provided in Table 6.1.
As explained in Chapter 3, the GST is collected by the 
Commonwealth Government with all GST revenues distributed 
to the States and Territories. In return for this arrangement 
established in 1999, the States and Territories undertook to 
abolish a range of minor taxes and duties. Accommodation 
tax, financial institutions duty, quoted marketable securities 
duty and debits taxes were all abolished by 2005. 
State and Territory governments subsequently agreed 
to abolish in stages a further tranche of taxes including 
stamp duties on mortgages, leases, and credit and rental 
arrangements. No agreement was reached on the abolition 
of insurance taxes, payroll tax or stamp duties on the sale of 
residential properties (Treasury 2007). Progress in abolishing 
remaining taxes has been mixed, with some listed taxes yet 
to be abolished.
This chapter does a survey of key issues relating to the GST 
and the main State tax bases of payroll tax and property and 
insurance tax. The chapter does not discuss in detail the 
issue of vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia’s federation, or 
the formula applied to determine horizontal fiscal equalization 
for distribution of GST revenues. However, these issues are 
fundamental to the Commonwealth Government White Paper 
processes for reform of the tax system and of the federation.
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Total ($m) Proportion 
of total State 
and local 
tax revenue 
including 
royalties and 
GST
NSW
($m)
VIC
($m)
QLD
($m)
SA
($m)
WA
($m)
TAS
($m)
NT
($m)
ACT
($m)
Payroll tax 20,752 15.0% 6.953 4,751 3,740 1,077 3,415 291 205 320
Stamp duty on real property 
transfers
12,610 9.1% 4,568 3,332 1,887 773 1,785 139 126 231
Motor vehicle taxes 8,399 6.1% 2,728 1,811 1,995 545 1,109 151 60 132
Gambling taxes 5,439 3.9% 1,873 1,745 1,034 421 218 93 55 54
Land tax 6,193 4.5% 2,333 1,589 990 562 559 89 0 71
Insurance taxes 5,526 4.0% 2,029 1,628 670 429 576 87 42 65
Other taxes (a) 4,173 3.0% 1,502 774 742 310 417 63 2 363
Total State tax revenue 63,219 45.8% 21,986 15,630 11,058 4,117 8,079 913 490 1236
Local government taxes 
(rates)
13,902 10.0% 3,624 3,890 3,023 1,238 1,695 335 97
Total State and Local tax 
revenue
77,411 55.9% 25,610 19,520 14,081 5,355 9,774 1,248 587 1,236
Royalties (b) 12,171 8.8% 2,128 46 3,651 232 5,937 55 122 0
GST (equalized allocation) (c) 48,395 35.3% 14,666 10,947 9,478 4,463 2,907 1,694 2734 984
Total State and Local 
Revenue including 
royalties and GST
138,517 100% 42,583 30,663 27,399 14,165 14,518 3,007 1,562 4,072
Source: ABS (2014c).
Notes: (a) ‘Other taxes’ for the ACT includes rates (local government taxes) as it has no smaller local governmental bodies that levy rates. 
(b) Royalties on natural resources for 2012-13, Commonwealth Grants Commission (2012), Interim Report, Table 4.2.
(c) GST allocations for 2012-13 from Treasury (2013d), Table 3.2.
Source: ABS (2014c); Commonwealth Grants Commission (2012) Interim Report, Table 4.2; Treasury (2013d), Table 3.2.
Note: Total State and local tax revenue for this comparison includes the GST and resource royalties.
Table 6.1: State tax revenues, with GST and royalties, 2012-13
Chart 6.1: Types of tax as a percentage of total State and local tax revenue, 2012-13
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Source: ATO (2014d).
Chart 6.2: How does GST work?
6.2 The GST: taxing 
consumption
The GST was introduced in 2000 and has changed little in 
the last fifteen years. Total GST collections amounted to 
around 13 per cent of total tax revenue in 2011-12. 
The GST is levied at a flat rate of 10 per cent on most 
goods and services consumed in Australia. GST-registered 
businesses generally including the GST in the price of sales 
to their customers while claiming credits for GST included 
in the price of their business purchases. Businesses with 
annual turnover less than $75,000 do not need to register 
for the GST. Chart 6.2 shows how GST operates through 
the chain of production and sale.
The economic incidence of the GST generally falls on the 
individual consumer. The GST is passed onto consumers 
in higher prices so that consumers are able to purchase 
less from a given disposable income. Similarly, payroll tax is 
passed onto employees in lower wages, thereby reducing 
their disposable income available for purchases (Freebairn 
2014, 13). A comprehensive GST has broad economic 
equivalence over the long run to a tax on wages such as 
a comprehensive payroll tax and, internationally, social 
security taxes (Kesselman 2010). 
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The GST rate and base
Australia’s GST rate is lower that of other countries. Chart 
6.3 shows the standard GST or equivalent value added 
tax (VAT) rate in selected countries. Most countries have a 
standard rate and some zero-rated or low-rated supplies.
The OECD’s VAT revenue ratio provides a measure to 
compare the coverage of the GST with the coverage of value 
added taxes in other OECD countries. The VAT revenue 
ratio measures the proportion of national final consumption 
expenditure that is covered by value added tax.28 The 
OECD’s analysis indicates that the GST covers about 47 per 
cent of the consumption base, less than the OECD average 
28 The VAT revenue ratio is calculated according to the formula VRR=  
        where VRR is the VAT revenue ratio; VR = VAT revenue collected;  
   VRdue = VAT revenue due; FCE = Final Consumption Expenditure: and  
   r = Standard VAT rate. The denominator, Final consumption  
   expenditure, in National Accounts data includes VAT revenue paid at  
   the point of consumption and hence must be reduced by the amount  
   of VAT paid. VAT revenue represents the amount of VAT revenue  
   collected and, as such, takes into account actual VAT compliance. It  
   does not represent the theoretical VAT base  
   assuming perfect compliance. OECD (2014e).
of 55 per cent in 2012. Australia’s GST coverage is similar 
to Canada but significantly lower than New Zealand’s GST, 
which has almost total coverage of the consumption base. 
This is shown in Chart 6.4.
Apart from New Zealand, most value added taxes have 
significant exemptions in the base. However, Australia’s GST 
base is narrower than that of many other countries. Major 
exclusions from the Australian GST base include basic food 
items, health care, childcare, education, water and sewerage 
services. These are shown as large tax expenditures in Table 
3.1 above. In addition, there are a wide range of smaller 
exemptions including precious metals, cars purchased by 
people with disability and second-hand goods. 
Source: OECD (2014f, 60).
Notes: Standard VAT/GST rates not reflecting exempt or concessional rates. Canadian rate of 13 per cent includes 5 per cent national GST plus 8 per cent 
Harmonised Sales Tax in provinces including Ontario; there are variations in other provinces. Switzerland bar shows the federal rate only; there are diverse 
additional rates levied by cantons.
Chart 6.3: Statutory GST/VAT rates, selected countries, 2012
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Chart 6.4: The GST/VAT revenue ratio in selected countries, 2012
Source: OECD (2014e, 95). 
Note: No value is available for the US as it does not have a national value added tax.
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In keeping with the internationally accepted system for 
value added taxes, imports of goods are subject to GST. 
Exported goods and services, including international travel 
purchased in Australia, are exempt from the GST as they 
are not consumed in Australia. However, there is a threshold 
of $1000 for GST applicable to imported goods. The rapid 
growth of online retailing has meant that this threshold 
is associated with increasing base erosion for the GST. 
Imported intangibles or services may escape taxation entirely 
(e.g. digital products such as ebooks, films and apps). Apart 
from the revenue concerns there has also been concern 
about the competitive neutrality implications for retailers. 
The Government has committed to consider the continuing 
appropriateness of the low value threshold as part of the 
White Paper process.
Australian households are spending proportionately more on 
housing, health, education and financial services than two 
decades ago. As a consequence, more of the consumption 
of Australia’s households is untaxed because these goods 
and services are exempt from GST. Chart 6.5 shows these 
changing household consumption patterns. Households have 
increasingly spent more on services and less on goods; have 
saved more overall; and have shifted consumption towards 
tax-exempt health and education services.
The rate and base of the GST have been discussed in a 
number of recent reviews including the GST Distribution 
Review (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2012) and the 
review of the low-value parcel processing threshold (Low 
Value Parcel Processing Taskforce 2012). While these reviews 
have examined aspects of the GST’s operation, there has not 
been a comprehensive policy review of the effectiveness and 
distributional consequences of the GST, including the extent 
to which the GST concessions have affected the overall 
fairness of the GST.
Recently, New Zealand enacted a tax reform that increased 
the rate of its exceptionally broad-based GST to 15 per cent. 
Compensation was provided through indexing transfers and 
credits such as the Family Working Tax Credit. While there 
are many differences, it is worth examining the New Zealand 
experience to see what lessons may apply in Australia.
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Chart 6.5: Changing household consumption patterns
Source: ABS (2014d).
Distributional impact of the GST
A broad-based comprehensive GST is proportional with 
respect to consumption but regressive with respect to 
income of individuals (see Chapter 1 for an explanation of 
these concepts). However, there are two caveats regarding 
the regressive nature of the GST.
First, it is important to weigh the consequences of the 
overall tax and transfer system when considering fairness. 
A regressive tax may fund a progressive transfer system 
and redistributive public goods across government as 
a whole. Many OECD countries with significant social 
security systems rely substantially on regressive taxes on 
consumption and wages to fund these systems. Moreover, 
the progressive income tax can offset regressivity of the 
GST, in particular if progression is maintained in marginal 
income tax rates and the base is broadened to tax savings 
more effectively. 
Second, there are significant exemptions in the GST base. 
These are widely considered to make it more progressive 
especially the exemption of food. However, there is evidence 
in a recent OECD analysis of distributional features of other 
VATs (excluding Australia) that a number of GST exemptions 
may benefit high income earners more than low income 
earners (OECD 201f). 
Administrative and compliance costs
The GST is a complex tax that has a relatively high 
administrative cost compared to most other Australian taxes 
including the income tax. The cost of collection by the ATO, 
which is paid by the States, is estimated at just under $700 
million in 2014-15 (Treasury 2014a, Paper 3, Table 3.9). This 
is approximately 1.25 per cent of revenue collected. There is 
also a significant level of uncollected GST debt. The reasons 
for this are not fully understood. One factor may be that 
many collectors and remitters of GST are small businesses 
that may face cashflow difficulties.
Elements of the tax base, including low-value imports 
and financial services, are left untaxed or taxed at a 
lower rate than the standard rate, because the technical 
or administrative costs of taxing them are considered to 
be too great. Technical and practical difficulties arise in 
levying GST on the supply of some goods and services, in 
particular financial services, residential rental services, the 
sale of existing residential premises and certain charitable 
fund raising. 
In consequence, under the current system, these supplies 
are ‘input taxed’. The supplier cannot charge GST on the 
supply of the good or service and may not claim a credit 
for the GST paid on purchases (inputs) relating to those 
goods and services. There are also special rules regarding 
second-hand goods, gambling, land development, imports, 
insurance and cars. All these exceptions and special rules 
add complexity to the tax.
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On some issues, such as the taxation of supplies of new 
housing (and the complex ‘margin scheme’ for real property 
developers), there has been significant litigation and 
uncertainty in application. Table 3.1 indicates that the TES 
estimate of input-taxation of financial services is estimated 
to have the highest revenue foregone of these various 
‘practical’ tax concessions in the GST. Consequently, the 
issue of taxing financial services deserves greater research 
and policy attention.
Directions for GST reform
The Henry Review was precluded by its terms of reference 
from recommending changes to the rate or base of the 
GST. However, it provided commentary and related findings 
on three main issues that relate clearly to broad based 
consumption taxation. 
First, the Henry Review found in favour of increasing 
emphasis on consumption taxation within the overall 
architecture of the tax system. This direction would be 
consistent with trends in other countries. There are some 
suggestions that value added taxes may be a substitute 
for company taxes and ‘policy-makers can potentially shift 
from corporate taxation towards consumption taxation as a 
response to tax competition’ (Loretz 2008, 651).
Second, the Henry Review considered financial services 
and canvassed a possible approach to the taxation of 
value added in the financial industry. This could enable the 
current input taxation of this sector to be replaced by full 
GST treatment. The approach measures value added as 
the sum of factor incomes in the sector rather than as the 
margin between sales and purchases (which does not work 
satisfactorily with finance), producing a more reliable measure 
of the same margin. The application of GST to financial 
services warrants research and policy development.
Third, the Henry Review discussed the technical and 
conceptual benefits of an alternative tax on consumption 
to the GST. This is a destination cash flow tax on business 
that would represent a substantial, broad-based reform of 
the GST and/or State payroll taxes. Apart from its potential 
for greater economic efficiency, this model of value added 
taxation would utilize the administrative and compliance 
advantages of 21st century, computer-based business 
systems. The Henry Review suggested that this form of 
taxation could be a more efficient tax base required to meet 
future needs for State governments. Improvements to payroll 
tax as an effective business tax at the State level would likely 
help improve revenue collection and efficiency. 
The various concerns about administration, complexity and 
compliance in the GST system suggest that, if other tax base 
options become available and more easily administered in 
future, then these are worthy of further research and policy 
consideration. The tax policy goal is efficient, effective and 
fair taxation of consumption, a matter which is also being 
explored by other country governments.
6.3 Payroll tax
The most important State tax in terms of revenue collection 
is payroll tax (leaving aside the GST). This raises much more 
revenue in the most populous and industrialised states (NSW 
and Victoria) than in smaller, agricultural or resource-rich 
states. In Australia, payroll taxes do not directly fund social 
security obligations of government and consequently are not 
levied at the very high rates at which they are imposed in 
other countries. 
Payroll tax has been harmonized in all states except 
Queensland. It is levied on the total payments for employee 
wages of employers, over specified thresholds (including 
wages, fringe benefits, bonuses and commissions). 
Nonetheless, the payroll tax is increasingly weakened through 
tax competition, producing increases in the threshold for 
taxation, variable rates and special exemptions. Most small 
businesses (and hence a large number of employees) are 
exempt from payroll tax because of the minimum threshold 
and it is in respect of the threshold that we see most payroll 
tax competition emerging.
As explained in section 6.2, the long-run economic 
incidence of a broad-based payroll tax is similar to that of a 
broad-based tax on consumption: it falls on labour income 
or wages. However, current Australian payroll taxes are not 
comprehensive. The concessions in the payroll tax base 
introduce distortions in the allocation of labour across the 
economy and render the incidence of the payroll tax more 
on businesses than on wages.
In spite of declining effectiveness, payroll tax remains 
an important State tax base. As technology improves, 
there is scope for further research to examine feasibility 
of broadening the payroll tax base, or levying it on a 
comprehensive national tax base, possibly through the 
Commonwealth PAYG wage withholding system, on behalf 
of the States.
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Table 6.2: Payroll tax rates, base and thresholds across States
Source: NSW Treasury (2014, 13).
Flat rate Method of calculation Exemptions
New South Wales 5.45% Single marginal rate First $750000 exempt
Victoria 4.90% Single marginal rate First $550000 exempt
Queensland 4.75% Deduction system First $1100000 exempt.
For payrolls between $1100000 and 
$5500000, a deduction of $1100000 
reducing by $1 for every $4 the payroll 
exceeds $1100000. No deductions for 
payrolls over $5500000
Western Australia 5.5% Single marginal rate First $750000 exempt
South Australia 4.95% Single marginal rate First $600000 exempt
Tasmania 6.1% Single marginal rate First $1250000 exempt
Northern Territory 5.5% Deduction system First $1500000 exempt.
For payrolls between $1500000 and 
$7500000, a deduction of $1500000 
reducing by $1 for every $4 the payroll 
exceeds $1500000. No deductions for 
payrolls over $7500000
Australian Capital Territory 6.85% Single marginal rate First $1750000 exempt
6.4 Taxes on land
Australia relies less on property taxes overall than some 
comparable countries. This is shown in Chart 6.6, 
which presents an overall picture of tax on property as a 
proportion of GDP. 
State and Territory governments levy a stamp duty on 
transfers of land and all except the Northern Territory levy 
land tax on the aggregate holding of unimproved land value 
that is owned by a taxpayer in the jurisdiction.
Duty is usually payable by the purchaser calculated on the 
sale price of the property (or market value if higher). Duty 
rates are progressive, for instance they range in NSW from 
1.25 to 7 per cent (over $3 million in value) and in Victoria 
from 1.4 to 5.5 per cent (on total value, if over $960,000). 
The base includes the purchase of a home which is to be the 
main residence. There has been a significant increase in duty 
revenues for all states over the last decade as house prices 
have risen substantially in many locations. However, revenues 
are highly volatile. Some concessions apply for first home 
buyers although economists suggest that this likely benefits 
existing land owners through increased house prices.
The Henry Review recommended that stamp duties be 
replaced over time by more efficient annual land taxes, 
a policy approach that has been taken up by the ACT 
government (Recommendations 51-54).
Land tax is levied by all States and Territories except the 
Northern Territory. This is a less efficient base than the one 
developed and advocated by the Henry Review, essentially 
due to its substantial exemptions based on land use and its 
step-scale land-holding aggregation features. A more efficient 
tax would be one more akin to existing local government 
rates (Wood et al 2009). 
States also levy a variety of mineral resource royalties. 
Royalties are intended as a price for access to a non-
renewable resource. States apply a range of royalties 
including a fixed rate per unit (e.g., tonne) of production; 
ad valorem royalties as a percentage of value or price of 
resources or profit based royalties. Table 6.1 indicates 
the relative importance of royalties for revenue raising. 
Although not as large as most State tax bases, royalties are 
particularly important in the resource-rich states of Western 
Australia and Queensland.
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Chart 6.6: Property tax as a proportion of GDP, selected countries
Source: OECD (2014f).
Local government taxes
Local governments are generally statutory bodies 
incorporated by under State Constitutions and Local 
Government Acts. They exercise delegated State legislative 
power to levy rates (property tax) on immovable property. 
Rates are charged on the value of residential and commercial 
immovable property in the jurisdiction. Councils apply a 
variety of different valuation methods including unimproved 
value, capital improved value and rental value and rates also 
vary by Council and use of property. 
On average, local governments fund most of their 
expenditures from own-source revenue, although self-funding 
capacity is highly variable across councils and in particular, 
rural and remote councils are heavily reliant on grants. 
Overall, only 37 per cent of council expenditures funded 
by rates. Other own-source funding comprises fees and 
charges, developer charges, fines and investment revenue. 
The balance comes from government grants from State and 
Commonwealth governments. 
Property tax reform in the Australian 
Capital Territory
The ACT levies conveyance duty and general rates on 
residential property, as well as land tax on commercial 
and rental property; it does not have a separate 
Council rates structure. Following recommendations 
of the ACT Taxation Review (2012) and commencing 
in its 2012-13 Budget, the ACT introduced an 
ambitious tax reform agenda to make property tax 
fairer, simpler and more efficient in future. 
The ACT has begun a transition from duties on 
residential property to general rates and land tax. 
The ACT Taxation Review recommended that the 
benefits of this transition will overall result in a fairer 
system that has better allocation of housing stock 
and investment and enhanced ability of individuals 
to exercise housing choices (2012, 140).
Commencing 4 June 2014, the ACT reduced 
conveyance duty rates and introduced a flat rate of 
5.25 per cent for high value properties. In 2014-15 
it will increase general rates on residential and 
commercial properties by around 10 per cent, while 
making the rates structure progressive. Further 
rate changes will take place over coming years. To 
minimize the cost to revenue, fairness and economic 
impact, the reform transition may take up to 20 
years. The ACT also proposes to abolish duty on 
insurance from 1 July 2016.
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7.1 Selective taxes
The Henry Review devoted substantial attention to the 
use of selective taxes as a way for governments to 
intervene in markets to achieve more equitable or efficient 
outcomes. The Henry Review considered that selective 
(narrow-based) taxation may be appropriate to correct for 
negative social or economic costs that are not adequately 
factored into private transactions.
A selective tax is simply a tax that targets a particular 
commodity, activity or type of taxpayer. Some selective 
taxes may also aim to capture economic rents derived by a 
particular industry or sector, for example the resource sector 
or gambling industry. The Henry Review considered selective 
taxes including taxes to improve the environment, road 
transport taxes, and taxes on alcohol, tobacco and gambling. 
The Henry Review recommended adoption of user charging 
in some cases where governments provide a specific good 
or service and this can be properly priced. It observed that 
public goods should generally be financed through general 
taxation but government costs associated with administration 
and enforcement of regulation for specific sectors could be 
recovered by targeted charges or taxes (Henry et al 2010b, 
339). Cost recovery taxes or user charges need to be subject 
to regular and systematic review to ensure that they properly 
reflect the cost of the service or good.
Selective taxes may be highly effective in increasing the 
price of activities that generate negative externalities 
that affect society as a whole. However, they present 
design challenges in accurately identifying the source and 
economic cost of the negative externality and hence the 
appropriate base and rate for the tax. Poorly designed 
selective taxes risk not achieving intended societal 
outcomes while still detracting from economic efficiency. 
They need to be weighed against other alternative policy 
levers that have the potential to achieve the desired 
behavioural change.
The Henry Review supported the use of selective taxation or 
pricing to address negative spillovers or externalities for the 
environment. On this basis, the Review supported the CPRS 
(now repealed) as an effective market-based mechanism that 
would be ‘the most cost-effective way to reduce Australia’s 
carbon emissions’ (Henry et al 2010b, 343). 
On the other hand, the Henry Review generally opposed the 
use of tax concessions with environmental objectives which 
‘tend to lack transparency, be poorly targeted, impose costs 
on all the community rather than just polluters and reduce the 
efficiency of the taxation system’ (Henry et al 2010b, 353).
Henry Review principles for taxes to 
improve the environment
Environmental taxes (or emissions trading schemes) 
should:
 > Be used to address environmental objectives, 
rather than to raise revenue;
 > Have their revenue recycled to reduce the 
associated tax (and transfer) distortions, should 
governments wish to avoid increasing the 
aggregate burden of tax; and
 > Be integrated with existing taxes and transfers.
An environmental tax is more likely to be 
appropriate in situations where:
 > Environmental damage due to economic activity 
is relatively constant;
 > The factors causing the environmental damage 
are measurable/verifiable by both the tax 
authorities and the agent causing the damage…;
 > The only cost-effective way the taxpayer can 
reduce their tax liability is to reduce the activity 
causing the damage (rather than, say, simply 
dumping waste illegally); and
 > Other instruments (such as spending and 
regulation) have been considered and found to 
be more costly.
Henry et al 2010b, 353; Recommendations 58, 59 
and 60
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7.2 Road transport taxes
The Henry Review strongly supported the development 
of road pricing or transport taxes to aid future transport 
challenges. In particular, the Review supported road network 
charges for commercial or heavy vehicle use (such as freight 
trucking). These charges should be used to correct market 
failures in the transport sector. Recommendations 61 to 
67 addressed road transport taxes including congestion 
charging and heavy vehicle road pricing. In exchange for a 
comprehensive reform introducing road use charges, it was 
suggested that taxes such as motor vehicle registration and 
stamp duties could be abolished. 
The development of effective road transport taxes calls 
for substantial further research and policy development. 
The Henry Review observed that the challenge of 
comprehensive transport tax reform is ‘formidable’ 
requiring coordination across all levels of government, but 
would promote the best investment in and use of roads, 
lift national productivity and improve wellbeing (Henry 
et al 2010b, 373-4). There are signs that some State 
governments are interested in reform; for example, the 
South Australian State Government has said that it will 
consider road transport charges for heavy vehicles as part 
of a tax review in 2015.29 
7.3 Alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling
The Henry Review made recommendations to improve 
alcohol, gambling and tobacco taxation in Australia 
(Recommendations 71 and 72, 76 to 78). 
A key reform proposal that has not yet been implemented is 
comprehensive and consistent alcohol taxation, on the basis 
of volumetric alcohol content ‘across all forms of alcohol, 
regardless of place, method or scale of production’. This would 
best support revenue and social policy goals. 
The Henry Review found that current tax and subsidy 
arrangements for alcohol are ‘complex and distort 
production and consumption decisions with no coherent 
policy justification’ (Henry 2010b, 438). It was particularly 
critical of the current wine equalization tax. The need for 
reform of Australian alcohol taxation has been supported by 
recent health and economic modelling (for example, Doran 
et al 2013).
29 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-10/new-road-transport- 
   charges-proposed-for-sa-heavy-vehicles/5878398.
Increasing tobacco prices through taxation is one of the most 
effective measures that can be taken to reduce premature 
death and disease due to smoking, to reduce consumption 
and deter young people from starting smoking.30 In respect 
of tobacco taxation, the Henry Review recommended an 
increase in the tobacco excise and its indexation to average 
weekly earnings instead of the consumer price index. These 
recommendations have been implemented. The indexation 
method for tobacco taxation has been changed effective 
1 March 2014. Excise rates were increased by 25 per cent 
in 2010 and commencing from 1 December 2013, four 
staged 12.5 per cent increases are being implemented (to be 
completed on 1 September 2016). 
Increased taxes on tobacco bring with them an increased 
risk and reward for smuggling and black market production 
and sales. These cause increased administrative costs and 
policing and criminal law costs, which should be monitored 
to ensure that taxation is at an optimal level.
In respect of gambling taxation, the Henry Review 
recognized that gambling taxes constitute an important 
revenue source for many State governments (as shown in 
Table 6.1 above). Unlike its stance on tobacco taxation, 
the Henry Review noted that the social policy argument 
for gambling taxation is not clear and emphasized 
that regulatory goals in relation to gambling should be 
distinguished from taxation of the gambling industry to 
raise revenue. It recommended that States should review 
gambling taxation to ensure it is consistent with social policy 
goals and raises adequate revenue from economic returns. 
Further research is needed into the merits, economic and 
distributional aspects of gambling taxation in general, and 
specific types of gambling taxes, as opposed to other 
approaches to regulation and licensing of gambling activity.
In general, the Henry Review opposed other forms of 
selective taxation such as luxury taxes, which it argued 
are inefficient, ineffective and arbitrary. In general, luxury 
goods are substitutable—if one is taxed, demand may 
shift to another good. Australia has few luxury taxes. The 
Review recommended that the luxury car tax be abolished 
(Recommendation 80).
30 See Department of Health, http://www.health.gov.au/ 
   internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/tobacco-tax.
A Stocktake of the Tax System and Directions for Reform 82
7.4 Financial transactions tax
One type of selective tax that has received significant 
attention since the GFC is a financial transactions tax. In the 
European Union, eleven countries agreed on 14 February 
2013 to introduce a tax on a range of financial transactions 
on a harmonized basis, as proposed by the European 
Commission.31 The countries are Belgium, Germany, Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. Annual revenues of such a tax have been estimated 
to be as much as EUR 30 to 35 billion, or 0.4 per cent of 
the GDP of the participating member states. However, there 
remains significant controversy. 
This EU proposal and the enhanced cooperation approach of 
the eleven countries have not proceeded beyond the Council 
Working Group at this stage. They have been criticized as 
contrary to international tax rules (including a challenge from 
the United Kingdom) and even if they are legislated, the start 
date is currently deferred until 1 January 2016. 
The Henry Review considered the case for a tax like 
the Financial Transactions Tax, on financial or currency 
dealings (known as a Tobin Tax). The policy goals of such 
a tax must be carefully defined. The goal of a Tobin Tax 
on currency or speculative financial dealings is to dampen 
speculative dealings, to put ‘stand in the wheels’ so as 
to stabilise the financial system. If the transaction tax 
succeeded, it would raise very little revenue. 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that a Tobin Tax or 
Financial transactions tax could raise revenue to fund global 
public goods. However, unless they are levied on a global 
and comprehensive basis, such taxes could likely be avoided 
through the use of untaxed jurisdictions or tax havens. They 
would be unlikely to raise the revenue anticipated and could 
be inefficient and have unintended effects.
31 See European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_ 
   customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm.
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Much of the recent commentary and analysis about reform of 
the Australian tax system has focused selectively on ‘priority’ 
areas for reform. The Henry Review addressed the overall 
Australian tax system including Commonwealth, State and 
local taxes and sought to take into account interactions 
between different taxes and in the tax and transfer system. 
It then identified a broad set of taxation arrangements to 
position Australia for dealing with the social, economic and 
environmental challenges for the next forty years. 
Overall, Australia raises less revenue through taxation than 
many comparable countries, including Canada and New 
Zealand, as a percentage of GDP. There is scope, and likely 
the budgetary need, to increase Australia’s tax take in the 
future to deliver the goods, services and fair support for those 
in need that the Australian people expect from government.
The Asprey Review observed that it will always be necessary 
for governments to utilise a variety of taxes to meet revenue 
needs. Multiple sources of tax revenue ‘have to be seen to 
be supplementing each other and their interactions—and 
sometimes their conflicts—have to be reckoned with’ (Asprey 
et al 1975, 11). The system-wide approach taken in the 
Henry Review remains an important guide to tax reform. 
Taxes should be collected across all tax bases of income, 
consumption and wealth, and all factors of production 
including labour, capital and land; however, the global context 
in which Australia operates and the increasing mobility of 
labour and capital must be considered in tax system design.
The challenges identified by the Henry Review remain and 
are discussed in Chapter 2 of this report. The global digital 
economy, changes in work and consumption patterns, and 
lower productivity have become more acute in the past five 
years. The context for tax reform has also become more 
challenging, as governments do not have fiscal surpluses to 
return to taxpayers in compensation for tax system changes. 
The Henry Review identified key policy and research 
directions but did not present a package or detailed 
prescriptions for reform. Its overall approach of broadening 
the personal income tax base and the consumption tax 
base, potentially lowering rates, and shifting towards a 
broad-based land tax remain of crucial relevance. 
The goal of increasing workforce participation has become 
central. Consequently, the way in which the tax and transfer 
system affects incentives to join or increase engagement with 
the paid workforce is a critical issue for any future tax reform. 
The Henry Review tended towards a flatter structure with a 
moderately high top rate but did not express a concluded 
view on the ideal progressivity of tax rates. More flexible, 
temporary and short-term connections of employees to 
formal employment arrangements cause difficulties for our 
PAYG system, which depends on withholding from employers 
and other intermediaries. Complex and differential tax 
treatment of work, savings and assets generate incoherence 
and revenue leakage. 
The Henry Review raised the issue of how to simplify and 
manage the many complex boundaries and interactions 
in the tax system. One of the most important goals in 
considering reform of the personal income tax is a review 
of the taxation of savings and investment. Removing 
distortions in savings decisions and taxing those who 
have assets more comprehensively will improve efficiency, 
fairness and resilience in the tax system. The tax treatment 
of retirement savings and the interaction between this and 
the age pension requires reform for revenue sustainability 
and fairness reasons.
In company tax, key tax research and policy areas 
are level, rate and base of company taxation and how 
corporate-shareholder taxation should operate, including 
the imputation system. The case for providing a lower 
company tax rate must be examined and efficiency gains 
weighed with other functions of the company tax. The tax 
treatment of multinational companies whether Australian 
or foreign owned will be an ongoing issue. Given rapidly 
changing global business practices and continuing financial 
innovation, the costs and benefits of utilising complex 
integrity measures to shore up the company tax system 
needs further consideration. 
The tax treatment of small business including whether there 
is a case for lower rates or a different tax system for small 
business relative to large business should be considered. This 
is important because of high compliance and administration 
costs generated by business tax structuring combining trusts 
and private companies, and the close interaction between the 
personal income tax and company tax system for privately 
owned enterprises. 
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The GST is Australia’s broad-based consumption tax. 
However, less than half of the potential tax base is taxed and 
Australia’s GST has a standard rate that is substantially lower 
than the rate in many comparable countries. To strengthen 
the system as a whole and to fund the goods and services 
that the public wishes government to deliver, we need 
to examine how to improve our taxation of consumption 
whether by broadening the base or increasing the rate. 
State taxes, especially property taxes and payroll taxes, 
warrant significant reform but this is challenging for political, 
fairness and revenue reasons. The largest economic benefit 
is likely to be gained by eliminating duties on real property, 
increasing broad-based land tax. As illustrated by the ACT 
reform discussed in Chapter 6, this may require a long 
transition and may cost revenue in the short term. There is 
potential for more efficient national tax bases to be used for 
benefit of the States, especially payroll tax; such a reform 
would potentially need to be done in conjunction with a 
broader reform of the federation.
This report has aimed to discuss the key directions for tax 
reform that arise out of the Henry Review, which remain 
of key relevance in today’s tax reform debate. Significant 
research and policy analysis is needed on future options for 
tax reform. Tax reform has potential to enhance Australian 
economic prosperity and support income-enhancing 
investment, innovation and productivity growth in Australia. 
It can also contribute to improving fairness and resilience of 
the system for the future. 
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Recommendations of the 
Henry Review
Review of Australia’s Future Tax System (Henry et al 2010b, 
Chapter 12).
Part One—A tax and transfer system for the 
21st century
Recommendation 1: Revenue raising should be concentrated 
on four robust and efficient broad-based taxes:
 > personal income, assessed on a more comprehensive 
basis;
 > business income, designed to support economic growth;
 > rents on natural resources and land; and
 > private consumption.
Additional specific taxes should exist only where they 
improve social outcomes or market efficiency through better 
price signals. Such taxes would only be used where they 
are a better means to achieve the desired outcome than 
other policy instruments. The rate of tax would be set in 
accordance with the marginal spillover cost of the activity.
User charging should play a complementary role, as a 
mechanism for signalling the underlying resource cost of 
publicly provided goods and services.
With both specific taxes and user charges, revenue would 
be a by-product of the tax or charge, not the reason for it.
Other existing taxes should have no place in the future tax 
system and over time should be abolished.
A—Personal taxation
A1—Personal Income tax
Recommendation 2: Progressivity in the tax and transfer 
system should be delivered through the personal income tax 
rates scale and transfer payments. A high tax-free threshold 
with a constant marginal rate for most people should be 
introduced to provide greater transparency and simplicity.
Recommendation 3: The primary unit in the personal tax 
system should continue to be the individual, and subsidies for 
dependants through the tax system should be restricted (see 
Recommendation 6a). However, there could be a case for 
optional couple assessment for people of late retirement age.
Recommendation 4: Income support and supplementary 
payments should be tax-exempt.
 > Family assistance should remain exempt from tax because 
it addresses direct costs associated with children.
 > Government payments that are similar in nature to income 
support, such as scholarships, should be exempt from tax 
to align their treatment with that of income support.
Recommendation 5: The Medicare levy and structural tax 
offsets—the low income, senior Australians, pensioner and 
beneficiary tax offsets—should be removed as separate 
components of the system and incorporated into the personal 
income tax rates scale. If a health levy is to be retained, it could 
be applied as a proportion of the net tax payable by an individual.
Recommendation 6: To remove complexity and ensure 
government assistance is properly targeted, concessional 
offsets should be removed, rationalised, or replaced by outlays.
 > The existing dependency offsets should be replaced with 
a single dependant tax offset where one of the following 
circumstances apply:
 > the dependant is unable to work due to disability or 
carer responsibilities; or
 > either the taxpayer or dependant has reached Age 
Pension age.
 > The zone tax offset should be reviewed. If it is to be 
retained, it should be based on contemporary measures 
of remoteness.
 > The mature age worker, employment termination 
payment, overseas civilian, entrepreneurs’, and notional 
tax offsets should be removed (see Part Two Annex A1). 
The education tax refund should be replaced as part of 
the single family payment, but as a back-to-school (lump-
sum) amount.
 > The overseas forces tax offset should be replaced by 
adjusting remuneration to maintain net incomes.
 > Averaging tax offsets for primary producers, the offset 
for ‘special professionals’ and the lump sum payment 
in arrears tax offset should be retained to minimise the 
extent to which the timing of such income influences tax 
liability (see Part Two Annex A1).
Recommendation 7: Consistent with recommendations by the 
National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission:
 > The medical expenses tax offset should be removed 
following a review of the scope and structure of health 
safety net arrangements.
 > The Medicare levy surcharge and assistance for private 
health insurance should be reviewed as part of the 
package of tax and non-tax policies relating to private 
health insurance. The Medicare levy surcharge lump 
sum payment in arrears tax offset should be retained if 
the Medicare levy surcharge is retained (see Annex A1). 
Assistance, if retained, for private health insurance should 
be provided exclusively as a direct premium reduction.
A Stocktake of the Tax System and Directions for Reform 92
Recommendation 8: All forms of wages and salary for 
Australian resident taxpayers should be taxable on an 
equivalent basis and without exemptions.
 > Private education payments provided in respect of 
employment or as an incentive to undertake employment 
and employment-related payments should be assessed 
as income and taxed at marginal tax rates.
 > The broad exemptions for foreign employment income 
should be removed and such income should be taxed at 
marginal tax rates.
 > Defence and disciplined forces payments should be 
taxable and direct remuneration increased for affected 
personnel.
Recommendation 9: Fringe benefits that are readily valued 
and attributable to individual employees should be taxed in 
the hands of employees through the PAYG system. Other 
fringe benefits, including those incidental to an individual’s 
employment, should remain taxed to employers at the top 
marginal rate (and non-reportable for employees). The scope of 
fringe benefits that are subject to tax should be simplified.
 > Market value should generally be used to value fringe 
benefits (with an appropriate adjustment for employee 
contributions).
 > The current formula for valuing car fringe benefits should 
be replaced with a single statutory rate of 20 per cent, 
regardless of the kilometres travelled.
 > All fringe benefit tax (FBT) exemptions should be reviewed 
to determine their continuing appropriateness. To improve 
simplicity, consideration should also be given to excluding 
fringe benefits from tax where the costs of compliance 
outweigh equity and tax integrity considerations. The 
broad definition of fringe benefits in the FBT law could be 
reviewed to exclude essential workplace items such as 
chairs, stationery and toilets.
 > For fringe benefits that are taxed in the hands of 
employers, a small de minimis threshold, below which 
fringe benefits are exempt from tax, should apply. The 
threshold could vary depending on the number of 
employees within an organisation.
 > Not-for-profit entities’ FBT concessions should be 
reconfigured (see Part Two Section B3). The FBT 
exemptions for members of the Defence force should be 
replaced with direct remuneration increases for affected 
personnel (see related Recommendation 8c).
Recommendation 10: Consideration should be given to a 
revised regime to prevent the alienation of personal services 
income that would extend to all entities earning a significant 
proportion of their business income from the personal 
services of their owner-managers, whether in employee-like or 
non-employee-like cases. This regime may also apply an arm’s 
length rule to deductions arising from payments to associates 
to ensure deductions reflect the value of services provided.
Recommendation 11: A standard deduction should be 
introduced to cover work-related expenses and the cost of 
managing tax affairs to simplify personal tax for most taxpayers. 
Taxpayers should be able to choose either to take a standard 
deduction or to claim actual expenses where they are above 
the claims threshold, with full substantiation.
Recommendation 12: There should be a tighter nexus 
between the deductibility of the expense and its role in 
producing income.
Recommendation 13: Gift deductibility should be retained, 
with the deductibility threshold raised from $2 to $25.
Recommendation 14: Provide a 40 per cent savings income 
discount to individuals for non-business related:
 > net interest income;
 > net residential rental income (including related interest 
expenses);
 > capital gains (and losses); and
 > interest expenses related to listed shares held by 
individuals as non-business investments.
In conjunction with introducing the discount further 
consideration should be given to how the boundaries 
between discounted and non-discounted amounts are 
best drawn to achieve certainty, reduce compliance costs, 
and prevent labour and other income being converted into 
discounted income. Further consideration should also be 
given to addressing existing tax law boundaries related 
to the treatment of individuals owning shares in order to 
address uncertainties about when the shares are held on 
capital account (and subject to capital gains tax) and on 
revenue account (and taxed as ordinary income).
Recommendation 15: When the 40 per cent savings income 
discount is introduced a smooth transition should be provided 
to minimise any disruption that may arise. The transition to a 
savings income discount for net residential rental income should 
only be adopted following reforms to the supply of housing 
(Part Two Section E4 Housing affordability) and reforms to 
housing assistance (Section F5 Housing assistance).
Recommendation 16: As part of the consideration of alternative 
company tax income arrangements and dividend imputation (see 
Recommendations 26 and 37), consideration should be given to 
extending the discount to other savings income.
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Recommendation 17: The capital gains tax regime should be 
simplified by:
 > increasing the exemption threshold for collectables and 
exempting all personal use assets;
 > rationalising and streamlining the current small business 
capital gains tax concessions by:
 >  removing the active asset 50 per cent reduction and 
15-year exemption concessions;
 >  increasing the lifetime limit of the retirement exemption 
by permanently aligning it with the capital gains tax 
cap for contributions to a superannuation fund; and
 > allowing taxpayers who sell a share in a company or 
an interest in a trust to access the concessions via the 
turnover test.
 > removing current grandfathering provisions relating to 
assets acquired before the commencement of capital 
gains tax, with a market value cost base provided for 
those assets when the exemption is removed, or before 
the end of previous indexation arrangements. A relatively 
long lead-time should be provided before these removals 
take effect; and
 > rewriting the capital gains tax legislation using a principles-
based approach that better integrates it with the rest of 
the income tax system.
A2—Retirement incomes
Recommendation 18: The tax on superannuation 
contributions in the fund should be abolished. Employer 
superannuation contributions should be treated as income in 
the hands of the individual, taxed at marginal personal income 
tax rates and receive a flat-rate refundable tax offset.
 > An offset should be provided for all superannuation 
contributions up to an annual cap of $25,000 (indexed). 
The offset should be set so the majority of taxpayers do 
not pay more than 15 per cent tax on their contributions. 
The cap should be doubled for people aged 50 or older.
 > An annual cap on total contributions should continue to 
apply.
 > The offset should replace the superannuation co-
contribution and superannuation spouse contribution tax 
offset.
 > Compulsory superannuation contributions made by 
employers should not reduce eligibility for income support 
or family assistance payments. They should also not form 
part of the calculation for child support.
Recommendation 19: The rate of tax on superannuation fund 
earnings should be halved to 7.5 per cent. Superannuation 
funds should retain their access to imputation credits. The 
7.5 per cent tax should also apply to capital gains (without 
a discount) and the earnings from assets supporting 
superannuation income streams.
Recommendation 20: The restriction on people aged 75 and 
over from making contributions should be removed. However, 
a work test should still apply for people aged 65 and over. 
There should be no restrictions on people wanting to purchase 
longevity insurance products from a prudentially regulated entity.
Recommendation 21: The government should support the 
development of a longevity insurance market within the private 
sector.
 > The government should issue long-term securities, but 
only where this is consistent with its fiscal obligations, 
to help product providers manage the investment risk 
associated with longevity insurance.
 > The government should make available the data needed 
to create and maintain a longevity index that would assist 
product providers to hedge longevity risk.
 > The government should remove the prescriptive rules in 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 
1994 relating to income streams that restrict product 
innovation. This should be done in conjunction with the 
recommendation to have a uniform tax on earnings on all 
superannuation assets.
Recommendation 22: The government should consider 
offering an immediate annuity and deferred annuity product 
that would allow a person to purchase a lifetime income. This 
should be subject to a business case that ensures the accurate 
pricing of the risks being taken on by the government. To limit 
the government’s exposure to longevity risk, it should consider 
placing limits on how much income a person can purchase 
from the government.
Recommendation 23: The government should help make 
people more aware of the retirement income system, and 
therefore better able to manage their superannuation, 
by increasing the regularity of superannuation guarantee 
contributions, making it easier for people to manage their 
superannuation and providing people with a single point of 
contact for government agencies.
 > Superannuation guarantee contributions should be paid 
at the same time as wages.This should be introduced 
over time so businesses can adjust their cash flows. 
As a first step, larger businesses (that is, businesses 
required to lodge their business activity statements on a 
monthly basis) should be required to pay superannuation 
guarantee contributions at least monthly.
 > Employers should report superannuation contributions to 
their employees when a contribution is made.
 > There should be a method of linking superannuation 
records, such as client identifiers like the tax file 
number, to make it easier for people to manage their 
superannuation.
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 > A superannuation portal where people can interact with 
government agencies and get information on retirement 
incomes should be developed. Over time this portal should 
evolve, subject to suitable safeguards, so that people can 
manage all their superannuation through one channel.
Recommendation 24: The preservation age for Service 
Pensioners should remain at 60 as it is already legislated to 
align with the eligibility age for that pension. An increase in the 
preservation age should apply to people who currently have a 
legislatively prescribed retirement age.
A3—Wealth transfer taxes
Recommendation 25: While no recommendation is made 
on the possible introduction of a tax on bequests, the 
Government should promote further study and community 
discussion of the options.
B—Investment and entity taxation
B1—Company and other investment taxes
Recommendation 26: The structure of the company income 
tax system should be retained in its present form, at least in the 
short to medium term.
A business level expenditure tax could suit Australia in the 
future and is worthy of further consideration and public 
debate. It is possible that other economies will move 
towards such systems over coming years and it could be in 
Australia’s interest to join this trend at an early stage.
Recommendation 27: The company income tax rate should be 
reduced to 25 per cent over the short to medium term with the 
timing subject to economic and fiscal circumstances. Improved 
arrangements for charging for the use of non-renewable 
resources should be introduced at the same time.
Recommendation 28: The capital allowance arrangements 
should be enhanced and streamlined to ensure effective rates 
more closely match rates of economic depreciation, and to 
reduce administration and compliance costs overall. This 
should include:
 > allowing low-value assets (assets costing less than 
$1,000) to be immediately written-off; and
 > reviewing the impact of special provisions applying to 
different investments in agriculture and statutory effective 
life caps and other concessional write-off provisions.
Recommendation 29: The capital allowance arrangements for 
small business should be streamlined and simplified, by:
 > allowing depreciating assets costing less than $10,000 to 
be immediately written-off; and
 > allowing all other depreciating assets (except buildings) to 
be pooled together, with the value of the pool depreciated 
at a single declining balance rate.
Recommendation 30: The small business entity turnover 
threshold should be increased from $2 million to $5 million, 
and adjustments to the $6 million net asset value test should 
be considered.
Recommendation 31: Companies should be allowed to carry 
back a revenue loss to offset it against the prior year’s taxable 
income, with the amount of any refund limited to a company’s 
franking account balance.
Recommendation 32: If earlier access to tax benefits from 
exploration expenses (relative to other expenses) is to be 
provided, it should take the form of a refundable tax offset 
at the company level for exploration expenses incurred by 
Australian small listed exploration companies, with the offset set 
at the company income tax rate.
Recommendation 33: Financial institutions operating in 
Australia should generally not be subject to interest withholding 
tax on interest paid to non-residents.
Recommendation 34: Consideration should be given to 
negotiating, in future tax treaties or amendments to treaties, a 
reduction in interest withholding tax to zero so long as there are 
appropriate safeguards to limit tax avoidance.
Recommendation 35: Taxation arrangements applying to 
Australian managed funds and related services should be 
improved to provide greater certainty that conduit income will 
not be subject to Australian tax.
B2—The treatment of business entities and 
their owners
Recommendation 36: The current trust rules should be 
updated and rewritten to reduce complexity and uncertainty 
around their application.
Recommendation 37: Dividend imputation should be 
retained in the short to medium term, but for the longer term, 
consideration should be given to alternatives as part of a further 
consideration of company income tax arrangements.
Recommendation 38: A flow-through entity regime for closely 
held companies and fixed trusts should not be adopted for 
now, but would merit further consideration if there is a move 
away from dividend imputation in the long run.
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Recommendation 39: While dividend imputation is retained, 
imputation credits should continue to be provided only for 
Australian company income tax. Dividend streaming and 
franking credit trading practices should, in general, continue to 
be prohibited.
Recommendation 40: If increased integration of the 
Australian and New Zealand economies is desired, a broad 
examination of the appropriate degree of harmonisation of 
business income tax arrangements between Australia and New 
Zealand should be undertaken.
B3—Tax concessions for not-for-profit 
organisations
Recommendation 41: Consistent with the recommendations 
of previous inquiries, a national charities commission should 
be established to monitor, regulate and provide advice to all 
not-for-profit (NFP) organisations (including private ancillary 
funds). The charities commission should be tasked with 
streamlining the NFP tax concessions (including the application 
process for gift deductibility), and modernising and codifying 
the definition of a charity.
Recommendation 42: Categories of NFP organisations that 
currently receive income tax or GST concessions should retain 
these concessions. NFP organisations should be permitted to 
apply their income tax concessions to their commercial activities.
Recommendation 43: NFP FBT concessions should be 
reconfigured.
 > The capped concessions should be phased out over 
ten years. In the transition period, the value of the caps 
would gradually be reduced. Reportable fringe benefits for 
affected employees (that is, those benefits that are easily 
valued and attributed) would be exempt from tax up to 
the relevant cap, and taxed at the employee’s marginal 
tax rate above the cap. The market value of these 
benefits would be taken into account for transfer payment 
purposes. Non-reportable fringe benefits would be taxable 
for NFP employers.
 > The FBT concessions should be replaced with direct 
government funding, to be administered by relevant 
Australian government portfolio agencies or the charities 
commission. All NFP organisations eligible for tax 
concessions should be able to apply to the relevant body 
for funding for specific projects or for assistance with the 
costs of recruiting specialist staff.
Recommendation 44: Simple and efficient tax arrangements 
should be established for clubs with large trading activities in 
the fields of gaming, catering, entertainment and hospitality. 
One option is to apply a concessional rate of tax to total net 
income from these activities above a high threshold. For clubs 
below the threshold, no tax would be applied to income from 
these activities.
C—Land and resource taxes
C1—Charging for non-renewable resources
Recommendation 45: The current resource charging 
arrangements imposed on non-renewable resources by the 
Australian and State governments should be replaced by a 
uniform resource rent tax imposed and administered by the 
Australian government that:
 > is levied at a rate of 40 per cent, with that rate adjusted to 
offset any future change in the company income tax rate 
from 25 per cent, to achieve a combined statutory tax rate 
of 55 per cent;
 > applies to non-renewable resource (oil, gas and minerals) 
projects, except for lower value minerals for which it 
can be expected to generate no net benefits. Excepted 
minerals could continue to be subject to existing 
arrangements if appropriate;
 > measures rents as net income less an allowance for 
corporate capital, with the allowance rate set at the 
long-term Australian government bond rate;
 > requires a rent calculation for projects;
 > allows losses to be carried forward with interest or 
transferred to other commonly owned projects, with the 
tax value of residual losses refunded when a project is 
closed; and
 > is allowed as a deductible expense in the calculation 
of income tax, with loss refunds treated as assessable 
income.
Recommendation 46: The resource rent tax should not 
provide concessions to encourage exploration or production 
activity at a faster rate than the commercial rate or in particular 
geographical areas, and should not allow deductions above 
acquisition costs to stimulate investment.
Recommendation 47: Existing projects should be transferred 
into the proposed system with an adjustment, as appropriate, 
to the starting base for the allowance for corporate capital. The 
Australian government should set out a time-frame to implement 
the resource rent tax and provide guidance at the time of 
announcement on how existing investments and investment in 
the interim will be treated under the resource rent tax.
Recommendation 48: The Australian and State governments 
should negotiate an appropriate allocation of the revenues and 
risks from the resource rent tax.
Recommendation 49: The Australian and State governments 
should consider using a cash bidding system to allocate 
exploration permits. For small exploration areas, where there 
are unlikely to be net benefits from a cash bidding system, a 
first-come first-served system could be used.
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Recommendation 50: The Australian and State governments 
should abolish fees and stamp duties on the transfer of 
interests in a resource project except those related to 
administrative costs.
C2—Land tax and conveyance stamp duty
Recommendation 51: Ideally, there would be no role for 
any stamp duties, including conveyancing stamp duties, in a 
modern Australian tax system. Recognising the revenue needs 
of the States, the removal of stamp duty should be achieved 
through a switch to more efficient taxes, such as those levied 
on broad consumption or land bases. Increasing land tax at the 
same time as reducing stamp duty has the additional benefit of 
some offsetting impacts on asset prices.
Recommendation 52: Given the efficiency benefits of a broad 
land tax, it should be levied on as broad a base as possible. In 
order to tax more valuable land at higher rates, consideration 
should be given to levying land tax using an increasing marginal 
rate schedule, with the lowest rate being zero, with thresholds 
determined by the per-square-metre value.
Recommendation 53: In the long run, the land tax base 
should be broadened to eventually include all land. If this 
occurs, low-value land, such as most agricultural land, would 
not face a land tax liability where its value per square metre is 
below the lowest rate threshold.
Recommendation 54: There are a number of incremental 
reforms that could potentially improve the operation of land tax, 
including:
 > ensuring that land tax applies per land holding, not on an 
entity’s total holding, in order to promote investment in 
land development;
 > eliminating stamp duties on commercial and industrial 
properties in return for a broad land tax on those 
properties; and
 > investigating various transitional arrangements necessary 
to achieve a broader land tax.
D—Taxing consumption
Recommendation 55: Over time, a broad-based cash flow 
tax—applied on a destination basis—could be used to finance 
the abolition of other taxes, including payroll tax and inefficient 
State consumption taxes, such as insurance taxes. Such a tax 
would also provide a sustainable revenue base to finance future 
spending needs.
D1—A cash flow tax
No recommendations in this section.
D2—The goods and services tax
Recommendation 56: The Government should consider 
making greater use of GST-free business-to-business 
transactions or reverse charging, provided the potential 
compliance cost savings outweigh the additional complexity 
costs and risks to revenue.
D3—Payroll tax
Recommendation 57: State payroll taxes should eventually be 
replaced with revenue from more efficient broad-based taxes 
that capture the value-add of labour.
D4—Taxing financial services
No recommendations in this section.
E—Enhancing social and market outcomes
E1—User charging
No recommendations in this section.
E2—Taxes to improve the environment
Recommendation 58: Once the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) is operational, additional measures which seek 
to reduce emissions (in sectors covered by the CPRS), and 
which are not justified on other grounds, should be phased out.
Recommendation 59: The industry assistance arrangements 
introduced in consequence of the CPRS should be regarded 
as transitional. The Government’s policy is to commission 
an independent review of the CPRS, including in relation to 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITEs) assistance, every 
five years starting in 2014. To complement this, the Productivity 
Commission should be asked to undertake and publish an 
annual review of CPRS-related assistance arrangements for 
the life of the CPRS to provide a basis for future decisions 
on assistance policy. To assist the Productivity Commission, 
an Associate Commissioner with appropriate knowledge and 
industry expertise should be appointed to the review.
Recommendation 60: The government should continue to 
monitor tax concessions aimed at supporting environmental 
outcomes, and consider replacing them with targeted spending 
programs where this would be a more effective and efficient 
method of achieving the appropriate environmental outcome.
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E3—Road transport taxes
Recommendation 61: Governments should analyse the 
potential network-wide benefits and costs of introducing 
variable congestion pricing on existing tolled roads (or lanes), 
and consider extending existing technology across heavily 
congested parts of the road network. Beyond that, new 
technologies may further enable wider application of road 
pricing if proven cost-effective. In general, congestion charges 
should apply to all registered vehicles using congested roads. 
The use of revenues should be transparent to the community 
and subject to further institutional reform.
Recommendation 62: The Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) should accelerate the development of 
mass-distance-location pricing for heavy vehicles, to ensure 
that heavy vehicles pay for their specific marginal road-wear 
costs. Revenue from road-wear charges should be allocated 
to the owner of the affected road, which should be maintained 
in accordance with an asset management plan. Differentiated 
compliance regimes to enforce this pricing policy may need 
to be considered to balance efficiency benefits from pricing 
against the costs of administration and compliance for some 
road users.
Recommendation 63: States should improve compulsory third 
party insurance to better reflect individual risks.
Recommendation 64: On routes where road freight is in 
direct competition with rail that is required to recover its capital 
costs, heavy vehicles should face an additional charge on a 
comparable basis, where this improves the efficient allocation of 
freight between transport modes.
Recommendation 65: Revenue from fuel tax imposed for 
general government purposes should be replaced over time 
with revenue from more efficient broad-based taxes. If a 
decision were made to recover costs of roads from road users 
through fuel tax, it should be linked to the cost of efficiently 
financing the road network, less costs that can be charged 
directly to road users or collected through a network access 
charge. Fuel tax should apply to all fuels used in road transport 
on the basis of energy content, and be indexed to the CPI. 
Heavy vehicles should be exempt from fuel tax and the network 
access component of registration fees if full replacement 
charges are introduced.
Recommendation 66: The revenue-raising component of 
State taxes on motor vehicle ownership and use should be 
made explicit, and over time only be used to recover those 
costs related to road provision. The administrative costs of 
providing government services should be recovered through 
user charges where applicable. Quantity limits on taxi licences 
should be phased out.
Recommendation 67: Governments should continue to 
reform road infrastructure provision, applying economic 
assessment to investments comparable to that for other forms 
of infrastructure.
Recommendation 68: COAG should develop a National 
Road Transport Agreement to establish objectives, outcomes, 
outputs and incentives to guide governments in the use and 
supply of road infrastructure. COAG should nominate a single 
institution to lead road tax reform, and ensure implementation 
of this agreement.
E4—Housing affordability
Recommendation 69: COAG should place priority on a review 
of institutional arrangements (including administration) to ensure 
zoning and planning do not unnecessarily inhibit housing supply 
and housing affordability.
Recommendation 70: COAG should review infrastructure 
charges (sometimes called developer charges) to ensure 
they appropriately price infrastructure provided in housing 
developments. In particular, the review should establish 
practical means to ensure that these changes are set 
appropriately to reflect the avoidable costs of development, 
necessary steps to improve the transparency of charging and 
any consequential reductions in regulations.
E5—Alcohol taxation
Recommendation 71: All alcoholic beverages should be taxed 
on a volumetric basis, which, over time, should converge to 
a single rate, with a low-alcohol threshold introduced for all 
products. The rate of alcohol tax should be based on evidence 
of the net marginal spillover cost of alcohol.
Recommendation 72: The introduction of a common alcohol 
tax should be accompanied by a review of the administration 
of alcohol tax, to ensure that alcohol taxpayers do not face 
redundant compliance obligations.
E6—Tobacco taxation
Recommendation 73: The existing regime for tobacco 
taxation in Australia should be retained, with the rates of tax 
substantially increased, depending on further evidence on the 
costs of harm from tobacco smoking.
Recommendation 74: Tobacco excise should be indexed to a 
broad measure of wages rather than CPI.
Recommendation 75: There should be no duty free allowance 
on tobacco for international travellers entering Australia.
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E7—Gambling taxation
Recommendation 76: Gambling taxes should be reviewed 
to ensure that they are focused on recouping economic rent 
generated by government restrictions on the supply of gambling 
services or are being used efficiently to impose such restrictions.
Recommendation 77: Governments should eliminate gambling 
tax concessions for particular types of gambling business, such 
as clubs. If governments wish to subsidise particular types of 
businesses, they should do so through direct expenditures.
Recommendation 78: Governments should consider the 
allocation of responsibilities for the regulation and taxation of 
gambling, with a view to minimising conflicts in policy-making 
between revenue-raising and addressing problem gambling.
E8—Rationalising other taxes
Recommendation 79: All specific taxes on insurance 
products, including the fire services levy, should be abolished. 
Insurance products should be treated like most other services 
consumed within Australia and be subject to only one 
broad-based tax on consumption.
Recommendation 80: The luxury car tax should be abolished.
Recommendation 81: Governments should undertake a 
systematic review of existing and potential user charges and 
minor taxes against the principles set out in this report. This 
should be coordinated with the introduction of the system 
wide Tax and Transfer Analysis Statement proposed in 
Recommendation 132.
F—The transfer system
F1—Income support payments
Recommendation 82: There should be three categories of 
income support payments:
 > A pension category for people who are not expected to 
support themselves through paid work, whether because 
of their age, disability or because they are providing 
full-time care for a person with disability (or frail aged). 
This pension would be paid at a rate that provides a basic 
acceptable standard of living, having regard to prevailing 
community standards.
 > A participation category for people of working age 
who are expected to support themselves through paid 
work now or in the near future. This would cover the 
unemployed including youth (both under and over 18), 
those who are temporarily incapacitated, people with a 
partial capacity to work and primary carers of dependent 
children. The rate of payment, for those who are expected 
to work, should provide a basic level of adequacy while 
maintaining incentives to work. This would be less than 
the pension rate. Parents on income support would 
receive a higher total level of payment. Unemployed youth 
aged less than 21 would be paid no more than full-time 
students to avoid creating incentives to leave full-time 
study for unemployment.1
 > A student assistance category for people engaged in 
full-time study. Students aged 21 and over would continue 
to be paid at a lower rate than the unemployed and at the 
same rate as younger students in similar circumstances. 
Some students have the capacity to work part-time to 
supplement their income support. Other students could 
be given the ability to borrow against future income to 
supplement their student assistance.2
Recommendation 83: There should be a more consistent 
approach to payment relativities within each of the three 
categories of payment based on the single to couple pension 
relativity. A more consistent approach would mean an increase 
to base rates for single income support recipients in the 
participation and student assistance categories. However, a 
lower relativity for singles in these categories without children 
may be warranted given their greater capacity to share 
accommodation.
Recommendation 84: Payments and income test parameters 
should be indexed in a consistent way to maintain relativities 
across the three payment categories and to reflect changes in 
community standards. Governments should regularly review 
indexation as community standards are likely to be affected by 
significant changes in the composition of the workforce and 
household incomes in coming decades. The current community 
standard for pensions is set by reference to Male Total Average 
Weekly Earnings. Indexing all payments to this standard has 
been projected to involve a significant increase in budgetary 
outlays over the coming decades so it will be necessary for 
governments to regularly review the appropriateness of this 
measure and the level of the benchmark.
1 Rates of payment for participation category customers aged less 
than 21 are discussed in Section F3 Family and youth assistance.
2 Rates of payment for student assistance category customers aged 
less than 22 are discussed in F3 Family and youth assistance.
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Recommendation 85: Income support arrangements for 
parents should support and encourage participation in work 
while maintaining adequate levels of assistance to families. As 
a condition of payment parents should be required to look for 
part-time work once their youngest child turns four. Parents 
would receive supplements as follows:
 > For couples and single parents with a youngest child 
under six years, the amount of the supplement should 
be set such that the total support for single parents on 
income support will be equivalent to the maximum rate 
of pension. The supplement would be paid through the 
family payment system.
 > For single parents with a youngest child aged six or older, 
the supplement should be paid at a substantially lower 
rate through the family payment system.
 > For couples with a youngest child aged six years or older, 
the lower rate supplement should be paid through the 
income support system.
Recommendation 86: People with disability who have a partial 
capacity to work, excluding people receiving Disability Support 
Pension (DSP), should have a part-time work requirement. They 
should be subject to a means test or payment arrangements 
that provide an incentive to work part-time and that recognises 
that they face higher average costs of work. This could also 
be achieved by an in-work supplement and/or an earnings 
disregard in the means test.
Recommendation 87: Students should have access to an 
income test that facilitates significant part-time work at a level 
that does not compromise educational outcomes. Adults 
requiring additional income should be able to borrow to top 
up their student rate of income support to the level of the 
participation payment rate. The feasibility of using the existing 
income-contingent loans scheme and the potential impact 
of it on access to higher education of students from a low 
socioeconomic background should be examined.
F2—Means testing
Recommendation 88: The current income and asset tests 
for income support payments should be replaced with a 
comprehensive means test based on a combined measure of 
employment income, business income and deemed income on 
assets. The comprehensive means test would:
 > extend deemed income on assets in addition to financial 
assets, including superannuation income streams, rental 
housing and other asset classes (whether income-
producing or not). Superannuation income streams 
where deeming income would be difficult to apply would 
be tested on gross income but with an actuarially fair 
deduction for capital;
 > have low and high deeming rates based on the returns 
expected from a portfolio of assets held by a prudent 
investor. These rates should be set by reference to an 
appropriate benchmark;
 > continue the means test exemption for owner-occupied 
housing up to a high indexed threshold;
 > set a high capped exemption for personal-use assets;
 > retain the current concessional treatment of employment 
income for certain allowances and pensions;
 > have different free areas for pensions and allowances; and
 > remove the liquid assets waiting period and the 
sudden-death cut-out that applies to people on certain 
payments.
Recommendation 89: Means testing for family assistance 
payments should be based on the same measure of taxable 
income as for income tax, including fringe benefits. However, 
payments should not be reduced as a result of the inclusion of 
compulsory superannuation contributions in taxable income. 
Consideration should be given to aligning the definitions of 
income and periods of assessment for family assistance 
payments more closely to those that apply to income support 
payments. However, this should not include deeming income 
on assets.
F3—Family and youth assistance
Recommendation 90: Current family payments, including 
Family Tax Benefit Parts A and B, should be replaced by a 
single family payment. The new family payment should:
 > cover the direct costs of children in a low-income family 
(that is, the costs associated with food, clothing, housing, 
education expenses); and
 > assist parents nurturing young children to balance work 
and family responsibilities.
Recommendation 91: The direct cost of children component 
of family assistance should be a per child payment.
 > Rates of payment should increase with the age of the 
children to recognise the higher costs of older children. 
Three rates of payment should apply: for 0–11 year 
olds; 12–15 year olds and 16–18 year olds while in 
secondary school. These age bands would appropriately 
accommodate the increasing costs of children (this 
would require higher payments rates for 12, 16 and 17 
year olds). The Baby Bonus should be abolished and a 
small supplementary payment, reflecting the direct costs 
of a new-born baby, should be paid over the first three 
months.
 >  A shared-care rate to recognise the higher costs of 
separated families should be considered, taking into 
account interactions with child support as well as other 
income support payments.
 > Additional payments for larger families, including the Large 
Family Supplement, the Multiple Birth Allowance for children 
over one year, and higher thresholds for larger families 
should be reconsidered as the case for these payments is 
not strong.
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Recommendation 92: A supplement for parents nurturing 
young children (aged under six years) should be provided as a 
per-family payment, means tested on family income in addition 
to the recently announced Paid Parental Leave arrangements.
 > The maximum rate of the supplement should be set such 
that the total support for single parents wholly reliant on 
income support is equivalent to the maximum rate of 
pension.
Recommendation 93: For single parents with children 
aged six or older, a parental supplement (which should be 
considerably smaller than under Recommendation 92), should 
be paid through the family payment system.
Recommendation 94: For couples with children aged six 
or older, a parental supplement at the same rate as for single 
parents should be paid through the income support system 
(See Part Two Section A1 Personal income tax).
Recommendation 95: Assistance for families should also 
recognise that there are specific circumstances, such as 
parents caring for disabled children and foster care children 
with higher needs, for which additional support beyond the 
early years is appropriate.
Recommendation 96: The total amount of family assistance 
should be withdrawn with a single means test to avoid 
cumulative withdrawal rates which create unnecessarily high 
disincentives for working. A single low withdrawal rate of 
15–20 per cent would be appropriate to minimise workforce 
disincentives.
Recommendation 97: While family payments should be the 
main form of assistance for families with children up to the end 
of secondary school, or the school year in which they turn 18 
(the earlier of the two), youth payments should be available to 
older children in some circumstances.
 > Dependent older children for whom a suitable pathway 
may be leaving school and looking for work or combining 
part-time work and part-time study should have access 
to a youth payment, governed by strict participation 
requirements.
 > Children without access to financial support from their 
families should continue to have access to a youth 
payment, governed by strict criteria.
Recommendation 98: Youth payments should be the main 
form of income support from the age of 18 until the age of 
independence.
 > Family payments should not be provided for those aged 
18 and over unless they are completing secondary school 
in the year they turn 18.
 > Youth payment rates should reflect the fact that most 
young people have lower needs than adults but need 
adequate assistance to participate in education and 
training.
 > Dependent youth payment recipients should be subject 
to a parental income test consistent with that applying to 
family payments. Family means tests should be designed 
so that families with dependent children in both the 
family payments and youth payments system are not 
disadvantaged.
 > The age of independence should be aligned for full-time 
students and non full-time students.
F4—Child care assistance
Recommendation 99: Child Care Benefit and Child Care 
Rebate should be combined into a single payment to parents 
(or to child care centres) in respect of each child based on a 
percentage of child care costs. The payment should have the 
following features:
 > a high rate of subsidy for low-income families that covers 
most of the costs of child care (up to 90 per cent). This 
would involve a small co-payment for low-income families;
 > a base rate of assistance for all families that use child 
care to facilitate parental engagement in the workforce. 
The base rate of assistance should be set as a proportion 
of child care costs, with reference to the marginal tax 
rate faced by the majority of taxpayers. (Based on the 
indicative personal income tax rates scale in Part Two 
Section A1, this would indicate a rate of assistance of 35 
per cent);
 > access to the base rate of assistance subject to a 
requirement that parents participate in work, education 
or training. Where parents are not participating, the 
maximum rate of assistance should be available for a 
limited number of hours. The number of hours subsidised 
without a participation requirement should be the same as 
the number of hours of universal access to pre-school (15 
hours by 2013); and
 > coverage of the full costs of child care for at-risk children 
and children facing multiple disadvantages, without 
participation requirements on parents.
Recommendation 100: The child care payment should be 
means tested down to the base rate of assistance based on 
family income and should have regard to the interaction with 
other means tested payments (income support and family 
payments) and marginal tax rates, to ensure that effective 
marginal rates of tax are not excessive.
Recommendation 101: The fringe benefits tax exemption 
for child care facilities provided on an employer’s business 
premises for the benefit of employees should be removed.
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F5—Housing assistance
Recommendation 102: The maximum rate of Rent 
Assistance should be increased to assist renters to afford an 
adequate standard of dwelling. To ensure that Rent Assistance 
can be maintained at an adequate level over time, the rent 
maximum should be indexed by movements in national rents, 
which could be measured by an index of rents paid by income 
support recipients.
Recommendation 103: To better target an increase in the 
maximum rate, Rent Assistance should be part of the income 
support system, with eligibility based on rent paid and the 
income support means test, rather than on eligibility for another 
payment (for example, Family Assistance).
Recommendation 104: Mechanisms should be developed to 
extend Rent Assistance equitably to public housing tenants along 
with removing income-linked rent setting in public housing.
Recommendation 105: A high-need housing payment should 
be paid to social housing providers for their tenants who have 
high or special housing needs or who may face discrimination 
in the private market. This payment should be funded by the 
Australian government. The Commonwealth and the States 
should retain the option of providing capital for social housing 
construction.
Recommendation 106: Income-linked rents should be phased 
out in social housing, with providers charging their tenants rents 
linked to the market rate, with existing rent-setting for current 
tenants phased out using grandfathering or other transitional 
arrangements. However, continued use of income-limited 
rents is appropriate in some circumstances, such as in remote 
Indigenous communities.
F6—Transfers tied to goods and services
Recommendation 107: The Productivity Commission, 
constituted to include an appropriately qualified and 
experienced member, should review concessions across 
all levels of government and provide recommendations for 
consideration by COAG.
Recommendation 108: The Productivity Commission 
should examine the principles of public service delivery 
and the mechanisms that are available to governments to 
deliver public services and their implications for financial 
arrangements in the federation. The findings of this study 
should be considered by COAG.
F7—Funding aged care
Recommendation 109: There is considerable scope to align 
aged care assistance with the principles of user-directed 
funding to provide assistance in line with recipients’ needs, 
enable their choice of care and support the fiscal sustainability 
of the aged care sector. However, effective user-directed 
funding is significantly limited by regulations that govern supply 
and price, reforms to which would have complex sequencing 
and transition issues. As such, the Productivity Commission 
should consider this potential reform direction in its upcoming 
inquiry into aged care.
Recommendation 110: It is important for governments to 
determine what an adequate level of aged care should be, the 
necessary pricing and regulatory arrangements to deliver it, and 
the most sustainable funding arrangement to ensure access 
by those who cannot afford it. Given this, and noting that the 
Productivity Commission will be inquiring into the disability 
insurance scheme, its consideration of aged care should 
include the potential for insurance to play a role in helping to 
fund aged care as Australia’s population ages.
G—Institutions, governance and 
administration
G1—A responsive and accountable tax 
system
Recommendation 111: The government should establish 
a more transparent means of dealing with community ideas 
about the tax system by extending the Tax Issues Entry System 
website and further developing its use.
Recommendation 112: The government should commit 
to a principles-based approach to tax law design as a way 
of addressing the growing volume and complexity of tax 
legislation, and as a way of helping those laws to be interpreted 
consistently with their policy objectives.
Recommendation 113: The Board of Taxation should be 
empowered to initiate its own reviews of how current tax policies 
and laws are operating, in consultation with the government. This 
would be in addition to reviewing matters referred to it by the 
government, though it should not engage in substantive policy 
development unless requested by the government.
In giving effect to these changes to the nature and functions 
of the Board, the government should ensure that the Board 
has adequate resources (including its own permanent 
secretariat). The government should also consider:
 > how to manage the increased workload for the Board, 
including whether the Board would require further 
members and/or members who can devote more time to 
the Board;
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 > whether the Secretary to the Treasury, the Commissioner 
of Taxation, and the First Parliamentary Counsel should 
be appointed as advisers to the Board, rather than as 
members; and
 > whether the Inspector-General of Taxation, the Auditor-
General, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Chair 
of the Tax Practitioners Board should be appointed as 
advisers to the Board of Taxation.
Recommendation 114: Information or advice provided by 
Treasury to assist the ATO in determining the purpose or object 
of the law, or materials used by the ATO to determine policy 
intent (other than correspondence with or from government) 
should be made public.
Recommendation 115: A board should be established 
to advise the Commissioner of Taxation on the general 
organisation and management of the ATO. The board would 
not be a decision-making body and would have no role in 
interpreting the tax laws or examining individual taxpayer 
issues. The government would appoint members to the board.
Recommendation 116: The government should clarify that the 
role of the Inspector-General of Taxation is to examine systemic 
tax administration issues that affect businesses.
Recommendation 117: The government should ensure 
that sufficient resources are devoted to the functions of the 
Inspector-General of Taxation, the Australian National Audit 
Office and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, recognising their 
importance in maintaining a fair and efficient tax system.
Recommendation 118: The Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts and Audit should examine reports of the Inspector-
General of Taxation and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and 
monitor the ATO’s implementation of the recommendations in 
those reports.
G2—State tax reform
Recommendation 119: Reforms to State taxes should be 
coordinated through intergovernmental agreements between 
the Australian government and the States to provide the States 
with revenue stability and to facilitate good policy outcomes.
G3—Local government
Recommendation 120: States should allow local governments 
a substantial degree of autonomy to set the tax rate applicable 
to property within their municipality.
Recommendation 121: Over time, State land tax and local 
government rates should be more integrated. This could 
involve:
 > moving to a joint billing arrangement so that taxpayers 
receive a single assessment, but are able to identify the 
separate State and local component; and
 > using the same valuation method to calculate the base 
for local government rates and land tax (with this method 
being consistent across the State).
G4—Client experience of the tax and 
transfer system
Recommendation 122: A tax and transfer client account 
should be developed, based on customer research and with 
customer input into its design. The account should include at 
least the following features:
 > Up-to-date presentation of income earned from all 
sources, taxes withheld, tax liabilities incurred, transfers 
received and information flows from third parties;
 > complete information from past periods;
 > an optional single point for updating personal information, 
undertaking transactions, and reporting information or 
making applications, with extensive pre-filling of forms 
based on information previously provided; and
 > the ability to test the impact of hypothetical changes in 
circumstances.
Recommendation 123: Pre-filled personal income tax returns 
should be provided to most personal taxpayers as a default 
method of settling their tax affairs each year.
Recommendation 124: Existing tax and transfer provisions 
should be reformed to support improvements in client 
experience, including greater alignment of income definitions 
and reporting, rationalising of personal tax deductions 
and offsets, and streamlining of mandatory administrative 
requirements. Future new policy proposals should be subject 
to comprehensive, published expected impact assessments on 
client experience systems and outcomes.
Recommendation 125: Where possible, information required 
for determining tax liabilities and transfer entitlements should be 
collected from third parties, including employers, government 
agencies, financial institutions, and share and property registries.
 > Over time, electronic provision of this information by third 
parties should be made mandatory.
 > To reduce current and minimise new compliance costs, 
reporting obligations should as far as possible be aligned 
with existing information concepts and systems of third 
parties, and facilitated through electronic interaction with 
information held in the ‘natural systems’ of those entities.
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Recommendation 126: Further approaches (extension to 
and approaches which build on Standard Business Reporting) 
should be pursued to reduce the compliance costs associated 
with business interactions with government.
Recommendation 127: The government should assist small 
businesses to be ’business ready‘ when they begin business. 
This could be achieved through education and financial 
assistance, which may include assistance to small business to 
get ready for Standard Business Reporting (SBR).
Recommendation 128: Common information standards, 
leveraging from the standards and governance put in place 
by the SBR Program, be developed and adopted to support 
system interoperability between tax and transfer agencies, and 
between those agencies and third parties, such as employers.
Recommendation 129: A modern privacy and secrecy 
framework be developed and adopted that maintains and 
streamlines protection of personal information held by 
government agencies, and facilitates exchange of information 
(other than an individual’s health information) between 
agencies to support improved client experience of the tax and 
transfer system.
Recommendation 130: A method of linking records, for 
example by linking existing client identifiers, be developed to 
facilitate development of a single client account for tax and 
transfer financial information. This would allow better service 
delivery by supporting interoperability and data exchange 
between the appropriate government agencies, and flows of tax 
and transfer information from third parties to those agencies. 
Information should not include individual health information.
Recommendation 131: A high level taskforce be established, 
under central agency leadership, to progress a whole of 
government approach to improving the client experience of the 
tax and transfer system, with:
 > membership from relevant agencies, the private sector 
and client representatives;
 > terms of reference requiring the taskforce to:
 > develop, consult, oversee and regularly report to 
government and Parliament on a whole-of-system 
reform of the administrative arrangements and 
technologies that deliver the client experience of the 
tax and transfer system;
 > position these reforms within the overall government 
initiative to improve the relationship between it and 
citizens; and
 > lead consultations with relevant stakeholders, including 
citizens, privacy advocacy groups, professional 
associations, financial institutions and employers.
 > a mechanism for capturing feedback from citizens on 
government service delivery, including both current 
administration and new proposals.
G5—Monitoring and reporting on the 
system
Recommendation 132: The government should, every five 
years, publish a Tax and Transfer Analysis Statement that 
analyses and reports on the overall performance and impact 
of the system, including estimates of efficiency costs and 
distributional impacts.
Recommendation 133: The Australian and the State 
governments should systematically collect data on aspects 
of existing taxes and transfers—including compliance cost 
data—according to consistent and transparent classifications 
and concepts, and make this information—including 
confidentialised tax unit records—freely available for further 
analysis and research.
Recommendation 134: The government should support one 
or more institutions to undertake independent policy research 
relevant to the Australian tax and transfer system.
Recommendation 135: The Australian government should 
ensure that the rules governing the development of the 
Budget encourage trade-offs between tax expenditures and 
spending programs. Budget decision-making processes should 
measure and treat tax expenditures and spending programs 
symmetrically, to ensure that there is no artificial incentive to 
deliver programs through one mechanism rather than another.
Recommendation 136: The government should introduce 
legislation to amend the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 
to recognise the publication of detailed information about tax 
expenditures in a Tax Expenditures Statement separate from 
the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). However, 
the Tax Expenditures Statement should continue to be released 
by the end of January in each year, or within six months of the 
last Budget, whichever is later.
Recommendation 137: The government should ensure 
that reporting standards are independently developed for the 
identification and measurement of tax expenditures in the Tax 
Expenditures Statement. In addition, the standards should 
establish a basis for reporting the broader economic and 
distributional effects of tax expenditures in the periodic Tax and 
Transfer Analysis Statement (see Recommendation 132).
Recommendation 138: The Council of Australian Governments 
should examine the ways in which the States could uniformly 
report tax expenditures annually according to the independent 
standards developed under Recommendation 137.
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